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 Several decades of research in the economics of education have shown that both 
the quality and quantity of school resources are important for student outcomes.  In this 
dissertation, I present two essays that address changes in both the quality and quantity of 
resources available to public schools over the past four decades (1960 – 2000).   
First, in chapter two I examine how the propensity for high test-scoring females to 
enter the teaching profession has changed over a forty-year period of occupational 
desegregation.  While it has long been presumed that improved labor market 
opportunities for women have adversely affected the quality of teachers (over three 
quarters of whom are female), there is surprisingly little evidence measuring the extent to 
which this is true.  In this essay, I combine data from five longitudinal surveys of high 
school graduates spanning the years 1957 to 2000 to evaluate this claim.  I find that while 
 
the test score ranking of the average new female teacher has fallen only slightly over this 
period, the likelihood that a female in the top decile of her high school class entered 
teaching has plummeted. 
 Next, in chapter three I examine the impact of rising within school district 
population heterogeneity and income inequality on local per-pupil expenditure and public 
school participation rates.  Like the nation at large, the populations of school districts in 
the United States have become significantly more diverse, in (among other dimensions) 
racial and ethnic background, schooling, and income.  Using a merged panel of school 
district demographics and financial data for 8,700 unified school districts over the 1970 
to 2000 period, I look at the effects of this rising heterogeneity on the support for local 
public schools.  I find that rising within-district income inequality is associated with 
greater per-pupil expenditure, a result consistent with a median voter model in which a 
lower tax price to the median voter results in greater per-pupil spending.  Greater 
fractionalization in race and educational attainment appears to reduce per-pupil 
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There are few publicly provided goods that command quite the same level of 
resources—and attention—as education.  Expenditure on public education in the 
United States (at the primary and secondary level) accounted for roughly 4 percent of 
U.S. GDP and 21 percent of state and local government expenditure in 1999, 
according to the Digest of Education Statistics (2003) and the Statistical Abstract of 
the United States (2003).  This level of commitment is not surprising—after all, the 
educational system is viewed not only as a path to individual self-sufficiency and 
social mobility, but also as an engine of economic growth, innovation, and 
competitiveness, a means of promoting civic and democratic values, and an important 
channel for reducing long-run inequalities in the population.1 
At the same time, there are few goods as elusive as education.  Despite nearly 
universal agreement over the importance of education in the United States, the nature 
of its production remains weakly understood.  Since the seminal Coleman (1966) 
report, economists and other social scientists have sought to quantify the relationship 
between educational outputs and purchased inputs through the estimation of education 
                                                 
1 Hoxby (2003) argues that the average poor child in the United States will receive 
much more in transfers through the education system over the course of her life (i.e. 
via federal and state redistribution) than she will through direct transfers (i.e. welfare 
payments).  
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production functions.  This has not been a straightforward task—given its many roles, 
there has been little agreement over what the “output” of the educational process is, 
much less how it should be measured.  Complicating matters further is the recognition 
that many inputs into the production of education—such as community and peer 
composition, family income, and parental involvement—are largely unobservable or 
otherwise outside of schools districts’ control. 
Research in the decades immediately following Coleman tended to focus on 
the relationship between the quantity of school resources, broadly defined, and student 
outcomes—i.e. the question of whether “money matters” in the production of 
education.2  The short answer to this question appeared to be a resounding “no”—that 
is, the level of school expenditure per pupil alone seems to have little, if any, causal 
relationship with student test scores, graduation rates, labor market outcomes, or any 
other relevant measure of student performance. 
Since that time, research into the production of education has shifted away 
from broader measures of school inputs (such as dollars) and toward the specific 
types, uses, or quality of inputs used in the education process.  Clearly, an additional 
dollar of per-pupil expenditure can be put to countless uses—to reduce class sizes, to 
reduce class sizes for certain students, to recruit more talented teachers, to promote 
parental involvement, or to update technology or infrastructure (just to name a few 
examples), all of which may have varying effects on school performance.  In 
identifying those inputs or applications of inputs that do in fact affect student 
outcomes, this literature has demonstrated that the relevant question for policymakers 
                                                 
2 See Hanushek (1986, 1996) for a summary of this literature.   
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concerned about the performance of schools is not whether money matters, but where 
it matters most.  While money is almost certainly not a sufficient condition for 
improved student outcomes, it is probably a necessary one.  In my assessment of the 
modern education production function literature, money seems to matter, if spent 
correctly. 
In this dissertation, I present two essays that address changes in both the 
quality and quantity of resources available to public schools over the past four 
decades.  Specifically, in the first essay (chapter two) I investigate how changing labor 
market opportunities for women have affected the quality of graduates who have 
chosen to enter the teaching profession.  While it has long been presumed that gender 
desegregation of the professions has adversely affected the quality of teachers (over 
three quarters of whom are female), there is surprisingly little evidence measuring the 
extent to which this is true.  In this essay, I combine data from five longitudinal 
surveys of high school graduates spanning the years 1957 to 2000 to evaluate this 
claim.  I find that while the relative test score ranking of the average new female 
teacher has fallen only modestly over this period, the likelihood that a female in the 
top decile of her high school class enters the teaching profession has plummeted. 
In the second essay (chapter three), I examine how rising population 
heterogeneity and income inequality within school districts has affected the level of 
per-pupil expenditure and the fraction of school aged children enrolled in private 
schools.  Like the nation at large, the populations of school districts in the United 
States have become significantly more diverse over the past several decades, in 
(among other dimensions) racial and ethnic background, schooling, and income.  
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Using a merged panel of school district demographics and financial data for 8,700 
unified school districts over the 1970 to 2000 period, I look at the effects of this rising 
heterogeneity on the support for local public schools.  I find that rising within-district 
income inequality is associated with greater per-pupil expenditure, a result consistent 
with a median voter model in which a lower tax price to the median voter results in 
greater per-pupil spending.  Greater fractionalization in race and educational 
attainment appears to reduce per-pupil expenditure and increase enrollment in private 
schools. 
 These essays contribute to the existing literature in a number of ways.  Recent 
empirical research has suggested that among purchased school inputs, teacher 
quality—particularly when measured with indicators of verbal and mathematical 
ability—is one of the few that have been consistently shown to have a positive and 
statistically significant relationship with student outcomes.3  A related body of 
literature shows that college graduates entering the teaching profession in the 1970s 
and 1980s did not compare favorably with those choosing other professions.4  There is 
little evidence, however, on how the verbal and mathematical abilities of those 
candidates who enter teaching have changed over a more extended period of labor 
market desegregation.  This deficiency has largely been due to a lack of data—there 
are no datasets currently available that (a) collect data both before and after the great 
transformation of the labor market that began in the early 1960s, (b) contain measures 
                                                 
3 See Wayne and Youngs (2003), Goldhaber (2002), or Rice (2003) for a survey of 
this research. 
4 See Manski (1985) and Hanushek and Pace (1995), for examples. 
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that can be considered reliable measures of teacher “quality,” and (c) identify actual 
teachers and non-teachers with a relatively high degree of certainty.  In chapter two of 
this dissertation, I address this problem by combining five different longitudinal 
surveys—two of which date prior to 1965—which track five cohorts of high school 
graduates through college and into the workforce (these datasets are described in detail 
in Appendix A).  Each of these surveys contain measures of math and verbal ability, 
which allow me to place teachers and non-teachers in the skill distribution of their 
high school cohort (a population whose composition has remained relatively constant 
over the past forty years, particularly when compared with the population of college 
graduates).  I am then able to assess how the propensity for women with high test 
score rankings—those individuals which research suggests would make the most 
effective teachers—to enter the teaching profession has changed across the five 
cohorts. 
 The second essay of this dissertation contributes to several strands of literature.  
First, a number of theoretical papers (Fernandez and Rogerson (1996) and Epple and 
Romano (1996) among them) have suggested that rising income inequality may be 
harmful to school spending.  They characterize this problem as “the ends against the 
middle,” where high-income households oppose spending on public schools because 
of their high demand for private schooling, and low-income households oppose 
spending because of their desire for lower taxes.  Given these results, one might 
suspect that the persistent rise in income inequality observed over the 1970 to 2000 
period has had a negative impact on the level of resources devoted to public education.  
By merging demographic data at the school district level from the 1970, 1980, 1990 
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and 2000 U.S. Census with financial data from the Census of Governments, I am able 
to observe how rising income inequality within school districts has been associated 
with per-pupil spending in practice.  This necessitates the computation of within-
district measures of income inequality for all school districts in all four census years, 
which we accomplish by using a novel maximum likelihood procedure to fit a 
distribution to grouped Census income data in each district (a methodology described 
in Appendix B).   This chapter also contributes to a broader empirical literature that 
has looked at the relationship between population heterogeneity and public finance in 
general.  This literature has typically found that greater heterogeneity is associated 
with reduced support for public programs.5  While my results show that greater 
fractionalization in race and schooling within school districts correspond with lower 
per-pupil spending and higher rates of private school enrollment tend to support these 
findings, I find that rising heterogeneity in income may actually increase spending on 
public education.  This may arise when greater heterogeneity in income represents a 
decrease in the tax price to the median voter.  
 This dissertation is organized as follows.  In chapter two I begin with a 
description of changes in the labor market since 1960, and a discussion of some of the 
ways in which these changes may have affected the quality of incoming teachers 
(Section 2.2).  The potential consequences of falling teacher quality are then 
considered through a review of the existing literature on the relationship between 
measured teacher characteristics and student performance (Section 2.3).  After 
                                                 
5 For example, Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) find that greater ethnic 
fractionalization within U.S. cities and counties is associated with lower spending on 
public infrastructure. 
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describing our methodology and data (Section 2.4), I present the results of a series of 
econometric estimates of the relationship between relative verbal and mathematical 
skills and entry into teaching across five cohorts of female high school graduates over 
the 1960 – 2000 period (Section 2.5).  Allowing for the possibility that changes in 
labor market desegregation may have affected the quality of new male teachers, I also 
take a brief look at five cohorts of male high school graduates over the same period 
(Section 2.6). 
 Chapter three begins with the argument that despite improved opportunities to 
migrate between jurisdictions, local communities have remained quite heterogeneous 
in practice, a claim supported by recent empirical work.  Given that perfect 
stratification of households across communities is rare, I explore some of the ways in 
which within-district population heterogeneity might affect support for public schools 
by presenting a simple median voter model of school spending.  The model is 
extended to allow for heterogeneity across several dimensions, including income 
(Section 3.2).  Our empirical strategy and data are described in Section 3.3.  Then, in 
Section 3.4, I present OLS estimates measuring the effect of rising within-district 
income inequality and race and schooling heterogeneity on local school revenues per 
pupil and rates of private schooling.  Allowing for the possibility that the local income 
distribution is endogenous to school spending, I also present instrumental variables 
estimates of the per-pupil revenues regressions, which I find are quite close to those 







CHANGING LABOR MARKET OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN AND THE 
QUALITY OF TEACHERS, 1957-2000 
 
“The quality of teachers has been declining for decades, and no one wants to talk 
about it… We need to find a more powerful means to attract the most promising 
candidates to the teaching profession.”  - Harold O. Levy, chancellor of the New York 






 Teacher shortages and concerns over the quality of the teaching force have 
become perennial issues in the United States.  With each passing year, school officials 
bemoan their inability to attract top candidates to teaching, and the debate over how 
best to attract and retain talented, better-qualified teachers seems to intensify.  One 
popular explanation for this mounting frustration points to the remarkable gender 
desegregation of the labor market since 1960.6  Schools that once found a captive 
labor pool in educated women are today forced to compete with more lucrative 
professions, with the best and brightest believed to be least likely to remain in 
teaching.  This conjecture has been the impetus behind many suggested policy 
measures—salary increases, or relaxed testing and course requirements, to name a 
                                                 
6 Temin (2002), for example, argues that our history of widening opportunities for 
women since 1960 has created conditions for the existence of multiple teacher pay-
quality equilibria, and that U.S. schools are currently stuck in a low pay-low teacher 
quality equilibrium.  Prior to 1960, he argues, multiple equilibria were not possible as 
women at all levels of ability were confined to a small number of occupations. 
 9
few—all intended to increase the attractiveness of teaching relative to other 
occupations. 
 Frustration over the quality of the teaching force comes amidst a growing body 
of evidence that shows that certain teacher characteristics—like their academic 
ability—are actually quite important for student achievement.7  This evidence is 
particularly remarkable given the current lack of agreement over the importance of 
other measured inputs into the production of education, such as per-pupil expenditure 
and class size.8  Recognizing the apparent importance of attracting quality teachers, 
the federal government in 2001 passed Title II of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act (ESEA)—a $2.9 billion program specifically targeted toward 
improving teacher quality.9 
 The hypothesis that gender desegregation of the professions has reduced the 
number of high-ability women choosing to teach is so frequently cited that it has 
virtually earned the status of common knowledge.  However, there is surprisingly little 
empirical evidence on the extent to which occupational desegregation has in fact 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Hanushek (1970, 1971), Ehrenberg and Brewer (1994, 1995), 
Ferguson and Ladd (1996), and Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2000).  Wayne and 
Youngs (2003) and Goldhaber (2002) review recent literature on the relationship 
between teacher characteristics and student achievement. 
8 Hanushek (1986, 1996) and Krueger (2002) provide contrasting views of this issue. 
9 In addition, local education agencies receiving money under Title I of ESEA must 
(beginning with the 2002-2003 school year) ensure that all teachers hired and 
supported using ESEA funds are “highly qualified,” a criteria based largely on 
educational attainment and subject matter knowledge (demonstrated through state-
administered tests—or, in the case of secondary teachers, through advanced 
certification or completion of an undergraduate or graduate degree in a specific subject 
matter). 
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affected teacher quality over time.  This lack of evidence was noted in the conclusion 
to a recent paper by Podgursky, Monroe, and Watson (2001), who state: 
Economists have hypothesized a secular decline in teacher quality as a 
consequence of rising non-teaching earnings and job opportunities for high 
ability women.  In this view, public schools benefited from the occupational 
crowding of women into teaching profession.  Unfortunately, time-series data 
on teacher quality are not available to directly test this hypothesis. 
 
In this chapter, we combine data from five longitudinal surveys of high school 
students spanning four decades (1957 to 2000), to see how the propensity for women 
with high verbal and mathematical skills (relative to their high school cohort) to teach 
has changed over time.  Inclusion of data prior to 1970 allows us the opportunity to 
provide evidence as to how this relationship between academic ability and entry into 
teaching has changed over a period of vast gender desegregation of occupations.10  
 Our results show that examination of the entire distribution of teacher quality 
and its changes over time tells a much richer story than one could tell from measures 
of central tendency alone.  While we detect only a modest decline in the average test 
score ranking of female entrants into the teaching profession over this period, the 
likelihood that a female near the top of the test score distribution—presumably the 
type of individual most likely to benefit from new opportunities in the labor market—
has plummeted.  We find that the probability a female from the top decile of her high 
                                                 
10 We will be studying changes in the reduced-form relationship between academic 
ability and entry into teaching without explicitly investigating the channels through 
which this relationship may have been shaped.  In other words, we will be observing 
the outcome of both demand and supply decisions in the market for teachers.  
Consequently, our results here should be interpreted as descriptive evidence on the 
academic ability of those individuals who actually identified themselves as teachers 
during this period.  In a recent paper, Bacolod (2003) relates changes in relative 
teacher salaries to changes in the quantity and quality of teachers over time. 
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school class enters teaching (by approximately age twenty-six) has fallen from 17 
percent in 1964 to under 5 percent in 1992, or just under 8 percent in 2000.  While the 
probability that a female with at least a high school diploma entered teaching fell over 
the entire distribution over this period (with a slight increase as enrollment rose in the 
1990s) the decline was much more pronounced at the top of the distribution.   
We organize this chapter as follows.  In Section 2.2, we begin with a 
discussion of changes in the labor market since 1960, and consider some of the ways 
in which these changes may have affected the quality of incoming teachers.  Section 
2.3 describes some of the existing research in the economics literature on teacher 
quality, discusses how other researchers have approached the rather nebulous measure 
of teacher “quality,” and explains how our approach will differ from that of previous 
research.  Section 2.4 describes our methodology and data.  Section 2.5 presents our 
results on changes in the ability composition of new female teachers over time, and the 
results of a simple econometric model relating the academic ability of females to entry 
into teaching.  We also take a brief look at the sample of male teachers in our data.  In 
Section 2.6, we make some concluding remarks and suggestions for future research. 
 
2.2 Background 
As is well known, women’s relationship with the labor market fundamentally 
changed during the forty-year period considered in this chapter.  Labor force 
participation among women aged 25-34 nearly doubled between 1964 and 1992; at the 
same time the fraction of women 25-34 with (four-year) college degrees tripled (see 
Table 2.1).  By comparison, the fraction of college educated young men increased by 
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only 50 percent over the same period.  These trends were likely aided in part by key 
legislative movements of the early 1960's and 70's that altered significantly the 
landscape of occupational opportunity for women.11 
Some occupations also became considerably less gender segregated over this 
period.12  Table 2.1 shows an index of gender representation in two professions—
medicine and law—calculated as the percent female in each occupation divided by the 
overall female share of the labor force, using data on men and women aged 25-34 in 
the March Current Population Survey (CPS), 1968-1996.  A value less than one 
indicates that women are underrepresented in the occupation (within this age range), 
relative to their representation in the labor force.13  In the late 1960’s this index ranged 
from 0.20 to 0.33 in medicine, and was virtually zero in law (0.08).   In less than thirty 
years, the value of this index for both occupations had nearly reached one (0.79 and 
0.94, respectively).   
 Despite striking shifts in the gender composition of professions such as 
medicine and law, the gender composition of new teachers has remained roughly 
constant.  Women continue to dominate the teaching profession, comprising roughly 
70 to 75 percent of teachers aged 25-34—a fraction virtually unchanged since 1964 
                                                 
11 The Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were 
among the most notable, replacing "protective labor laws" and explicitly outlawing 
employer discrimination on the basis of sex.  See Lloyd and Niemi (1979) for a 
discussion. 
12 This is well documented in Blau, Simpson, and Anderson (1998), Beller (1992), and 
elsewhere. 
13 This and other methods of measuring occupational segregation and concentration 
are discussed in Siltanen, et. al. (1995). 
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(Table 2.1).  The proportion is higher for elementary teachers (about 83 percent) than 
secondary teachers (50 percent), though the fraction has been steadily falling for 
elementary and rising for secondary teachers within this age range.   
While teaching remains a predominantly female occupation, the occupation 
itself has significantly diminished in importance as a career path for female college 
graduates.  Nowhere is this so evident as in the plummeting percentage of (working) 
female graduates who identify themselves as teachers (Figure 2.1).  According to data 
from the March CPS, in 1964 over half of working female college graduates were 
teachers—by 1996, this percentage had fallen below 15 percent.  While this drop in 
the fraction of graduates choosing to teach can be attributed largely to changes in the 
denominator (the enormous rise in college completion among women), one thing in 
this picture is clear: conditional on working, of those women who acquired a college 
education in the 1960’s, most went into teaching; of those completing college today, 
most do not.  This raises the question—how has the composition of those women who 
do choose to teach changed over time? 
Occupational desegregation and the movement of females into high-skill 
professions such as medicine and law do not necessarily imply a reduction in the pool 
of talent available for teaching, if the pool of college graduates is expanding.  While 
Table 2.1 indicates a dramatic increase in the pool of female college graduates, the 
growth in teachers over the same period was not nearly as fast.  The total stock of 
teachers rose by only 89 percent between 1960 and 1996, rising the most between 
1960 and 1970 (46 percent) to accommodate an enrollment boom, and rising slowly 
thereafter.  Meanwhile, the fraction of young women with degrees tripled, with the 
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most talented more likely than ever to earn a degree.  Figure 2.2 shows college 
completion rates among five cohorts of female high school graduates, conditional on a 
high school standardized test score decile.14  While in 1964 only 33 percent of women 
in the top three deciles completed college, by 2000 75 percent of women scoring in 
these deciles were finishing college.  It remains to be seen whether this influx of 
talented females allowed the teaching profession to maintain a certain level of quality, 
or whether these new graduates increasingly selected into occupations other than 
teaching.   
 
2.3 Prior Literature on Teacher Quality 
 Concern over teacher quality is not new.  Weaver (1983) recounts a nearly 
100-year history in the United States of attempts to raise teacher standards.  Much of 
the research on teacher quality in recent years has focused on 1) what “quality” 
exactly refers to, and how it should be measured15, 2) how those entering teaching 
compare along various dimensions to their non-teacher peers, 3) whether teacher 
characteristics are in fact important for student achievement, and 4) how best to raise 
the quality of the teaching force without drastically reducing the supply of teachers or 
the diversity of the profession. 
                                                 
14 The data used in Figure 2.2 will be described in greater detail in Section 2.4.  For 
now, this figure is presented solely for illustrative purposes. 
15 Interest in this question has been considerably renewed with the ESEA (“No Child 
Left Behind”) requirement that teachers be “highly qualified.”  Debate over what this 
term means, and whether or not federal definitions of “highly qualified” teachers are 
in fact indicators of “quality,” continues. 
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 Ideally, teacher quality would be measured as a multi-dimensional vector of all 
teacher characteristics that are positively associated with outputs of the educational 
process.  This vector likely includes many attributes—like patience, creativity, or 
communication skills, for example—that are unobservable or otherwise difficult to 
measure.  Recognizing the shortcomings of the approach, researchers have focused 
instead on such measurable characteristics as degree attainment, certification status, 
teaching experience, school selectivity and test scores in this vector of teacher 
“quality.”  Others, like Loeb and Page (2000), Lakdawalla (2001), and Stoddard 
(2003) interpret relative teacher salaries as indicators of teacher quality.  Of course, 
these latter interpretations depend on a willingness to accept relative wages as a 
measure of teacher quality—as some authors have pointed out, the relationship 
between teacher salaries and teacher quality (and student achievement) is a tenuous 
one.16 
 In this paper, we use a measure of academic ability—scores from a 
standardized test administered in high school—as our measure of “quality.”  We 
acknowledge the obvious limitations of using a one-dimensional measure of quality—
to think that a single test score can capture all of the factors that make for an effective 
teacher would be naïve at best—but it is hard to believe that measures, say, of a 
teacher’s verbal and mathematical ability are not an important dimension of teacher 
quality.  After all, these are tests of skills that teachers are expected to cultivate in their 
                                                 
16 See Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (1999), Manski (1987), and Ballou and Podgursky 
(1997).  Loeb and Page (2000) argue that cross-sectional studies of the relationship 
between teacher salaries and student achievement that do not take into account 
alternative wage opportunities are misspecified.  They find that once relative wages 
are controlled for, that teacher salaries are modestly related to student outcomes. 
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own students.  And there is a growing literature that finds that such measures—
particularly teachers’ verbal scores—are among the most important determinants of 
student achievement.17  Ehrenberg and Brewer (1995), for example, find that a one-
half standard deviation increase in the verbal aptitude score of white female teachers 
would have raised the synthetic gain scores of white elementary students in the 1966 
Coleman Report data by roughly 4 to 8.5 percent.  Likewise, Ferguson and Ladd 
(1996) find that a one standard deviation increase in teachers ACT composite scores 
(in the state of Alabama) would have resulted in a 0.10 standard deviation increase in 
student reading scores from 3rd to 4th grade (comparable to about one-half the black-
white test score gap in urban areas during this time period).  What a teacher’s test 
score measures is less clear, but this literature has illustrated that these scores do 
indeed capture something (whether specific skills or general intelligence) that is 
important in explaining the academic achievement of their students. 
 Discovery of the apparent importance of teachers’ academic ability in the 
production of education comes at the same time a number of other studies find that the 
academic ability of teachers and aspiring teachers did not compare favorably to that of 
their peers in the 1970’s and 80’s.  These conclusions have often been made through 
comparison of the mean SAT or ACT scores of examinees intending to major in 
education to those who do not.  Weaver (1983), for example, reports that the average 
prospective education major ranked at about the 37th percentile of all SAT verbal test 
takers in 1972, a ranking that remained unchanged through 1980.  Ballou and 
                                                 
17 See, for example, Hanushek (1970, 1971), Ferguson and Ladd (1996), Ferguson 
(1998),  Ehrenberg and Brewer (1994, 1995), Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2000), 
Wayne and Youngs (2003) and Goldhaber (2002). 
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Podgursky (1997) find that the average SAT score of prospective education majors fell 
at about the 45th percentile, but that this ranking improved considerably by 1992.  
While these comparisons are informative, they may be misleading as not all SAT/ACT 
takers attend college, and those who do may change majors, or may never enter the 
teaching force.  These studies also tend to neglect other potentially interesting aspects 
of the distribution of teacher quality, beyond the mean. 
 Vance and Schlechty (1982) were one of the first to make use of a longitudinal 
study to compare the academic ability of teachers and non-teachers.  The availability 
of longitudinal data permitted the authors to actually follow students into the 
workforce, avoiding the problems inherent in using SAT scores of intended education 
majors.18  Their tabulations on college graduates from the National Longitudinal Study 
of the High School Class of 1972 (NLS-72) indicate that teachers identified in 1979—
particularly those who had expressed an intention to continue teaching—came 
disproportionately from the bottom two quintiles of the SAT score distribution. 
 Several other cross-sectional studies of college graduates have found a 
negative relationship between academic ability and the likelihood of entering teaching.  
Manski (1987), in a test of how increased teacher salaries might impact the quality of 
the teaching force, found a negative, statistically significant relationship between 
SAT/ACT scores and entry into teaching among working college graduates in the 
NLS-72.  Hanushek and Pace (1995) and Vegas, Murnane and Willett (2001) obtain 
                                                 
18 Gitomer and Latham (1999) are able to link SAT and ACT scores to practicing 
teachers by linking test score data to prospective teachers who elected to take the 
Praxis I or II licensing exam.  Unfortunately, this data is only available for those who 
took the licensing exam between 1994 and 1997. 
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similar results among college graduates using data from High School and Beyond.  
Podgursky, Monroe and Watson (2001) also find the same relationship in Missouri 
state administrative data. 
The picture emerging from this literature is that the test scores of college 
graduates choosing teaching as a profession during the 1970’s and 80’s did not 
compare favorably to those of their peers.  In light of the extended trend of 
occupational desegregation described in Section 2.2, however, we would like to know 
whether or not this relationship between academic ability and entry into teaching has 
in fact worsened over time.  The literature on this question is quite limited, and 
virtually all papers to date have considered only college graduates over a fairly short 
time period.19   Murnane, et. al. (1991) and Bacolod (2003) are among the few to 
address the question of changes in teacher quality over time.  Each use college 
graduates from the National Longitudinal Surveys of Young Men, Women, and Youth 
and find that the percentage of graduates (of any IQ) entering teaching fell over the 
period 1967-1989, with a greater decline among those with high IQ scores.   
Here, we hope to improve on the existing literature by bringing together for 
comparison many of the datasets used in the cross-sectional studies mentioned above 
(and incorporating some older ones), measuring teacher quality with a variable shown 
to have important effects on student achievement, and by taking care to keep the 
underlying sample constant over time.  Our analysis will cover a significantly longer 
                                                 
19 Pavalko (1970), using the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study, is an exception.  Dividing 
the high school class of 1957 into three ability groups, he finds that at that time in 
Wisconsin, teachers were drawn disproportionately from the higher third of the IQ 
distribution. 
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time period than that considered by Murnane et. al. and Bacolod (encompassing a 
period of more rapidly changing labor market characteristics), and in most cases our 
sample of graduates is significantly larger.  Our methodology and data will be 
described in further detail in Section 2.4. 
 
2.4 Methodology and Data 
2.4.1 Methodology 
 To provide a picture of the changing relationship between academic ability and 
entry into teaching over time, we combine data from five longitudinal surveys, two of 
which are comprised of individuals who graduated from high school prior to 1965.  
We first look (in Section 2.5.1) at how the test score ranking of the average new 
female teacher has changed over time, and examine changes in the overall 
composition of new female teachers.  We then estimate for individuals in each high 
school cohort the likelihood of entering the teaching profession (by approximately age 
twenty-six), conditional on measured academic ability.  Each of these methods 
provides a perspective on how school districts’ ability to attract high test-scoring 
individual into the teaching profession has changed over time.  While our primary 
focus is on women (Section 2.5.1 and 2.5.2), we also perform the same analysis on our 
sample of men (Section 2.5.3).   
The econometric model we estimate is as follows: 
(1) Pr(Yit = 1| xit , zit) = f(αt + βtxit + γt΄zit),  
where Yit is an indicator equal to one if person i (in cohort t) identifies herself as a 
teacher, f is the logistic function and xit is a measure of person i's academic ability.  In 
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some specifications, we add a vector of student and/or parental characteristics (zit), but 
our primary interest here is in the “total relationship” between test score and entry into 
teaching, not necessarily the “partial relationship.”  Loosely, we are interested in 
whether or not there have been changes in the gradient ∂f / ∂x—a measure of the 
relationship between underlying academic ability and entry into teaching in a given 
year—that would have affected the distribution of ability among new teachers. 
In each cohort, we include those individuals with at least a high school 
diploma as our sample.  As we described in the introduction, college completion 
among females tripled over our sample period.  Were we to use college graduates as a 
reference group, our interpretation of changes in the gradient ∂f / ∂x could be biased if 
college completion has increased differentially across ability groups over time.20  A 
simple example may help to illustrate this idea.  Suppose the population is fixed at 500 
“low ability” and 500 “high ability” individuals.  Each year, school districts recruit 60 
low ability and 40 high ability individuals into the teaching profession (i.e. assume the 
skill distribution of teachers is unchanged over time).  In the first year, assume 100 
low ability and 300 high ability individuals graduate from college (a total of 400, with 
25 percent of all graduates of low ability and 75 percent of high ability).  Based on our 
assumption of the skill distribution of new teachers, and assuming that only college 
graduates can become teachers, 60 percent of low ability college graduates became 
teachers (60 of 100) and 13.3 percent of high ability college graduates became 
                                                 
20 Vegas, Murnane, and Willett (2001) is one of the few studies that begins with a 
sample of high school graduates.  However, like most of the empirical work described 
in Section 2.3, they do not look at changes in teacher quality over time, but rather the 
impact of certain individual characteristics on various sequential decisions (high 
school completion, college graduation, and finally entry into teaching).     
 21
teachers (40 of 300)—i.e. a high ability college graduate is 46.7 percentage points less 
likely to become a teacher than a low ability college graduate (loosely, our gradient ∂f 
/ ∂x for year one).  If we normalize this marginal effect by the overall mean (the 25 
percent of all college graduates who become teachers in year one), then the elasticity 
of entry to teaching with respect to ability is -1.87 (-46.7/25).  Now, in year two, 
assume 200 low- and 350 high-ability individuals complete college (a total of 550, 
with 36 percent of college graduates of low ability and 64 percent of high ability).  In 
this year, our proportions change to 30 percent of low ability graduates and 11.4 
percent of high ability graduates entering the teaching profession—a difference of 
only 18.6 percentage points.  With an overall fraction of 16.6 percent of college 
graduates entering teaching, this implies an elasticity of -1.02.  While the composition 
of the teaching force has not changed (it remains 60/40), a comparison of the marginal 
effects (or elasticities) across years might lead us to believe that the negative 
relationship between ability and teaching has weakened from year one to year two.21  
We clearly would not want to interpret these effects of a changing population 
composition as changes in the quality of teachers. 
A look at Figure 2.2 suggests that increases in college completion rates were 
not in fact constant across the ability distribution.  While the absolute increase in the 
fraction of females completing college was greater for high scoring females, the 
increase was proportionately larger for students at the bottom of the distribution—low 
                                                 
21 It can be shown in this example that when the percentage increase in college 
completion rates is equal across ability groups that the elasticity of entry into teaching 
with respect to ability remains constant (though the marginal effect will still be 
affected). 
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scoring females were over five times more likely to complete college in 2000 vs. 
1964, compared to twice as likely for high scoring females.  Assuming that ∂f / ∂x is 
negative among college graduates (as was suggested by the cross-sectional studies 
discussed in Section 2.3), one might estimate ∂f / ∂x to be less negative among college 
graduates in later years simply as a result of the influx of more low-ability students 
into the sample.  Similarly, one could overestimate a change in ∂f / ∂x if individuals 
with higher test scores were more represented in later year samples.  Restriction of the 
sample to working college graduates could add yet another layer of this kind of sample 
selection bias, by the same reasoning. 
We avoid these potential problems by using a sample of all (working and non-
working) high school graduates—a sample we believe to be much more stable over 
this period.  While the high school graduation rate among women also rose (from 68 
percent to 86 percent in Table 2.1—an increase driven largely by gains in high school 
completion among black women), the growth was not nearly as dramatic.22  
Admittedly, any change in the ability composition of high school graduates could bias 
our results in a similar manner.  Unfortunately, there is no way using our data to detect 
the extent of change in the composition of high school graduates, but we believe that 
any bias induced by such changes is smaller than that potentially induced by limiting 
our analysis to college graduates. 
 
 
                                                 
22 In some specifications of (1), we include race dummies and report predicted 




 Our data consists of five separate cohorts of high school graduates from five 
longitudinal surveys—the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (WLS) for the class of 1957, 
Project Talent (Talent) for the classes of 1960-64, the National Longitudinal Study of 
the High School Class of 1972 (NLS-72), the sophomore cohort of High School and 
Beyond (HSB) for the class of 1982, and the National Education Longitudinal Study 
of 1988 (NELS) for the class of 1992.  These five studies are alike in that they each 
include a detailed survey of the student during their senior year, all require students to 
participate in a battery of aptitude tests, and all conduct numerous follow-up surveys 
after high school.  Together, these surveys provide us five distinct pictures of the 
relationship between academic ability (as measured in high school) and occupational 
choice among high school graduates over four decades.23  
 In each survey, we take as our sample women who have graduated from high 
school, have a test score available, and responded to a selected follow-up survey.  To 
allow for comparison across surveys and avoid life-cycle effects on occupation choice, 
we choose the follow-up survey conducted when most respondents were 
approximately twenty-six years of age. These follow-up surveys were conducted in 
                                                 
23 Detailed information about these longitudinal studies can be found in Appendix A.  
The Department of Education surveys (NLS-72, HSB, and NELS) intentionally 
oversampled certain minority or socioeconomic groups.  These datasets each provided 
sampling weights, which we use where appropriate.  Unweighted results are provided 
in section five of Appendix A.  Note, the NELS data was recently added to this 
chapter, upon its release in Spring 2003.  Consequently, less scrutiny has been given to 
its accuracy.  Appropriate caution should be used when interpreting results from this 
data.  
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1964 (for WLS respondents), 1971-74 (Talent), 1979 (NLS-72), 1992 (HSB), and 
2000 (NELS).  Descriptive statistics for each sample cohort are provided in Table 
2.2.24   
Neither of our 1960’s-era datasets is ideal.  WLS, consisting exclusively of 
white high school graduates in Wisconsin is clearly not a nationally representative 
sample, but it is large—over 4,600 women participated in the 1964 follow up.  By 
contrast, Project Talent is designed to be nationally representative, but publicly 
released data contains one-third as many observations as WLS.  As a test of the 
comparability of the WLS data, we contrasted the 1936-42 birth cohort (approximately 
the same cohort as our WLS respondents) of Wisconsin-born females with white 
females born outside of Wisconsin in the 1970 1% and the 1980 and 1990 5% Census 
Public Use Micro Samples (PUMS; see Table 2.3).  Nothing in Table 2.3 suggests that 
white Wisconsin women of this cohort look markedly different from white women of 
the same birth cohort born outside of Wisconsin.25  In the most relevant year (1970), 
when this cohort was approximately thirty years of age, we see little difference in the 
educational attainment, labor force participation, or fraction teaching between the two 
groups, with the exception being the fraction earning masters’ degrees, which is 
almost one percentage point higher among females born outside of Wisconsin.  
Earnings and wages are slightly higher among females outside of Wisconsin (by about 
                                                 
24 Not many observations were lost in restricting the sample to follow-up participants 
with test scores.  The lowest rate of response among female high school graduates 
(with test scores available) across the four surveys was 86.5 percent (WLS)—see 
Table 2.2. 
25 Keep in mind that large samples as those we have used in Table 2.3 will tend to find 
statistically significant differences, even when the difference itself is quite small. 
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7 to 8 percent) in 1970, likely explained in part by their higher average educational 
attainment and greater tendency to reside in MSAs.  Wider differences between these 
cohorts appear later in life (1980 and 1990), particularly in the fraction completing 
higher degrees.  While we are unable to claim WLS to be a nationally representative 
sample, we can have some confidence that our sample—at least at the age when most 
decisions about entering the teaching profession are made—looks much like the larger 
population of white females in the U.S.  With the inclusion of Project Talent, we hope 
to have a fairly representative picture of female high school graduates in the late 
1950’s and early 60’s. 
 Among other variables, we have for each student a measure of academic 
ability, and a self-reported occupation at approximately age twenty-six.  As our 
measure of academic ability, we combine the raw scores from the math and verbal 
portions of a test battery administered to each of the five cohorts during their senior 
year.26  We then compute a centile ranking and standardized score based on each 
student’s placement in the distribution of all high school graduates of the same gender 
(suggesting that our ability measure should be interpreted as a measure of relative—
                                                 
26 See Appendix A, Section A.3 for information about the specific content of each test 
battery, which does differ somewhat across surveys.  The exam given to the Wisconsin 
Longitudinal Study participants (the Henmon-Nelson Test of Mental Ability) differed 
significantly from the others in that it was designed as an IQ test, and thus may 
measure different aptitudes.  The High School and Beyond cohort completed the test 
battery during the sophomore and senior years—for comparability, we use the raw 
score from the test battery administered during the senior year. 
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not absolute—math and verbal aptitude).  Table 2.2 provides the mean centile rank 
and standard score of all high school graduates responding to each follow-up survey.27 
 While the tests of math and verbal abilities administered to each cohort do 
differ from each other, most are quite similar in content to other standardized tests 
administered in high school, like the SAT or ACT.   Indeed, among those students for 
whom we have both a test score and an SAT or ACT score, the correlation between 
these scores is quite high (0.850 for the NLS SAT scores, and 0.841 and 0.863 for the 
NLS and HSB ACT scores, respectively).  As an additional, admittedly rough test of 
the comparability of these test scores across surveys, we used logistic regression 
analysis to examine the relationship between centile rankings or standardized scores 
and entry into medicine among men across four of the five surveys.28  With the 
fraction of male high school graduates eventually entering medicine remaining 
roughly constant since 1970, and having no reason to believe that the relationship 
between cognitive ability and entry into the medical profession has changed much 
since 1960, we would expect (if our test scores measure similar aptitudes) to see a 
fairly consistent relationship between these two variables over time.29  And as Table 
                                                 
27 Means differ slightly from fifty and zero due to varied response to the follow-up 
surveys.  Note that centile ranks were determined using all female high school 
graduates for whom we have a test score available, not just those who responded to the 
follow-up survey. 
28 Too few of the NELS participants were classified as physicians to include the NELS 
in this comparison. 
29 Using data from the March Current Population Survey, the fraction of male high 
school graduates age 25-34 who report themselves to be physicians or surgeons has 
remained very close to 0.5—0.6 percent, with no apparent upward or downward trend, 
over the period 1970-1996. 
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2.4 shows, this is indeed the case. In all cases, the coefficient on test score is positive 
and statistically significant (evidence that the qualities measured by these scores are 
strongly associated with entry into a high-skilled profession such as medicine), and the 
marginal effect (also shown as a percentage of the sample mean, i.e. as an elasticity) 
of test score on entry into medicine among men remains roughly constant across the 
four surveys. 
 Our occupation variable has a fairly broad definition here and should be 
interpreted as “profession” or “line of work,” as the individuals in our sample report 
occupations, regardless of whether or not they are currently working.  A broader 
definition is actually quite useful in this context, as it has been suggested by Polachek 
(1981) and Flyer and Rosen (1997) that women who expect to spend more time out of 
the labor force may select into occupations like teaching because of their flexibility.30  
If this is indeed the case, comparing teachers to non-teachers in a sample of working 
women may lead to biased results.31  Note that teachers identified in our data may be 
                                                 
30 In our WLS sample, close to 35 percent of the women identifying themselves as 
teachers were out of the labor force at the time of the 1964 follow-up survey.  Project 
Talent is unique in that most women out of the labor force did not report an 
occupation.  We identified 58 “housewives” in the Project Talent survey who held 
teaching certificates—an indication that they might be teaching, if they were in the 
labor force at the time of the survey.  However for consistency with the other surveys, 
we did not count these individuals as teachers.  Incidentally, 18 of the 58 housewives 
(31 percent) with teaching certificates were ranked in the top decile of the test score 
distribution. 
31 Most empirical work on teacher quality to date restricts analysis to working women 
only.  One caveat associated with our use of a broader definition of occupation is that 
it suggests our results on teachers apply to those women who identify themselves as 
teachers, not necessarily those employed as teachers at the time of the survey.  If some 
low-scoring women report themselves as teachers and are not in the labor force 
because they could not find work as a teacher, for example, then our results—as a 
 28
elementary or secondary teachers, and may work (or have worked) for public or 
private school districts.  Unfortunately, our data does not allow us to make an accurate 
distinction between these classes of teachers. 
Tables 2.5a and 2.5b report the top ten most frequently reported occupations 
by female high school and college graduates in four of our five surveys.  As expected, 
we find evidence here of significantly less concentration in the occupations held by 
women in later years, particularly among those with a college education.  Whereas 49 
percent of female college graduates in the WLS sample were teachers in 1964 
(compare to 52 percent in Figure 2.1), only 11.8 percent were teachers in the 1992 
HSB follow-up (compare to 15 percent in Figure 2.1).  In 1992, female college 
graduates were more likely to be in management (14 percent) or clerical work (a broad 
category, 17 percent) than in teaching. 
 
2.5 Results on New Entrants into Teaching 
2.5.1 Descriptive Evidence on the Changing Ability of New Female Teachers 
Table 2.6 presents some preliminary findings on the female teachers we 
identified in our five cohorts.  While not surprisingly their mean centile rank and 
standard score lies consistently above that of the average high school graduate (fifty 
and zero, by definition), we find the centile rank of the average new female teacher 
falling about 3 percentage points, from the 67th (or 69th if using Project Talent) to the 
                                                                                                                                            
general statement about practicing teachers—would bias the average ability of 
teachers downward. 
 29
64th percentile—about 5.2 percent—over this time period.32  As centile rankings mask 
information about the tails of the distribution, we also compared the mean standard 
scores of teachers across these cohorts.  Here, the downward trend in the mean among 
female teachers is much more stark—a fall from 0.60 standard deviations above the 
mean female high school graduate (or 0.65 in Talent) to 0.46 from 1964 to 2000—
conservatively, a 23 percent drop. 
Figure 2.3 takes a closer look at the distribution of new female teachers across 
decile groups.  Perhaps the most striking trend in the composition of new female 
teachers observed here is the steadily declining share of new female teachers who 
scored in the top decile of their high school cohort.  While in 1964 over 20 percent of 
young female teachers fell in the top decile of their high school class (over 25 percent 
when considering Project Talent), this number had fallen to 11 percent by 2000.33  
This drop in the fraction of new female teachers scoring in the top decile can be 
reconciled with the modest decline in the mean centile rank observed over the 1964 – 
2000 period through examination of changes in the other nine deciles.  As Figure 2.3 
shows, there was a similar decline in the fraction of teachers who scored in the lowest 
decile of the test score distribution—from 3 percent to under 1 percent by 2000 (with a 
unexplained rise in 1992).  Approximately 31 percent of teachers scored in the 2nd – 
                                                 
32 The magnitude of this decline in the centile rank of the average teacher may in fact 
be underestimated, if the ability composition of high school graduates has changed 
over time (and if the increase in the high school graduation rate is driven by students 
at the lower end of the distribution).  But again, we are unable to test this hypothesis in 
this data. 
33 Keep in mind that this is the top decile of the high school graduate distribution—a 
sizable population, not a small ‘elite’ as the top decile of the college graduate 
distribution might be considered. 
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6th deciles in 1964; this proportion grew monotonically over our high school cohorts 
after 1971-74, with nearly 41 percent of the teachers in our sample falling in these 
deciles in 2000.  The fraction of teachers in the 7th, 8th, and 9th deciles fluctuated over 
these five cohorts with few discernible trends.  It does appear, however, that the 
fraction of teachers who scored in the 7th (and possibly 9th) deciles of their high school 
class has been steadily rising over this period (although the jump in the 9th decile 
appears only in our last cohort). 
Our results so far suggest that—while the academic ability of the average new 
female teacher has remained relatively unchanged over this period relative to the 
average high school graduate (when comparing mean centile ranks)—teachers are 
much less likely to come from the top decile of their high school class in 2000 vs. 
1964.34  They also appear to be much less likely to come from the bottom decile of the 
test score distribution in later years (although the proportion of teachers from this 
decile is relatively much smaller).  We investigate these findings in further detail in 
Section 2.5.2.  
 
2.5.2 Econometric Evidence on the Changing Propensity to Teach—Females 
 In the last section, we found that the academic ability of the average new 
female teacher—measured as one’s placement in the distribution of female high 
                                                 
34 It should be emphasized again that the changes in test score rankings of new 
teachers are changes in the relative academic ability of new teachers, i.e. relative to 
other high school graduates.  It has been noted that although the relative ability of new 
female teachers has been falling over time, the absolute skill level of new female 
teachers may be rising, if parental education is an input into cognitive ability (observe 
in Table 2.6 the steady increase in average parental education for these teachers).  I 
thank Darius Lakdawalla for being the first to make this observation. 
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school graduates—has fallen somewhat since 1964.  Here, we find that this decline 
can be largely explained by a marked decrease in the propensity to teach among 
women at the highest end of the test score distribution—presumably those who stood 
to benefit most from changes in occupational opportunity over this period.  
 To investigate how the relationship between academic ability and entry into 
teaching has changed over time, we estimated equation (1) separately for each cohort, 
including at first a continuous measure of academic ability (the student’s centile 
ranking or standardized score), and a control for the respondent’s age.35  We then 
allow test scores in enter in a nonlinear fashion into our model—specifically, we 
implement decile dummies as our measure of ability.  Finally, we included other 
covariates that might explain differential rates of entry into teaching—most 
importantly, parental education and race. 36   Unfortunately, the range of additional 
covariates available in our five datasets varied widely from one dataset to the next, 
limiting our ability to make consistent comparisons across cohorts.   
Tables 2.7a and 2.7b provide coefficient estimates from our initial 
specifications.  Table 2.7a implements centile rankings as our measure of academic 
                                                 
35 At first, we are primarily interested in the total relationship between entry into 
teaching and academic ability.  Other authors, such as Murnane, et. al. (1991) include 
a cognitive ability measure as one of several regressors, which captures the partial 
relationship between teaching and ability.  I thank an anonymous referee for noting 
that the total relationship is of foremost interest in this chapter.  We include a control 
for age due to some variation (especially in Project Talent) in the respondents’ age 
when we observed them. 
36 Parental education was not provided in Project Talent.  Talent did identify the 
respondent’s race, but there were too few ethnic minorities identifying themselves as 
teachers to include race dummies in this regression.  In regressions where race 
dummies are included, whites are the omitted group.  Of course, race dummies were 
not relevant in the WLS regressions. 
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ability; while 2.7b uses standard scores (sampling weights have been used in the NLS-
72, HSB, and NELS regressions).  The marginal effects of test score ranking on the 
likelihood of entering teaching—calculated as ∂f / ∂xit in equation (1)—and their 
respective elasticities (i.e. the marginal effect normalized by the mean of yit) are also 
computed for a female high school graduate of average age, both at the mean test 
score and one standard deviation above the mean (or at the 85th centile in Table 
2.7a).37  Standard errors for all coefficients, marginal effects, and elasticities are 
shown in parentheses.  
As one would expect in a sample of graduates with a minimum of a high 
school degree, we find in Tables 2.7a-b that test scores and entry into teaching have a 
positive, statistically significant relationship across all five cohorts.  What is more 
interesting in these tables is the substantial weakening of this relationship between 
ability and entry into teaching since 1964.  On both an absolute and elasticity basis, 
the effect of a one point increase in centile rank (or standard score) on the probability 
that a female high school graduate enters teaching has fallen markedly over this 
period, with the decrease much more prominent when standard scores are used as a 
measure of ability (as would be expected, given our results in Section 2.5.1).  As 
observed in Table 2.7a, the elasticity of a one-centile increase in test score calculated 
at the mean white female has dropped from 0.022 in 1964 (with a 95% confidence 
interval of [0.018, 0.026]), to 0.015 in 2000 (with a 95% confidence interval of [0.011, 
                                                 
37 Elasticities—or, the percentage increase in the likelihood of choosing teaching as an 
occupation for a unit change in test score rank—are more comparable here than 
marginal effects, as the mean of the dependent variable falls somewhat over the five 
cohorts.  We use elasticities to make all of our cross-cohort comparisons in this 
chapter. 
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0.019]), or about a third of its size (compare columns (2) and (7)).38  These effects are 
again a bit stronger when using standard scores as our measure of academic ability. 
Table 2.7b indicates the elasticity of a one standard deviation increase in test score 
calculated at the mean white female has dropped considerably—from 0.640 (with 95% 
confidence interval of [0.522, 0.757]) to 0.488 (95% confidence interval of [0.356, 
0.620]), or about 0.26 percentage points.39  The point estimate using Project Talent of 
0.79 shows an even greater decline than that suggested by WLS.  While given our 
samples we are unable to reject the hypothesis that these elasticities differ from 1964 
to 2000 at the 95% level (we can do so at the 90% level), we nevertheless find the 
sharp decline in this strength of this relationship between test scores and entry into 
teaching to be striking. 
 Results thus far suggest that the positive relationship between academic ability 
and entry into teaching among female high school graduates has indeed weakened 
over time.  Our stronger results with the use of standard scores also suggest that 
individuals near the tails of the test score distribution may be particularly important in 
explaining this trend.  For this reason, and to allow for the possibility that test scores 
may in fact be nonlinearly related to the likelihood of entering teaching, we estimate 
(1) again for each cohort, but instead implement decile dummies as our measure of 
ability.   
                                                 
38 This result differs little when the elasticity is computed at the 85th percentile vs. the 
mean centile. 
39 Note that a movement of one standard score will be a much greater movement (in 
magnitude) than one centile rank.  Thus the marginal effects and elasticities will 
correspondingly be larger in magnitude when using standard scores.  We are more 
interested here in the change in these effects than the magnitude, per se. 
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Table 2.8 presents the results of this estimation (the lowest decile is the 
omitted group).  We again include a control for the respondent’s age, and use 
sampling weights in all available cases.  Here, most of the coefficients on the decile 
dummies are positive and statistically significant (in this context, statistical 
significance simply means that being in decile j makes one more likely to be a teacher 
than if she were in the lowest decile).   
As marginal effects and elasticities like those provided in Tables 2.7a-b are 
less meaningful under this specification, we have calculated the (average) predicted 
probability that a female in decile j becomes a teacher, for all five cohorts (see Table 
2.9).  For females in most deciles the probability of being identified as a teacher fell 
roughly in half from 1964 to 1992, with a modest rise between 1992 and 2000 
(compare columns (1), (4) and (5) in Table 2.9).  We find however, much larger drops 
in this probability for females in the top three deciles from 1964-1992, or the top, 8th, 
and bottom deciles from 1964-2000 (the introduction of the NELS cohort changes our 
findings somewhat).  Columns (6)-(10) of Table 2.9 normalize these predicted 
probabilities by the overall fraction of each cohort that we identified as teachers.  
Values greater than one indicate that the probability that a female high school graduate 
from that decile becomes a teacher is higher than average; values less than one 
indicate the opposite.  Here these trends are clearer—women in the top decile are 
much less likely to become teachers, relative to the average, in later years vs. earlier 
years.  The opposite trend is true for deciles near the bottom of the distribution (with 
the lowest decile being a notable exception). 
 35
Figure 2.4 plots these predicted probabilities.  This picture illustrates 
particularly well the nonlinear relationship between test score and entry into teaching, 
and the comparatively larger reduction in the predicted probability of becoming a 
teacher among those at the top of the ability distribution. 
We repeated the same analysis above with the inclusion of race dummies, 
parental education and other covariates, like socioeconomic status (where available).  
The results were virtually unchanged, and are not presented here.40 
 If women near the top of their high school classes are increasingly less likely 
over this period to enter teaching, what career paths were they pursuing?  We 
tabulated the top ten occupations reported by females ranking in the top decile of their 
class, in four of our five cohorts (NELS is excluded), and the results are striking, if not 
unexpected.  Whereas close to 20 percent of females in the top decile in 1964 chose 
teaching as a profession (teaching was the most frequently reported occupation among 
this group in 1964), only 3.7 percent of top decile females were teaching in 1992.  Top 
scoring women in our 1992 cohort were much more likely to be working as computer 
specialists (5.9 percent), accountants (6.0 percent), or managers (15.1 percent).41  Top 
decile females were almost as likely to be lawyers and judges (3.2 percent) as 
teachers.  
                                                 
40 In the analog to Figure 2.4, we computed the predicted probability of entering the 
teaching profession for a white female with average parental education, conditional on 
test score decile. 
41 Because we have not conditioned on labor force participation (“none” and 
“housewife” are counted as occupations), these tabulations should be unaffected by 
changes in female labor force participation.  Interestingly—even in 1992—the most 




2.5.3 Evidence on New Male Teachers 
 An intriguing possible side effect of the gender desegregation of occupations 
and the movement of talented women into high-cognitive ability occupations is the 
substitution of high skilled men into teaching.  As men lost a virtual monopoly on 
certain professions, finding themselves in competition with capable women for these 
positions, some may have opted for a career in teaching.  While our sample sizes are 
obviously much smaller for male teachers, we summarize some of our findings on 
male teachers in Table 2.10. 
Our results in Table 2.10 are quite interesting, if only suggestive.  Across these 
five cohorts, we find that the average academic ability of male teachers rose from 
1964-2000 by 6.6 percent (18.2 percent through 1992), or 28.2 percent (100 percent 
through 1992) if using standardized scores.  This increase in the average ability of 
male teachers also appears to be driven by those at the top of the ability distribution, as 
the next panel in Table 2.10 indicates.  While (as with women) the probability that a 
male high school graduate entered teaching fell over this period for most decile groups 
(again with a slight increase between 1992 and 2000), here the decline in probability is 
much less dramatic for those in the top decile.  While most other decile groups saw a 
decline in the likelihood of entering teaching of 35-75 percent from 1964 to 2000, this 
reduction was only 29 percent for those in the top decile (the difference is much more 
stark when comparing HSB to earlier cohorts, but the large fraction of top decile men 
identified as teachers in HSB compared to adjacent cohorts casts some doubt over this 
finding). 
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Again, appropriate caution should be used with the results in Table 2.10.  Our 
sample of male teachers was naturally much smaller than that of females (as few as 62 
male teachers in the case of HSB), and the representation of males (particularly top 
decile males) in the general population of teachers may be small enough that such a 
trend may not be economically significant.  In addition, male teachers are much more 
likely to be secondary teachers than elementary teachers, suggesting that if anything, 
these results are most relevant for male secondary level teachers.  Nevertheless, we 
find our results on men to be intriguing, and worthy of additional study with more 
suitable data. 
 
2.6 Conclusions and Further Research 
 Despite the wealth of cross-sectional studies that have examined the 
characteristics of college graduates choosing teaching as a career, there has been little 
empirical evidence on how these characteristics—particularly the academic ability of 
these teachers—have changed over time.  We believe—in light of the vast 
occupational desegregation witnessed during the past four decades—that it is of great 
interest to understand how this desegregation may have affected the recruitment of 
highly skilled women into teaching. 
 In this chapter, we have found—at least among these five cohorts of high 
school graduates—a slight but detectable decline in the relative academic ability of the 
average new female teacher, when ability is measured as one’s centile rank on a 
standardized test of verbal and mathematical aptitude.  The magnitude of this decline 
is greater when measuring ability with standardized scores.  In addition, we find that 
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examination of the entire ability distribution of new teachers is more informative than 
trends in central tendency alone.  Consistent with the earlier findings of Murnane et. 
al. (1991) and Bacolod (2003) on college graduates in the NLSY, we find that the 
likelihood of entering teaching as a profession by age 25-26 has fallen for all ability 
levels of high school graduates (with a modest increase between 1992 and 2000, likely 
due to rising enrollment and class size reduction programs), but this probability has 
fallen much more for females at the top of the distribution—i.e. females in the top 
decile of their high school class are much less likely to become teachers in 2000 vs. 
1964.  While our sample sizes of men are much smaller, we detect the opposite trend 
among men. 
 While we are confident that these results are indicative of trends in teacher 
quality among entering female teachers, and believe that our estimates provide some 
initial measures of the extent to which females of high verbal and math ability are less 
likely to enter teaching, we acknowledge some shortcomings inherent in our data.  
First, while our five datasets all have the advantage of being longitudinal in nature 
(allowing us to compare respondents to others in their high school class and be 
confident of their ultimate occupational choice), they provide snapshots of only five 
particular moments in time.   Second, the specific exams given to students and the 
other covariates available varied from one survey to the next.  Consequently, we 
cannot be completely certain that the standardized test scores used here measure 
exactly the same skills or aptitudes, nor can we consistently control for as many other 
interesting covariates across the surveys as we would wish.  In addition, our test score 
rankings are only measures of relative—not absolute—academic ability, and thus we 
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are unable to make inferences about changes over time in the level of verbal and 
mathematical skills among new teachers.  Finally, despite the importance of the 
academic ability of teachers to student success, we acknowledge again that test scores 
are but one measure of teacher “quality,” and do not claim to have captured in this 
measure the myriad of important skills, talents, and character traits that make for a 
great teacher. 
 If our results can be applied to the wider population of new teachers in the 
United States, a given student in 2000 (conditional on having a female teacher) could 
expect to find a teacher who is—on average—of only slightly lower academic ability 
than a given student in 1964.  However, that student is much less likely to find a 
teacher of the highest academic ability than a student in 1964.  Further, given recent 
research on the sorting of teachers across schools within states and school districts—
the likelihood that a student in low income or predominately black school encounters a 
teacher of the highest academic ability is likely even lower.42  For the casual observer, 
these results will surprise few (as suggested by our leading quote from Chancellor 
Levy).  However, we hope that our quantitative results here will serve as an impetus 
for further research into changes in teacher quality over time (our curious finding on 
the quality of male teachers in particular calls out for more work and better data).  If 
the significant loss of women in the top decile—those who likely stood to benefit most 
from occupational desegregation—is indicative of a wider trend, then these findings 
should be of interest to parents, researchers and policymakers alike. 
                                                 
42 See Lankford, Loeb and Wyckoff (2001). 
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Table 2.1:  Labor Market Characteristics, Selected Years, 1964-1996 
 
  1964 1970 1980 1990 1996
% Young Females (age 25-34) with:  
 At least a high school degree 67.4 73.3 84.3 86.5 86.5
 At least four-year college degree 8.9 12.0 20.7 22.8 26.1
 In the labor force 37.2 45.7 65.4 73.2 74.0
   
Index of gender representation (age 25-34)  
 Physicians 0.33 0.20 0.47 0.69 0.79
 Lawyers 0.08 0.20 0.44 0.60 0.94
   
Public elementary teachers (millions) 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.9
Public secondary teachers (millions) 0.6 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2
Public school enrollment (millions) 39.0 52.2 49.7 53.8 59.5
  
% Young teachers (age 25-34) that are female  
 All -- 70.0 72.4 74.2 76.3
 Primary -- 85.1 84.6 86.0 82.8
 Secondary -- 46.6 54.4 53.0 57.2
 
Source: March Current Population Survey 1964-1996, except teacher counts, taken from the 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2000.  First teacher count figure for 1960, first 
enrollment is from 1965.  Gender representation index is calculated from data beginning in 
1968.  
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Table 2.2:  Descriptive Statistics for Five Cohorts of Female High School Graduates 
 
 WLS Talent NLS72 HSB NELS 
High school graduation year(s) 1957 1960-63 1972 1982 1992 
    
Follow-up survey year(s) 1964 1971-74 1979 1992 2000 
    
Sample size1 4,609 1,634 6,751 5,389 4,284 
    
Response rate to follow-up survey (%)2 86.5 100.0 88.5 90.4 - 
    
Average age in years at follow-up 25.0 26.8 26.1 27.5 26.1 
    
Race/Ethnicity (%):    
       White -- 88.1 82.1 74.5 74.6 
       Black -- 6.4 9.6 12.5 10.5 
       Hispanic -- 1.3 3.2 10.9 10.6 
       Other  -- 4.2 5.0 2.1 4.4 
    
% With at least 2 year of college 28.6 29.7 40.6 35.6 59.9 
% With at least 4 years of college 14.5 20.5 24.7 26.0 42.3 
    
% Working full or part-time 38.9 48.7 72.1 74.1 86.8 
    
Mean, mother’s education (years) 10.3 -- 12.4 12.6 13.1 
Mean, father’s education (years) 9.7 -- 12.8 13.0 13.6 
% Currently married (HS graduates) 82.9 80.2 60.8 58.5 46.4 
% Currently married (college graduates) 65.3 77.8 46.7 50.5 40.3 
    
Mean, centile rank3,4    
       High school graduates 50.0 50.4 50.4 50.7 50.5 
       College graduates 73.4 74.9 72.4 76.2 67.4 
    
Mean, standard score    
       High school graduates 0.019 0.000 -0.001 0.010 0.000 
       College graduates 0.820 0.843 0.742 0.914 0.579 
 
1  Sample consists of those individuals who (a) have completed high school by the given follow-up year, 
(b) responded to the follow up, and (c) had a valid test score.  Sampling weights were used in 
generating means in NLS-72, HSB, and NELS surveys. 
 
2 Response rate is calculated as the percent of all high school graduates (with test scores) responding to 
the follow-up survey.  The public use version of Project Talent was designed such that all included 
students were respondents to the follow-up survey in 1971-74. 
 
3 Centile ranks are based on students’ placement in the distribution of all graduates of the same gender 
in their high school class.  For the NLS-72, HSB, and NELS surveys, centile ranks were assigned using 
an algorithm incorporating base-year weights. 
 
4 ‘College graduates’ refers to completion of a four-year bachelor’s degree.
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Table 2.3:  Comparison of White Female High School Graduates Born in Wisconsin versus Other Women,  
1936-1942 Birth Cohorts, 1970, 1980 and 1990 PUMS 
 
 Females, ages 28-34 in 
1970, born in: 
 Females, ages 38-44 in 
1980, born in: 
 Females, ages 48-54 in 















Sample size 1,494 51,174  7,475 271,924  7,939 295,978  
% Unemployed 3.85 3.75  3.55 3.73  2.74 3.14  
% Not in labor force  56.5 56.4  29.2 32.3 ** 22.8 26.8 ** 
          
Teachers (% among high school grads) 10.1 9.1  6.8 7.1  6.8 7.0  
Elementary teachers 6.6 6.3  4.8 5.4 ** 5.6 5.5  
Secondary teachers 3.2 2.5  1.4 1.3  0.6 0.9 ** 
          
Bachelor’s degree (%)2 16.5 16.7  16.8 18.5 ** 17.9 19.8 ** 
Master’s degree (%)2 1.4 2.2 ** 3.9 4.7 ** 5.95 8.0 ** 
          













          













          
% Living in MSA 59.7 64.9 ** 69.2 69.4  56.4 63.5 ** 
% Living in same state as birth 67.5 57.9 ** 65.6 56.4 ** 65.4 55.6 ** 
** Identifies a statistically significant difference in sample means.  Person weights were used in the 1990 samples.  The 1970 and 1980 samples were 
designed to be self-weighting. 
 
1  Females from all other areas may include foreign born. 
 
2 In the 1970 and 1980 samples, we assume those with at least four years of college have a bachelor’s degree, and those with at least six years of college have 
a master’s degree. 
 




Table 2.4:  Logit Estimates of the Probability of Male High School Graduates Entering 
Medicine 
 
Sample WLS  NLS-72  HSB 
Dependent variable Physician in 1975  Physician in 1986  Physician in 1992 
Mean of dependent 
variable 
0.011  0.023  0.008 
Mean age of respondent 43.0  32.9  27.4 
Sample size 4,331  4,358  4,834 
      
Variable (1) (2)  (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
Constant -8.075 -5.347  -7.323 -4.760  -8.567 -5.671 
 (0.696) (1.374)  (0.502) (0.206)  (0.790) (0.286) 
         
Centile rank 0.052   0.051   0.055  
 (0.008)   (0.006)   (0.010)  
         
Standardized score  1.374   1.473   1.330 
  (0.198)   (0.167)   (0.198) 
Marginal effect of test 
score at: 
        
     Mean 0.0002 0.0065  0.0004 0.0124  0.0002 0.0045 
     95th percentile or +1 
     SD 
0.0013 0.0249  0.0023 0.0512  0.0011 0.0169 
         
Elasticity of marginal 
effect at: 
        
     Mean 0.0521 1.3676  0.0506 1.4603  0.0546 1.3250 
     95th percentile or +1  
     SD 
0.0509 1.3487  0.0486 1.4197  0.0537 1.3125 
 
Standard errors in parentheses.  For the WLS, NLS-72 and HSB surveys, we used data from 
the 1975, 1986 and 1992 follow-up respectively. 
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Table 2.5:  Most Frequently Reported Occupations, Four Cohorts of Females with at Least a High School Degree 
 
A:  Females with a High School Degree 
 WLS -- 1964   Talent – 1971-74   NLS-72 – 1979   HSB – 1992  
Rank Occupation %  Occupation %  Occupation %  Occupation % 
1 None/housewife 27.0  Housewife 45.1  Clerical 35.4  Clerical 34.2 
2 Clerical 15.9  Secretary 4.4  Service worker 11.9  Service worker 16.3 
3 Stenographer/typist 12.8  Elementary teacher 2.7  Manager 8.7  Manager 11.0 
4 Teacher 9.7  Registered nurse 2.2  Operative (non transport) 7.1  Sales/worker 5.3 
5 Nurse/professional 4.6  Student 1.8  Teacher 6.7  None/housewife 3.7 
6 Bookkeeper 2.9  Bookkeeper 1.6  Sales 6.1  Operative (non transport) 3.6 
7 Office machine operator 2.1  Factory assembly 1.4  Nurse, dietician, therapist 5.0  Teacher 3.5 
8 Waitress 1.9  Clerk/typist 1.2  None/housewife 3.0  Craftsman 2.6 
9 Beautician 1.9  None 1.1  Health technician 2.1  Health technician 2.2 
10 Medical/dental technician 1.8  Clerical – other 1.0  Craftsman 2.0  Nurse, dietician, therapist 2.2 
            
 
B:  Females with at least a Four-Year Degree 
 WLS -- 1964   Talent – 1971-74   NLS-72 – 1979   HSB – 1992  
Rank Occupation %  Occupation %  Occupation %  Occupation % 
1 Teacher 48.8  Housewife 34.1  Teacher 24.6  Clerical 17.3 
2 None/housewife 14.2  Elementary teacher 13.1  Clerical 16.4  Manager 13.9 
3 Student 3.9  Teacher – other 3.5  Manager 11.5  Teacher 11.8 
4 Social worker 3.4  Student 2.6  Nurse, dietician, therapist 9.2  Sales 8.9 
5 Stenographer/typist 3.1  Registered nurse 2.3  Sales 4.9  Service worker 6.7 
6 Nurse, professional 3.1  Secondary teacher 2.3  Service worker 4.3  Accountant 5.4 
7 Medical/dental technician 2.5  Social worker 2.0  Writer/artist 3.2  Nurse, dietician, therapist 5.1 
8 College professor 2.2  Sec. teacher/P.E. 1.5  Health technician 2.6  Computer specialist 4.2 
9 Therapist/healer 2.1  Music teacher 1.5  Social worker 2.1  Writer/artist 4.1 
10 Musician/music teacher 1.5  Pre-K/K teacher 1.2  Accountant 2.0  Health technician 2.3 
            
Project Talent differed from other surveys in that women who were out of the labor force did not report an occupation.  Consequently, many of the women 
who reported “housewife” in Project Talent would have specified a profession in any of the surveys.  Also, Project Talent did not use Census classifications 
of occupations, as the other surveys did, reducing comparability between occupation titles in this table. 
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Table 2.6:  Descriptive Statistics, New Female Teachers 
 
 
 WLS Talent NLS-72 HSB NELS 
High school graduation year 1957 1960-63 1972 1982 1992
Follow-up survey year 1964 1971-74 1979 1992 2000
  
Number of teachers1 369 99 431 219 302
     % of all female high school graduates 8.0 6.1 6.8 4.1 7.0
     % of all female college graduates 55.2 30.4 24.4 13.3 16.3
  
Race of teacher (%)  
     White -- 89.9 86.5 80.2 83.8
     Black -- 7.1 8.4 10.7 5.3
     Hispanic -- -- 1.4 7.9 8.0
     Other -- 3.0 3.7 1.1 2.8
  
% With at least 4 years of college 79.1 98.0 96.2 78.2 92.7
% Currently working 64.9 100.0 88.2 78.0 94.5
% Currently married 66.7 73.9 55.4 60.2 50.1
  
Mean, mother’s education (years) 11.6 -- 13.2 13.7 14.0
Mean, father’s education (years) 11.3 -- 13.5 14.5 14.7
  
Ability measures:  
     Mean centile rank2 67.2 69.5 66.4 64.8 63.7
     Mean standard score3 0.60 0.65 0.55 0.50 0.46
  
 
1Teachers were identified using the following codes:  WLS (#51 – Teachers, NEC”), 
Project Talent (#400-433 – all elementary and secondary teachers), NLS-72 (#142-145 
– “Elementary Kindergarten, Secondary, and Teachers except college and university, 
nec), and NELS (#23 – “Educator, K-12”).  Occupations reported by the sophomore 
cohort in HSB were not codified using any numeric system, so we hand-coded each 
respondent’s occupation.   
 
2For the NLS-72, HSB, and NELS surveys, centile ranks were assigned using an 
algorithm incorporating base-year weights.  Mean centile ranks calculated using 
follow-up weights. 
 
3Scores were standardized using base-year survey weights; mean standardized scores 
calculated using follow-up weights. 
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Table 2.7a: Logistic Regressions of Teacher Entrance Models for  



















      
Sample mean 0.080 0.061 0.068 0.041 0.070 
Sample size 4,609 1,634 6,751 5,389 4,284 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 

































      
Marginal effect of  
centile score at: 
     





















      
Elasticity of  
centile score at: 
     





















      
Log-likelihood -1197.0 -347.3 -1505.0 -758.7 -1059.7 
      
Pseudo r-squared 0.060 0.070 0.047 0.029 0.030 
 
Standard errors in parentheses.  Sampling weights were used in columns (3), (4), and (5). See 
Appendix A for unweighted versions of these regressions.  Marginal effects and elasticities 
calculated for a female high school graduate of average age.  Missing values for the age 
variable were replaced with the sample mean; a dummy variable was included in the 
regression taking the value of one for all individuals for whom this replacement was made.
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Table 2.7b: Logistic Regressions of Teacher Entrance Models for 



















      
Sample mean 0.080 0.061 0.068 0.041 0.070 
Sample size 4,609 1,634 6,751 5,389 4,284 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 

































      
Marginal effect of 
standardized score at: 
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Elasticity of  
standardized score at: 
     











     One standard  











      
Log-likelihood -1200.1 -347.5 -1504.4 -759.2 -999.0 
      
Pseudo r-squared 0.058 0.070 0.047 0.029 0.045 
 
Standard errors in parentheses.  Sampling weights were used in columns (3), (4), and (5).  See 
Appendix A for unweighted versions of these regressions.  Marginal effects and elasticities 
calculated for a female high school graduate of average age.  Missing values for the age 
variable were replaced with the sample mean; a dummy variable was included in the 
regression taking the value of one for all individuals for whom this replacement was made. 
 52
Table 2.8: Logistic Regressions, Who Enters Teaching,  


















Sample mean 0.080 0.061 0.068 0.041 0.070 
Sample size 4,609 1,634 6,751 5,389 4,284 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 























































































































      
Log-likelihood -1192.5 -346.3 -1489.8 -753.0 -979.8 
Pseudo r-squared 0.064 0.073 0.056 0.037 0.064 
Standard errors in parentheses.  Sampling weights were used in columns (3), (4), and (5).  See 
Appendix A for unweighted versions of these regressions.  Missing values for the age variable 
were replaced with the sample mean; a dummy variable was included in the regression taking 
the value of one for all individuals for whom this replacement was made. 
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Table 2.9: Predicted Probabilities of Entering Teaching as an Occupation, 
Females with at least a High School Degree 
 
   
Predicted Probabilities 
 Predicted Probabilities as Proportion 
of the Sample Mean 
 
 
 WLS Talent NLS-72 HSB NELS  WLS Talent NLS-72 HSB NELS
Sample mean 
 
 0.080 0.061 0.068 0.041 0.070  0.080 0.061 0.068 0.041 0.070 
Decile of  
test score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
10th  0.169 0.147 0.096 0.057 0.079  2.11 2.41 1.41 1.39 1.13 
9th  0.135 0.111 0.109 0.054 0.145  1.69 1.82 1.60 1.32 2.07 
8th  0.122 0.092 0.117 0.046 0.069  1.53 1.51 1.72 1.12 0.99 
7th  0.094 0.061 0.089 0.062 0.112  1.18 1.00 1.31 1.51 1.60 
6th  0.090 0.049 0.079 0.041 0.089  1.13 0.80 1.16 1.00 1.27 
5th  0.079 0.063 0.068 0.047 0.062  0.99 1.03 1.00 1.15 0.89 
4th  0.045 0.037 0.048 0.024 0.071  0.56 0.61 0.71 0.59 1.01 
3rd  0.021 0.012 0.029 0.021 0.049  0.26 0.20 0.43 0.51 0.70 
2nd  0.024 0.018 0.018 0.022 0.019  0.30 0.30 0.27 0.54 0.27 
1st  0.022 0.019 0.001 0.017 0.007  0.28 0.31 0.02 0.42 0.10 
             
 
Values in columns (1) – (5) are the average predicted probability of entering the teaching profession, by decile, for a female 
with at least a high school degree.  These columns correspond to reported (weighted) results in Table 2.8.  See Appendix A 
for the predicted probabilities, based on unweighted regression results.  Values in columns (6) – (10) are the predicted 
probabilities in columns (1) – (5), normalized by the sample mean for each cohort. 
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Sample size (males with at 
least a high school degree) 
 
4,379 1,527 6,444 4,984 3,855
Number of teachers 169 69 135 62 87
  
Mean centile ranking 60.6 59.6 60.9 71.6 64.6
Mean standard score 0.39 0.30 0.37 0.78 0.50
  
Average predicted 
probability of teaching 
 
     1st-2nd deciles 0.013 0.016 0.009 0.002 0.007
     3rd-4th deciles 0.042 0.033 0.013 0.006 0.020
     5th-6th deciles 0.038 0.059 0.025 0.009 0.024
     7th-8th deciles 0.038 0.049 0.025 0.009 0.025
     9th-10th deciles 0.063 0.067 0.027 0.025 0.038
  
Average predicted 
probability divided by 
sample mean 
 
     1st-2nd deciles 0.328 0.363 0.438 0.197 0.323
     3rd-4th deciles 1.067 0.731 0.585 0.554 0.885
     5th-6th deciles 0.976 1.306 1.182 0.898 1.070
     7th-8th deciles 0.985 1.084 1.186 0.883 1.150
     9th-10th deciles 1.624 1.485 1.247 2.490 1.733
 
Predicted probabilities are calculated in the same manner as those in Table 2.9.  
Probabilities have been computed for males with at least a high school degree, of 
average age.   Sampling weights were used in columns (3), (4), and (5).  See Appendix 







POPULATION HETEROGENEITY, INCOME INEQUALITY,  
 





At the same time that public school districts are struggling to attract the most 
talented candidates into the teaching profession (shown in chapter two), they are also 
facing a different kind of challenge—rising heterogeneity within their own 
constituencies.  These demographic changes could have significant implications for 
the future of public education in the United States.  For example, in the presence of 
human capital spillovers, greater interaction between families of different skills, 
incomes, races, or language abilities through the education system may do much to 
reduce long-run inequalities in income and educational attainment in the population, 
as Benabou (1996), Schwab and Oates (1991) and others have suggested.  On the 
other hand, if this increased heterogeneity is accompanied by significant disagreement 
over the level or use of school resources, some school district residents may respond 
by reducing their support for public schooling, or by withdrawing from the system 
altogether. 
Heterogeneity within school districts has risen markedly since 1970.43  
Districts have not only become more racially and ethnically diverse, but also more 
                                                 
43 We show this to be true along a number of dimensions in a sample of 8,700 unified 
public school districts, in Section 3.3. 
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heterogeneous in age, educational attainment, native language and immigrant status, 
religious preference, home ownership rates, and wealth.  Rising inequality in income 
is another important dimension of heterogeneity within school districts—at the 
national level, household income inequality rose over 16 percent between 1969 and 
1999 (as measured by the Gini coefficient); about three quarters of all U.S. school 
districts experienced a rise in income inequality to some degree over this period.44  To 
the extent that these population characteristics are correlated with household 
preferences for education, it seems likely that greater fractionalization in these 
characteristics would have some effect on local support for education.  The question of 
how these trends in heterogeneity and income inequality have actually affected local 
school districts, however, is largely unexplored. 
Economists and other social scientists have begun to examine the impact of 
heterogeneity on public finance in general, and much of the evidence thus far suggests 
that heterogeneity within jurisdictions tends to reduce the support for public programs.  
Explanations for this finding have varied.  One model, for example, assumes that a 
voter’s willingness to support public spending depends on how close their preferred 
use of funds is to their expected use.  In this model, as preferences become more 
polarized, the typical voter becomes more likely to disagree with the median voter 
over the ultimate use of funds and chooses to reduce their support for public spending 
                                                 
44 See http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/ie6.html (access date August 9, 
2003) for Census data on nationwide household income inequality.  As we show in 
Section 3.3, rising income inequality has not been strictly a between-district 
phenomenon. 
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altogether.45  Other authors have suggested a special case of this model, where voters’ 
support for public programs depends on the share of beneficiaries who come from the 
same socioeconomic or ethnic group.46   
The link between income inequality and school finance has also received some 
attention.  Epple and Romano (1996) and Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) have 
developed theoretical models that show that rising income inequality may be harmful 
to school spending.  Epple and Romano describe the problem as “the ends against the 
middle,” where high-income households oppose spending on public schools because 
of their high demand for private schools, and poorer families prefer lower taxes and 
expenditure in general.47 
In this chapter, we use the demographic characteristics from a national panel of 
8,700 unified school districts in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 to explore how changing 
within-district population heterogeneity has affected local support for public 
education.  We measure support for education in two ways—local tax dollars and 
student participation—and examine the impact of heterogeneity on both local 
education revenues per student and the fraction of students within district boundaries 
who enroll in private schools.  We utilize a within-group estimator that holds constant 
the permanent unobserved characteristics of school districts and examines whether 
                                                 
45 Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999). 
46 Luttmer (2001). 
47 Goldin and Katz (1997) find some evidence that income inequality slowed the 
development of secondary schooling in some communities during the first half of the 
20th century.  They attribute this in part to the opposition of both high- and low-
income families to higher spending on education. 
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changing within-district support for schools over time is correlated with changes over 
time in population heterogeneity.  Because school spending varies considerably across 
states and time, we also hold constant changes in spending that are common to all 
districts in a state for a given year. 
We find that rising income inequality within a school district actually increases 
the level of real per-pupil expenditure at the local level, a finding consistent with a 
median voter model in which rising income inequality reduces the tax price to the 
voter with the median income.  This result is robust to several measures of income 
inequality, and across numerous sample definitions.  We find that increased 
heterogeneity in race and schooling reduce per-pupil expenditure somewhat; greater 
racial heterogeneity within a school district also tends to increase the proportion of 
children who enroll in private schools.  Income inequality appears to have little impact 
on private schooling. 
 This chapter is organized as follows.  In Section 3.2, we argue that despite 
opportunities to migrate between jurisdictions (a key assumption of the Tiebout 
hypothesis), communities in practice are in fact quite heterogeneous.  Given that 
perfect stratification of households is rare, we explore some of the ways in which 
heterogeneity might affect support for schools by presenting a simple median voter 
model of school spending; we also briefly review other literature on this subject.  
Section 3.3 describes our empirical model and data.  Section 3.4 presents our results, 




3.2 Heterogeneity and Collective Choice 
3.2.1 Some Evidence on Heterogeneity and Tiebout Sorting 
Before we address why heterogeneity within a community might affect the 
demand for local public goods, a prerequisite question might be: why do local 
communities have heterogeneous populations?  The benchmark local public finance 
theory of community formation—that of Tiebout (1956)—largely ignores 
heterogeneity within jurisdictions by assuming that households costlessly sort into 
homogeneous communities that offer their preferred level of public services.48  
Multiple jurisdictions, together with zoning regulations and a property tax, create an 
efficient “market” for public goods in which each household exactly satisfies their 
demand for public services, and (through the capitalization of taxes and benefits into 
property values) faces a “price” commensurate with their level of demand for those 
services.49 
In practice, communities are often much more heterogeneous than the Tiebout 
model might predict.50  Labor market decisions, moving costs, government 
interventions into the housing market, infrequent entry and exit of governments, the 
                                                 
48 We emphasize that perfect Tiebout sorting implies homogeneity in preferences for 
public spending, not necessarily in observed characteristics (see Hamilton (1976), 
Epple and Platt (1998)).  In practice, however, demand for education spending appears 
to be strongly correlated across households with similar observed characteristics. 
49 Hamilton (1975) introduced the idea of municipal zoning into the original Tiebout 
model.  Zoning acts not only as a barrier to entry (resulting in an inelastic supply of 
housing in the locality) but also as a tool in which municipalities can indirectly set the 
tax price that households pay for local services.  
50 In the words of Oates (1981), “the pure [Tiebout] model … involves a set of 
assumptions so patently unrealistic as to verge on the outrageous.” 
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bundling of public services, and imperfect information about communities all act as 
barriers to perfect sorting across jurisdictions.  Communities also seem to be willing to 
tolerate some heterogeneity in the population in return for economics of scale in the 
production of public goods.  Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby (2000) find evidence for such 
a tradeoff in U.S. school districts, municipalities, and special districts over the 1960-
1990 period. 
Yet even as Tiebout “market imperfections” have mitigated over time, 
communities remain significantly less homogeneous than one would expect.51  In a 
recent paper, Rhode and Strumpf (forthcoming) document a persistent decline in 
stratification by race, income, education, and age (as well as other proxies for public 
spending preferences) across U.S. municipalities and counties over the past century, 
despite plummeting mobility costs that in theory should have facilitated greater 
Tiebout sorting.  Perhaps the most striking of their findings relates to income—they 
show that within-county income inequality has remained roughly constant since 1949 
(declining over the 1949-1979 period, and then rising thereafter), while between-
county inequality declined over the 1949-1979 period (but rose modestly during the 
1980s).  This result parallels a similar finding for counties within the Boston 
                                                 
51 Rhode and Strumpf (forthcoming) argue that improvements in transportation and 
communications technology have contributed to large reductions in moving costs over 
time; Fischel (2001) claims that the suburbanization of America has minimized the 
importance of labor market decisions and commuting costs in household location 
decisions, and increased households’ ability to sort among jurisdictions. 
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metropolitan area over the same years.  The authors interpret these results as evidence 
of little, if any, increase in sorting by income across U.S. counties over time.52 
Other authors have pointed out patterns or trends in demographics that appear 
on the surface to be inconsistent with perfect Tiebout sorting.  Pack and Pack (1978) 
in a frequently cited paper find sufficiently large variation in income and house prices 
within communities in Pennsylvania MSAs to rule out perfect Tiebout sorting.  Cutler, 
Glaeser and Vigdor (1999)—while not intended as a test of the Tiebout hypothesis per 
se—find evidence of a persistent increase in racial integration within census tracts in 
metropolitan areas, and particularly in suburban tracts, since 1970.53   
The question of how much heterogeneity is sufficient to refute the Tiebout 
hypothesis persists, and none of these findings should be taken as prima facie evidence 
against Tiebout sorting.  Indeed, a score of capitalization studies, beginning with Oates 
(1969), have demonstrated that homebuyers almost certainly take local policies into 
account when making their housing investments.  They do, however, suggest that 
forces other than Tiebout sorting have been important enough to prevent perfect 
                                                 
52 The sharp decline in the number of local jurisdictions over this period of falling 
mobility costs would also appear to support this conclusion. 
53 It should be pointed out that race and ethnicity continue to be important correlates 
with preferences over local policies, independent of income.  A recent article in The 
Washington Post about opinions in Prince George’s County, Maryland—a county 
described in the article as “a symbol of black affluence”—is illustrative: “A stark 
divide exists in the way blacks and whites view a broad spectrum of institutions and 
conditions in Prince George's County, from the police and public schools … Blacks 
were twice as likely to be satisfied with the public schools and to view the police force 
as being overly aggressive … Half of blacks said African Americans do not hold 
enough political power, [and] half of the whites said it would be better if more whites 
moved to Prince George's.” [“Prince George’s Split Along Race Lines, Poll Shows,” 
August 25, 2002]. 
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stratification of households across communities along demographic characteristics—a 
condition that is key to our analysis that follows. 
 
3.2.2 A Median Voter Model of School Expenditure 
Absent the ability (or desire) to sort into perfectly homogeneous jurisdictions, 
conflicting household demands for public goods must instead be resolved through the 
political process.54  When public decisions are made through non-market processes, it 
becomes necessary to consider the mechanism through which household preferences 
are aggregated into a collective choice.  In the public finance literature, the median 
voter model remains a simple yet powerful tool for modeling the demand for public 
goods in heterogeneous communities.  Under certain conditions (among other things, 
preferences that are single-peaked), the median voter model predicts that voting by 
majority rule over a single-dimensional public good will result in the provision of the 
median voter's desired level of public services. 
To better understand how increased heterogeneity or income inequality might 
affect school expenditure (and to help motivate our empirical analysis in the next 
section), we present a stylized median voter model of a community voting over the 
size of a local school budget.  Household-voters are allowed to be heterogeneous first 
in income, and later in preferences over the nature (but not the size) of the school 
budget.  This simple model is intended only to be illustrative of some of the ways in 
which population heterogeneity might affect school spending—for convenience, we 
                                                 
54 Drazen (2000) points out that even when preferences for public goods are identical 
within a community, voters often have the incentive to disagree over the incidence of 
taxation (he refers to this as ex-post heterogeneity in the electorate). 
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have ignored many important features of real communities, including mobility 
between jurisdictions, and private schooling alternatives.  We discuss the implications 
of these extensions to the model at the end of this section. 
 
Model 
 Suppose there are H households in a school district, each containing one school 
aged student, and one voter.  Household income yh is exogenous and distributed 
according to f(yh), a non-symmetric income distribution.  Preferences over public 
schooling and private consumption are identical across households, and are given by 
the following utility function for household h: 
(1) u(g, ch) 
where g = G/H is per pupil expenditure (the same for all households), G is the total 
school budget, H is the number of households and ch is private consumption (the price 
of both g and ch is assumed to be one). 
School district residents determine by majority vote the size of the district 
budget G, as well as a constant proportional tax rate on income t.55  The individual 
household and government budget constraints are given by (2) and (3), respectively: 
(2) yh = c + tyh 
                                                 
55 Most school districts in the United States finance local school expenditures via 
property taxes, not income taxes (the average unified school district in 2000-01 
received 65 percent of its local revenues from property taxes, and less than 1 percent 
from income taxes (see U.S. Bureau of the Census (2001))).  Our interest in this paper, 
however, is the effect of income inequality on school spending.  While income and 
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In this expression, the term in brackets represents the "tax price" of an additional unit 
of per-pupil expenditure to household h.  Solving the household's optimization 
problem is straightforward, and results in the following first order condition which 


















If u(·) is quasi-concave, preferences will be single-peaked and the median voter 
theorem will apply.  If demand for g is monotonic in income (see panel (a) of Figure 
3.1 for an illustration)—the majority voting outcome will be that level of g demanded 
by the household with the median income (ym).  In this simple case, the level of per-
pupil spending observed in each school district will be a function of both the median 
income in the district and the tax price to the median household (which differs from 
one whenever the distribution of income is skewed, and in particular will be less than 
one whenever yh < µy).  As the median voter's tax share falls—as when, for example, 
the mean income in the district grows relative to the median—the price of an 
additional unit of school spending to the median voter falls, and the median voter will 
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optimally choose a higher level of per-pupil expenditure.56  In this scenario, an 
increase in income inequality that raises the mean district income relative to the 
median income should be expected to increase per-pupil spending.57 
Demand for g may not, however, be monotonic in income.58  If both low- and 
high-income households prefer lower levels of per-pupil expenditure (shown in panel 
(b) of Figure 3.1), per-pupil expenditure may have no clear systematic relationship 
with median income (the household with the median income will no longer be the 
decisive voter), and any increase in income inequality that results in higher 
concentrations of households in the tails of the income distribution is likely to result in 
lower levels of per-pupil spending. 
From the baseline model presented above, greater income inequality will tend 
to increase expenditure when demand is monotonic in income (when greater income 
inequality represents a lower tax price for the median income household); it tends to 
lower expenditure when demand is not monotonic in income (a case of “the ends 
against the middle”).  However, even when demand for school spending is monotonic 
in income, rising heterogeneity in the population may lead to reductions in total 
spending for other reasons, as we consider in the following extension. 
Following Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) we extend our simple model by 
assuming that households have identical preferences over the levels of per-pupil 
                                                 
56 Whether or not the median voter outcome is socially efficient is another question (it 
will not be, in general)—see Rubinfeld (1987). 
57 Extending this model to allow for the disincentive effects of taxation do not 
qualitatively change this result—see Meltzer and Richard (1981). 
58 See Stiglitz (1974). 
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spending and private consumption, but are allowed to disagree over the nature of 
school spending (a disagreement over an appropriate school curriculum is one 
example).  Let the parameter φh represent the distance along the ideological line 
between household h’s ideal use of the school budget and the actual use of the budget, 
and modify the household utility function from (1) to read: 59 
(6) u(g(1-φh), ch), 0 < φh < 1 
In this modified utility function, the marginal utility from an additional dollar 
of per-pupil expenditure is reduced to the extent that household h disagrees with the 
way in which the school budget is spent (that is, the higher is ϕh).  Put another way, to 
household h the effective level of per-pupil expenditure is g*=g(1-ϕh).  In a 
homogeneous district with no disagreement over the nature of school expenditures, ϕh 
will be zero for all households. 
Now suppose that the size and the nature of the school budget are determined 
in a two-stage process.  First, households vote over the size of the school budget (G, t).  
They then vote over an appropriate curriculum (more generally, the allocation of the 
budget).  Using backward induction, voters know that in the second stage, the median 
voter (i.e. the voter with the median ideology) will prevail in the choice of a 
curriculum.  Forward-looking voters will be able to anticipate this outcome—and thus 
know their (1 – φh)—and vote accordingly for their optimal (G, t) in the first stage.  
The household optimization problem will be identical to that above, but with the 
following first order condition: 
                                                 

























As in (5), h's optimal choice of g is decreasing in the household's tax share, but 
now support for school spending will be further diminished to the extent that 
household h expects to disagree with the median voter over the use of school funds.  In 
households where φh=0, this first order condition reduces to (5).  As φh goes up, 
however, the price of an effective unit of g is increased—if households do not receive 
the full benefit of an additional unit of g, they will (according to this result) be less 
willing to substitute away from private consumption. 
In the above extension, even when demand for g is monotone in income, the 
majority-voting outcome may not correspond to that level of g preferred by the voter 
with the median income; instead, the effect of heterogeneity in preferences over the 
allocation of g may dominate and determine the identity of the decisive voter.  Hence, 
we may observe lower levels of per-pupil spending in districts where heterogeneity 
exists along dimensions other than income that are correlated with preferences over 
the allocation of public funds—race, ethnicity, age, religion, native language and 
educational backgrounds are but a few possible examples. 
The introduction of private schooling alternatives considerably complicates 
this theoretical analysis, as other authors, including Stiglitz (1974), Epple and Romano 
(1996), and Glomm and Ravikumar (1998) have shown.  Both Glomm and Ravikumar 
(1998) and Epple and Romano (1996) prove the existence of a majority-voting 
equilibrium in the presence of private alternatives—in the former, the focus is on an 
equilibrium in which the voter with the median income is decisive, in the latter several 
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possible equilibria are shown to exist.  Epple and Romano argue that for public goods 
like education, the likely majority voting equilibrium will be one in which there are 
two opposing coalitions of voters—one comprised of high- and low-income 
households who prefer a low level of expenditure on public education (with high-
income households opting for private schooling alternatives), and another made up of 
middle-income households who prefer a high level of public expenditure on education.  
Thus, where private schooling alternatives exist, greater income inequality may 
increase the likelihood of an “ends against the middle” outcome, with lower spending 
on education and higher rates of private schooling. 
While the model presented in this section provides few clear predictions about 
the impact of income inequality and population heterogeneity on support for public 
education, it does illustrate some of the ways in which diversity in the local population 
might affect school financing and overall participation in the public schools.  It 
remains an empirical question as to how these forms of heterogeneity actually do 
affect public support for education in practice.  Before introducing our own empirical 
model in Section 3.3, we summarize in the following section a growing empirical 
literature that has begun to explore the relationship between population heterogeneity 
and public finance.   
 
3.2.3 Related Literature 
 A small but growing empirical literature has begun to study the impact of 
heterogeneity on public expenditure, and much of this literature appears to suggest that 
population heterogeneity reduces the support for public programs.  Alesina, Baqir, and 
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Easterly (1999), for example, find that ethnic fragmentation within cities, counties, 
and metropolitan areas is negatively related to public spending on education and 
infrastructure.  Similarly, Poterba (1997), Murray and Ladd (2000), and Harris, Evans, 
and Schwab (2001) show that per-pupil education spending within school districts 
declines with the elderly share, an observation consistent with an elderly preference to 
vote down public programs that they themselves do not benefit from.60   
In a study of the growth of secondary schooling the United States during the 
early part of the 20th century, Goldin and Katz (1997) find that localities that 
supported the expansion of secondary schools were more likely to have relatively 
equal income distributions, as well as populations that were homogeneous in religious 
or ethnic background.  Hoxby (1998) points out that the time pattern of spending 
inequality across school districts closely follows that of national income inequality—
i.e. “the two decades in which spending inequality rose the most (the 1930’s and the 
1970’s) were also decades of rising income inequality.  The decade in which spending 
inequality fell the most (the 1940’s) was a decade of falling income inequality” (p. 
310).   
In another strand of this empirical literature, several authors have found that 
interpersonal preferences—that is, preferences for social programs that depend on the 
types of individuals who benefit from them—may also play a role in the support for 
public spending.  Luttmer (2001), for example, finds using individual-level data from 
the General Social Survey that support for redistribution declines in the number of 
                                                 
60 Both Harris et al and Murray and Ladd find that this effect is less pronounced at the 
local level, where elderly homeowners are likely to benefit indirectly from education 
spending via property values. 
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local welfare recipients, but rises with the share of recipients who come from the same 
racial group.  Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) argue that differences in U.S. and 
European support for welfare spending can be largely explained by interpersonal 
preferences—because welfare recipients in the United States are disproportionately 
black, the majority of (non-black) voters seem to be unwilling to support a generous 
system of redistribution. 
A smaller literature has looked at the impact of local population heterogeneity 
on private school enrollment.  Betts and Fairlie (2003) use household-level Census 
data from 1980 and 1990 to test whether a rising foreign-born population is associated 
with higher enrollment of (native-born) white students in private schools.  While they 
find no relationship between immigration and enrollment in private elementary 
schools, they do find a statistically significant impact of immigration on enrollment in 
private secondary schools (they attribute this effect primarily to differences in the 
native languages of school-aged children).  Clotfelter (1997) finds that private school 
enrollment is positively affected by income inequality and the presence of nonwhites 
in the public schools.  Hoxby (2000) includes measures of income inequality and 
racial and ethnic heterogeneity in district- and MSA-level regressions in a paper 
assessing the impact of school district competition on private school enrollment, 
school expenditure, and student achievement, but (because her paper focuses on the 
effects of competition between school districts) does not discuss her empirical findings 
on these measures. 
Finally, in a separate context some authors have treated income inequality or 
other measures of within-district heterogeneity as endogenous variables; many of 
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these papers might be characterized as tests of the Tiebout sorting hypothesis within 
urban areas.  Urquiola (2000), for example, examines how competition between 
school districts within metropolitan areas affects the level of ethnic heterogeneity and 
income inequality within school districts.  He finds that greater competition within 
MSAs tends to result in greater homogeneity in income and race within school 
districts located in those MSAs.  Aaronson (1999) finds that the school finance 
reforms of the 1970s and 1980s (which effectively reduced the level of between-
district competition in affected states) reduced sorting by income across school 
districts (which he measures using within-district measures of income inequality).61 
Through our empirical model introduced in the next section, we hope to 
contribute to this literature by examining the relationship between changes in within-
school district heterogeneity over time (specifically, fractionalization in race and 
schooling, and income inequality) and support for public education, as measured 
through per-pupil spending, and private school enrollment.    
 
3.3 Empirical Model and Data 
3.3.1 Econometric Strategy 
 The goal of this chapter is to examine how rising within-district heterogeneity 
has affected the support for public education.  The stylized model and subsequent 
discussion in Section 3.2 suggested several ways that increased heterogeneity might 
affect this support.  First, when demand is monotone in income, increased income 
                                                 
61 See also Eberts and Gronberg (1981), Grubb (1982), and Schmidt (1992), for other 
empirical studies that treat within-district income inequality as an endogenous 
variable. 
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inequality may represent a reduction in the tax price to the voter with the median 
income, yielding an increase in the overall level of spending.  Where demand is not 
monotonic in income, increased income inequality may decrease total spending on 
education.  Second, even if demand is monotone with income, heterogeneity in 
preferences over the nature of school spending may result in reduced support for 
public education if households find themselves unable to agree over the allocation of 
school funds.  Interpersonal preferences that reflect households’ willingness to support 
members of other racial or socioeconomic groups may be important in this context.  
Third, where private schooling alternatives exist, rising income inequality may result 
in a coalition of “the ends against the middle,” where low- and high-income 
households reduce their support for public education (and the wealthy enroll in private 
schools).  Finally, to the extent that mobility is an option, some households may 
respond to greater within-district heterogeneity through exit. 
 In this section, we present an empirical model designed to explore how 
changes in within-district heterogeneity over time are associated with changes in local 
support for public education.  We estimate this model with a balanced panel of 
roughly 8,700 school districts in the United States over a 30-year period.62  The unique 
structure of our data allows us to control for certain unobserved characteristics 
correlated with tastes for education spending and private schooling that a cross-
sectional analysis would not, a feature we describe in further detail below. 
 
                                                 
62 This data is described in more detail in Section 3.3.2 (following), and in Appendix 
B. 
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Our basic empirical model is as follows: 
(8) ijtjtijijtijtijt SHXy εδγβ ++++= . 
Our endogenous variable yijt is, alternately, local per-pupil education revenues in 
district i in state j in year t, and the fraction of students within district i's boundaries 
enrolled in private school in year t.63  Xijt is a vector of exogenous demographic and 
socioeconomic characteristics in district i in year t thought to be correlated with tastes 
for school expenditure and private schooling, while Hijt is a vector of within-district 
population heterogeneity measures (explained further below).  Specifically, we include 
in Xijt measures of the racial composition of the district, median family income, the 
fraction of households in poverty, the share of housing units in the district that are 
owner-occupied, and the educational attainment of district residents.64  Our vector of 
heterogeneity measures Hijt includes indices of within-district fractionalization in race 
and years of schooling, and varying measures of income inequality.65  The error term 
εijt is assumed to have a zero mean and constant variance. 
                                                 
63 Per-pupil revenues and per-pupil expenditures are nearly identical measures 
(revenue data excludes capital expenditures), so we will use these terms 
interchangeably.   
64 The inclusion of these variables follows a long tradition of empirical estimation of 
demand functions for local public goods.  See Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) for the 
seminal empirical work on the demand for local public goods.  Lovell (1978), Brown 
and Saks (1985), Brazer and McCarty (1987), Rubinfeld and Shapiro (1989), Santerre 
(1989), Magna and Lee (1990), and Sass (1991) all provide examples of empirical 
estimates of demand functions for school spending.  Most models typically include a 
“tax price” as a right-hand-side variable.  We do not, however as discussed in Section 
3.2, our measure of income inequality may proxy for the tax price to the median voter. 
65 Our data includes other interesting measures of population heterogeneity, including 
the foreign born share of the population, the distribution of English language ability 
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Because much of the variation in local revenues and private school enrollment 
shares is between districts—not within districts over time—we include district fixed 
effects (δij) in each model.  While much of the between-district variation in spending 
and private school enrollment can be explained through observed district 
characteristics, one might be concerned that there are unobserved characteristics (e.g., 
a stronger preference for education) that are correlated with our right-hand-side 
variables of interest (e.g., income).  Our district fixed-effects will capture any of these 
unobserved characteristics that are permanent within districts over time. 
Likewise, some of the variation in school revenues and private schooling 
shares may be due to state-specific trends in or shocks to these variables that are also 
correlated with our right-hand side variables.  For example, a statewide economic 
downturn may affect both local revenues for education and income inequality.  We 
include year-specific state effects Sjt in each of our models to capture any such 
trends.66    
Taken together, our empirical model estimates how local per-pupil revenues 
and private school enrollment shares change as population demographics and within-
district heterogeneity change over time, absent any trends in these variables within a 
state.  Our use of district fixed-effects implies that we are using a within-group 
                                                                                                                                            
within a district, and the distribution of housing values within a district.  We hope to 
incorporate these measures into the empirical model in a later version of this paper. 
66 We will also be estimating this model on a sample of school districts within 
metropolitan areas.  In those specifications, we include year-specific MSA effects, 
rather than state-year effects. 
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estimator, which means that we will use within-district variation in population 
heterogeneity and spending over time to identify our parameter of interest (γ). 
 One might be concerned that some of the changes over time in within-district 
population heterogeneity are in response to the policies or performance of local school 
districts (in particular, to the spending policies of the district).  Work by Urquiola 
(2000), Aaronson (1999), and others discussed in the previous section suggested that 
income inequality within school districts might in part be a function of the 
competitiveness of the local market for education.  Where households have a greater 
ability to Tiebout-sort into neighboring districts, dissatisfaction with local school 
spending may result in out-migration and a subsequent change in the local income 
distribution.  To the extent this sorting occurs, our heterogeneity measures Hijt will be 
endogenous and ordinary least squares estimates of γ will be biased and inconsistent. 
 We deal with the potential endogeneity of Hijt in several ways.  As a first pass, 
we interact Hijt with several different measures of local school district competition, to 
see whether the impact of local population heterogeneity on local spending varies 
across districts with different sorting opportunities.  If sorting is important, we might 
expect that any impact that local population heterogeneity might have (positive or 
negative) on district revenues would be lessened in districts with greater sorting 
opportunities.  Next, we estimate (8) using subsamples of low-mobility districts (as 
measured by the percent of residents who lived in a different county five years earlier) 
and districts located outside of metropolitan areas, where Tiebout sorting would seem 
less likely to be an important force.  Finally, we estimate an instrumental variables 
model, where we instrument for within-district income inequality using a measure of 
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income inequality from a nearby district outside a specified distance.  The idea here is 
to identify the effect of local income inequality only with that portion of within-district 
income inequality that is attributable to regional labor market conditions, not to inter-
district sorting.  
 
 
3.3.2 Data Sources 
 
 The empirical strategy outlined above requires a dataset that contains school-
district level demographic and financial data, together with detailed measures of 
within-district population heterogeneity and income inequality.  There is no readily 
available data source that meets all of these criteria—however, we constructed such a 
data set by merging eight national school district data sources: the 1970 Census of 
Population and Housing Special Fifth-Count Tallies, the 1980 Census of Population 
and Housing Summary Tape File 3F, the 1990 Census School District Special 
Tabulation, the 2000 Census of Population and Housing School District Tabulation 
(STP2), the 1972, 1982, and 1992 Census of Governments: School Districts, and the 
2000-01 F-33 School System Finance File.67  The first four of these data sets provide 
detailed information about the demographic characteristics of the population living 
within each U.S. school district, while the latter represent the primary historical source 
of school finance data in the United States.  By merging these eight data sources, we 
were able to construct a national panel of the socioeconomic, demographic, and 
financial characteristics of unified public school districts for 1970, 1980, 1990, and 
                                                 
67 Caroline Hoxby (1996 and 2001) was the first to merge these datasets (at least 
through 1992) to create a national panel of public school districts.     
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2000.  Detailed information about the construction and contents of this panel can be 
found in Appendix B.68 
 School districts in the United States are typically organized as unified (K-12), 
elementary-only, or secondary-only districts.  Because the organization and cost 
structure varies across these different types of school districts, we chose to restrict our 
analysis to unified districts.  This decision was not overly restrictive—despite having 
only 62 percent of all U.S. districts in our panel (as measured in 2000-01), the 
included districts represent over 80 percent of all publicly enrolled K-12 students in 
the nation.69   
 In our analysis in Section 3.4, we make use of three different samples of school 
districts.  The first is our full sample of unified public school districts, a balanced 
panel of 8,699 school districts in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 (a total of 34,796 
observations).  The other two are subsets of the full panel—one a sample of districts 
located in metropolitan areas (MSAs), with 3,292 districts (13,168 observations), and 
the other the remaining sample of districts located outside of MSAs, with 5,407 
                                                 
68 An earlier version of this panel was used in Harris, Evans, and Schwab (2001).  For 
information about the construction of the original panel, see Harris (1999), at 
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/econ/evans/wkpap.htm (access date August 9, 2003). 
69 Total public Pre-K-12 enrollment in 2000-2001 was 47 million, according to the 
2001 Digest of Education Statistics (see http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2001/digest/dt003.asp, 
access date August 10, 2003).  Our panel represents a total of 37.7 million K-12 
students in 2000.  About a third of all unified districts in 2000 are missing from our 
panel—this is due primarily to the aggregation of small districts in the 1970 Census 
data, or the consolidation of districts over the sample period.  See Appendix B for 
details. 
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districts (21,628 observations).70  Within-district variation in population heterogeneity 
and income inequality tends to be greater and more prevalent in urban areas; private 
schooling also tends to be more important in urban areas where private schools are 
more plentiful than in rural or sparsely populated districts.  Thus, we present most 
results for both the full sample of districts and our subset of districts in MSAs.  On the 
other hand, our estimates from the MSA subsample are most likely to suffer from the 
endogeneity bias discussed in the previous section.  Therefore, we supplement our 
results with estimates from the non-MSA subsample, where appropriate. 
Our two endogenous variables are local school district revenues per pupil, and 
the fraction of school age children enrolled in private school.  Data on local revenues 
per pupil comes from the Census of Governments data files.  This variable represents 
all revenues raised locally for education, via property taxes, income taxes, sales taxes, 
special fees, or any other local revenue source.  Of course, more than half of the 
typical school district’s budget comes from outside the district, from state or federal 
sources.  However, we focus on local revenues because we feel this measure best 
reflects local commitment to public education.  Private school enrollment shares (at 
least in 1970, 1980, and 1990) are calculated using enrollment data from the special 
school district tabulations of the decennial Census.  Unfortunately, the Census did not 
provide private school enrollment counts in 2000.  To obtain these counts, we used 
                                                 
70 Appendix B provides the counts of school districts in each state.  Districts were 
included in the MSA subsample if they reside in a county that was considered part of a 
metropolitan area according to the U.S. Census 1973 standards (see 
http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/metro-city/73mfips.txt (access date 
August 9, 2003) for a complete list of 1973 metropolitan areas). 
 79
GIS shapefiles to match census tracts to school districts and aggregate private school 
enrollment counts to the school district level.  See Appendix B for details.     
No measures of within-district heterogeneity or income inequality were 
available in any of our source datasets.  We were, however, able to generate our 
measures using data from the Census demographic files.  Our measures of within-
district heterogeneity in race and schooling are simple fractionalization indices—one 
minus the sum of the squared population shares across four different race or 
educational attainment categories.71  These fractionalization indices range from zero to 
one, and can be interpreted as the probability that two randomly selected school 
district residents come from different race or educational backgrounds.  A value of 
zero would indicate a perfectly homogeneous district; a value closer to one would 
represent greater heterogeneity.72 
 Generating a measure of within-district income inequality was a bit more 
difficult.  While the Census frequently reports Gini coefficients of income inequality 
at the state and national level, they do not report these coefficients for smaller 
geographic areas like counties or school districts.  Fortunately, our Census data does 
contain some information about the distribution of income in each school district, in 
the form of counts of families who fall into certain income ranges in each year.  As we 
                                                 
71 For race fractionalization, our categories in all years are: white, black, Asian and 
Pacific Islander (API), and “other.”  For fractionalization in schooling, our categories 
are the fraction of the population 25 and older who are high school dropouts, high 
school graduates only, recipients of some college education, or college graduates (and 
higher).  See Appendix B. 
72 With four categories, the largest value that our fractionalization index can take is: (1 
– (.252 + .252 +.252 +.252)) = 0.75.  See Vigdor (2001) for a theoretical interpretation 
of these indices. 
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explain in Appendix B, if one assumes a flexible functional form for the CDF of 
income within a district, the counts of families in each income group can be used in a 
maximum likelihood procedure to estimate the parameters of this distribution.  Given 
these parameters, the Gini coefficient can then (for some distributions) be directly 
calculated.  We assume that family income in each school district follows a three-
parameter Dagum (1977, 1980) distribution—a re-parameterization of the Burr Type 
III distribution—and compute Gini coefficients of income inequality for each district 
in our panel.  In addition to these school district Ginis, we use the Dagum parameters 
to compute three other measures of within-district income inequality—the log of the 
ratio of the 95th centile of income to the median income (the log(95/50) ratio), the log 
of the ratio of the median income to the 5th centile of income (the log(50/5) ratio), and 
the log of the ratio of the 95th centile of income to the 5th centilie of income (the 
log(95/5) ratio). 
 
3.3.3 Overview of Data 
 Summary statistics for our full sample and MSA subsample are provided in 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2.  In these tables—as with all of our regression models—school 
district observations are weighted by the number of publicly enrolled students in the 
district, and all monetary variables are in constant (1992) dollars.  Through weighting, 
we are estimating the impact of population heterogeneity or income inequality on a 
randomly selected public school student from the population.73 
                                                 
73 In our regressions where the private school enrollment share is our left hand side 
variable, we weight using the total school age population in each district, rather than 
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 The rise in within-district heterogeneity and income inequality alluded to in 
our introduction is observable in both our full sample and MSA subsample—
heterogeneity in race and schooling have risen monotonically over the 1970-2000 
period in both samples, as has income inequality, as measured by both the Gini 
coefficient and the log(95/50) ratio.  In the full sample, we find that the average Gini 
coefficient has risen almost 15 percent, from 0.34 to 0.39; our indices of schooling and 
race fractionalization rose 14 percent and 90 percent, respectively.74  With the 
exception of schooling fractionalization, the growth in within-district heterogeneity 
was even more striking in MSAs, with income inequality in the average district rising 
19 percent, from 0.33 to 0.39; race fractionalization more than doubled, from 0.18 to 
0.36.75  Inequality in the lower half of the income distribution (as measured by the 
log(50/5) ratio) also rose over the 1970-1990 period in both samples, but fell slightly 
from 1990 to 2000. 
                                                                                                                                            
public school enrollment.  We have experimented with several other weights, 
including an average of public school enrollment over the 1970-2000 period.   Our 
results are generally insensitive to our choice of weights.   
74 By comparison, household income inequality reported by the Census rose 16.2 
percent nationwide, from .401 to .466 (see 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/ie6.html, access date August 9, 2003).  It 
is interesting to point out that average schooling fractionalization in 2000 is near its 
four-category maximum of 0.75, as the fraction of school district residents with less 
than a high school degree, a high school degree only, some college, and college or 
more have converged to roughly 25 percent each in the full sample. 
75 The increase in income inequality, race and schooling fractionalization was less 
dramatic outside of urban areas.  In our non-MSA sample, income inequality rose 5.1 
percent on average from 1970 to 2000 (from a Gini coefficient of 0.362 in 1970 to 
0.380 in 2000), compared to a 14.6 percent average increase in our MSA sample.  The 
increase in our race and schooling fractionalization indices were 24.8 percent and 53.8 
percent in our non-MSA sample (compared to 10.3 percent and 100 percent in the 
MSA sample). 
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 Tables 3.1 and 3.2 also show a steady rise in real local per-pupil revenues over 
our sample period.  While the average district in our full sample raised $1,861 in 
revenues per-pupil in 1970 (in 1992 dollars), by 2000 this sum had risen to $2,736.  At 
the same time, local school districts were contributing a smaller and smaller share of 
their total per-pupil budget—we see that the local share of total per-pupil revenues has 
steadily fallen, from over half in 1970 to just above 40 percent in 2000.  Most of this 
decline is attributable to large increases in state support for education over this 
period—on average, state contributions to district per-pupil spending rose more than 
127 percent from 1970 to 2000.76   
 There was no discernible trend in private school enrollment shares over this 
time period in the full sample—mean district enrollment in private schools in our 
sample remained roughly constant at 10 percent.  Not surprisingly, the private school 
enrollment share was higher in metropolitan areas—on average, about 12 percent of 
school age children were enrolled in private schools in our MSA sample; only 6 
percent of K-12 children outside of MSAs were enrolled in private schools over our 
sample period (although there is a distinct upward trend in private school enrollment 
in non-MSA districts—the share in private schools was about 4.9 percent in 1970, and 
7.0 percent in 2000).77 
                                                 
76 See Corcoran, et al (2003) for a recent survey. 
77 We also noticed a downward trend in private school enrollment shares in some of 
the largest U.S. urban school districts over this period, particularly between 1990 and 
2000.  Our finding that private school enrollment shares rose significantly outside of 
MSAs may be due to measurement error in our 2000 private school enrollment share 
variable, which was constructed by matching census tracts to school districts (rural 
districts were most likely to suffer from measurement error under this method—see 
Appendix B).  
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One might be concerned that these observed increases in mean within-district 
heterogeneity and income inequality are driven by our use of enrollment weights—in 
other words, that income inequality or race fractionalization was only important in a 
few select heavily populated districts.  Table 3.3 shows this not to be the case.  In this 
table, we provide greater detail about the distribution (both weighted and unweighted) 
of within-district changes in income inequality, race, and schooling fractionalization in 
our sample.  Just under 75 percent of the school districts in our full sample 
experienced a rise in income inequality between 1970 and 2000; nearly 90 percent of 
these districts became more fractionalized in race and schooling.78  On the average, the 
likelihood that two randomly selected individuals from a school district come from a 
different ethnic or educational background rose by nine and eleven percentage points 
in the full sample, respectively. 
 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Local Revenues per Pupil 
 We begin by estimating our empirical model in equation (8), using local 
revenues per pupil as our endogenous variable.  Again, we include district fixed 
effects and year-specific state effects in all specifications, and all observations are 
weighted by total district public school enrollment.  The results are shown in Table 
3.4.   
                                                 
78 The shape of this distribution was virtually identical for districts outside of MSAs.  
Roughly 75 percent of districts saw an increase in income inequality, and 90 percent 
saw an increase in race fractionalization.  Almost 99 percent saw an increase in 
schooling fractionalization. 
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 Our baseline specification in column (1) includes a detailed set of demographic 
and economic controls, as well as a within-district Gini coefficient of income 
inequality.  In columns (2) – (4) we add our two other heterogeneity measures (race 
and schooling fractionalization), and in column (5) two additional controls (the 
percent of district households with children, and the fraction of the district population 
residing in an urbanized area).     
Our estimated coefficient on the Gini coefficient is positive, sizable, and 
statistically significant.  Across these five columns, our point estimate of this 
coefficient ranges from $3,028 to $3,567, with a standard error of about $225 in all 
cases.  The inclusion of our additional heterogeneity measures and controls have little 
effect on our estimate of this coefficient—in fact, if we were to construct a 95% 
confidence interval around these five estimates, all pairwise comparisons of these 
intervals would overlap.  Given that the mean Gini coefficient in our sample is about 
0.36 (with a standard deviation of 0.06), this result suggests that a two standard 
deviation increase in income inequality within a district in the full sample is associated 
with a $363 to $428 increase in per-pupil spending.  This estimate is quite large—
roughly equivalent in magnitude (by our estimates) to a $8,500 increase in real median 
district family income (or, about a 21 percent increase over the average median 
income across districts). 
The estimated coefficients on our demographic and economic characteristics 
are generally of the expected sign, and qualitatively similar to those found in other 
empirical estimates of local demand functions for education.  Real local per-pupil 
revenues are positively related to median family income, with a $1,000 increase in real 
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median family income associated with a $43 to $53 increase in per-pupil spending 
(implying an approximate income elasticity of demand for per pupil spending of 0.7 to 
0.9 at the mean, quite in line with other estimates, see Rubinfeld (1987)).  Per-pupil 
revenues tend to be lower, all else equal, in districts with higher poverty rates and in 
districts where a greater proportion of residents are nonwhite; per-pupil revenues are 
higher in districts with a greater fraction of college graduates and a greater share of 
residents who are 65 and older.79  We also find the typical “renter effect” found in 
other empirical estimates of local demand functions for public goods—a one standard 
deviation increase in the fraction of homeowners is associated with roughly a  $170 to 
$300 decrease in per-pupil spending.80 
Race and schooling fractionalization appear to have a negative impact on real 
per-pupil revenues in the full sample (statistically significant at conventional levels), 
although our point estimate for the fractionalization in schooling coefficient is far 
larger than that for fractionalization in race.  Given a mean race fractionalization index 
of 0.25 in the full sample (and a standard deviation of 0.20), we estimate that a one 
standard deviation increase in race fractionalization is associated with a $40 decrease 
in local per-pupil spending.  By contrast, the effect of a one standard deviation rise in 
schooling heterogeneity is about a $178 to $195 decrease in per-pupil spending. 
                                                 
79 Our estimated coefficient on the elderly share would seem to contradict the 
conclusion of Harris, Evans and Schwab (2001) that a larger elderly population share 
reduces public spending on education.  However, in their paper they find that the 
impact of the elderly is much less pronounced at the local level, where older voters 
may feel that greater spending on education is capitalized into property values.  Their 
model also uses the log of total revenues or local revenues as left hand side variables, 
which seems to have some effect on their result. 
80 See Oates (1998) for a survey of the “renter effect” literature. 
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Based on our results in the first five columns of Table 3.4, it would appear that 
increases in within-district heterogeneity in race and schooling are associated with 
reductions in the level of real per-pupil spending, while rising within-district income 
inequality seems to increase (by a sizable amount) real per-pupil expenditure.  These 
results are consistent with the idea that heterogeneity in preferences for educational 
spending correlated with race or educational background (but not necessarily with 
income) tend to reduce support for public schooling.  They also appear to be consistent 
with the median voter theory outlined in Section 3.2 where changes in the income 
distribution affect the tax price to the median voter, and the level of educational 
expenditure demanded.  We explore this idea further in columns (6) – (10).  
In columns (6) through (10) of Table 3.4, we replace our Gini coefficient 
measure of income inequality with two other measures—the logged ratio of the 95th 
centile of income to the median (log(95/50)), and the logged ratio of the median 
income to the 5th centile (log(50/5)).  The former can be considered a measure of 
income inequality in the top half of the distribution, while the latter measures income 
inequality in the bottom.  Given our stylized model in Section 3.2, increases in income 
inequality that increase the mean income relative to the median should lower the tax 
price to the voter with median income, and increase per-pupil spending; increases that 
reduce the mean income relative to the median should reduce per-pupil spending.  We 
find exactly this pattern in columns (6) through (10)—as the 95th centile of income 
rises relative to the median within a district, we observe increases in per-pupil 
spending; as the 5th centile of income falls relative to the median, we observe 
decreases.  Specifically, a one percentage point increase in the 95th centile of income 
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relative to the median is associated with (all else equal) an $8.20 increase in real per-
pupil revenues; a one percentage point increase in the median income relative to the 
5th centile of income is associated with a $1.81 decline in per-pupil revenues.  Given 
that the standard deviations of these variables in our full sample are 0.18 and 0.32, 
respectively, a two standard deviation increase in the log(95/50) ratio would increase 
spending per-pupil by $294; a two standard deviation increase in the log(50/5) ratio 
would decrease spending by $116.  Our estimates of the coefficients on race and 
schooling fractionalization in these columns are nearly identical to those in columns 
(1) through (5). 
Clearly, a 0.01 increase in the log(95/50) ratio will not have an equivalent 
effect on the tax price to the median voter as a 0.01 fall in the log(50/5) ratio.  Because 
households at the top of the income distribution comprise a disproportionate share of 
total income, an increase in the log(95/50) ratio will add more to mean income than an 
equivalent decline in the log(50/5).  Therefore, to compare the magnitudes of our 
coefficient estimates on these inequality measures, we performed the following 
exercise: using the estimated parameters for the income distribution in each district, 
we computed the fraction of total district income coming from the bottom quartile 
(ℓ(0.25), where ℓ(p) is the Lorenz curve for an individual district) and the fraction of 
total district income comprised by the top quintile (1-ℓ(0.75)).  Averaged across all 
districts, the upper quartile makes up roughly 47 percent of total income; the bottom 
quartile makes up about 8 percent of total income.  Thus, for the mean district, a 
hypothetical rise in income of 10 percent among the top quartile of the distribution 
(with an accompanying rise in the 95/50 ratio of 10 percent) will increase mean 
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income by 4.7 percent.  A rise in income of 10 percent among the bottom quartile of 
the distribution (with an accompanying fall in the 50/5 ratio of 10 percent) will 
increase mean income by 0.8 percent.  In other words, a 10 percent rise in income at 
the top of the distribution (for the mean district) will have an effect on total income 
that is roughly 5.8 times that of 10 percent rise in income at the bottom of the 
distribution.  This ratio is similar in magnitude to the ratio of our two regression 
coefficients on the log(95/50) and the log(50/5): the coefficient on the log(95/50) is 
4.5 times that on the log(50/5) ratio, suggesting that our coefficient estimates—in 
relative terms—are quite reasonable.  
Table 3.5 presents the results of the same ten specifications in Table 3.4, 
estimated on our subsample of districts located in MSAs.81  Our coefficient estimates 
for the effect of income inequality on school spending are quite similar to those in 
Table 3.4.  Based on this sample of districts in MSAs, we estimate that a two standard 
deviation increase in the Gini coefficient corresponds to a $442 to $564 increase in 
per-pupil spending, about the same size effect when considered as a percentage of 
mean local revenues per pupil (mean per-pupil revenues in our sample of MSA 
districts is higher than that for our full sample).  Increases in the log(95/50), log(50/5), 
and schooling fractionalization index all have similar effects in the MSA subsample as 
in the full sample.  The primary difference between our estimates using the full sample 
and our estimates from the MSA subsample is our coefficient estimate for race 
fractionalization—in contrast to the full sample results, our point estimate for this 
                                                 
81 In these regressions we use time-specific MSA effects (which subsume state level 
trends), rather than state effects.  The results are not significantly changed when state 
effects are used. 
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coefficient is positive, and statistically significant in all specifications except column 
(5).  
In summary, our results so far find a consistent positive relationship between 
income inequality and local per-pupil revenues, whether income inequality is 
measured using a Gini coefficient, or through the log(95/50) and log(50/5) ratios.  This 
result holds for our full sample of districts, as well as our subsamples of districts in 
MSAs.  The same is true for heterogeneity in schooling—we find a sizeable negative 
relationship between fractionalization in educational attainment and per-pupil 
spending across all samples.  We find some evidence that race fractionalization 
decreases per-pupil revenues in our full sample; the opposite result arises in our 
subsample of MSAs.  In the next section, we consider another possibility—whether 
heterogeneity in population characteristics or income result in an increase in a change 
in the fraction of children enrolled in private schools. 
 
3.4.2 Private School Enrollment Share 
 Table 3.6 presents our coefficient estimates from model (8), where our 
dependent variable is now the fraction of school age children within a district enrolled 
in private schools.  The order of model specifications is exactly the same as that in 
Table 3.5, and we continue to include district fixed effects and year-specific state 
effects in all models.  In these regressions, we weight all observations by total K-12 
enrollment (i.e. both public and private) in the district.82  
                                                 
82 This weight (public plus private enrollment) is more appropriate in this context than 
total public enrollment.  Rather than weighting to estimate the impact of population 
 90
 We find that in the full sample, the Gini coefficient of income inequality has a 
negative, statistically significant relationship with the fraction of students enrolled in 
private school.  Our point estimates range from –0.041 to –0.051, with a standard error 
of 0.011 in all cases.  Given that the standard deviation of income inequality in our 
sample across all years is 0.06, these estimates suggest that a two standard deviation 
increase in income inequality within a school district is associated with a 0.2 to 0.3 
percentage point reduction in the share of school aged children enrolled in private 
schools.  With a mean private school enrollment share of 10 percent, this effect 
represents about a two to three percent rise in the private school enrollment share over 
the mean, a small but not insignificant effect.83 
 Our estimated coefficients on our demographic and economic controls are 
mostly as expected.  Private schooling shares tend to be lower in districts where a 
greater share of the population is nonwhite, in poverty, or are homeowners; private 
schooling shares rise with the fraction elderly and with real median family income (we 
find that a $1,000 increase in real median family income is associated with about a 0.2 
percentage point increase in private schooling). 
                                                                                                                                            
heterogeneity on the average student (appropriate in our school spending regressions), 
we weight here to account for heteroskedasticity in our error term (the fraction of 
students enrolled in private schools is an estimate from the Census 1-in-6 longform 
data, an estimate that is likely to be more precise in more populated school districts).  
We have experimented with other weights with these specifications (public 
enrollment, average total enrollment over the sample period, etc), and the choice of 
weights has little effect on our results. 
83 This finding is dependent on our use of weights.  In the unweighted version of these 
regressions, we find a positive and statistically significant effect of income inequality 
on private schooling (in the unweighted version of column (4), we estimate this 
coefficient to be 0.019, with a standard error of 0.009).  
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 Our results for race and schooling fractionalization are somewhat 
contradictory.  While we find that increased racial fractionalization has a positive, 
statistically significant relationship with private schooling, we find the opposite is true 
with fractionalization in schooling.  According to Table 3.6, a one standard deviation 
increase in race fractionalization within districts (0.20 in the full sample) is associated 
with a 0.36 to 0.38 percentage point increase in the fraction of students enrolled in 
private schools; a one standard deviation increase in schooling fractionalization (0.07), 
on the other hand, corresponds with a 0.27 to 0.37 percentage point reduction in the 
private schooling share. 
 Table 3.7 presents the same five specifications, estimated using the subsample 
of districts in MSAs.  Here, we find generally the same pattern—increases in within-
district income inequality are associated with reductions in the share of students 
enrolled in private schools, while increases in racial fractionalization increase the 
private school enrollment share.  However, in this case, our estimate for the coefficient 
on income inequality is imprecise—in no column in Table 3.7 is the negative 
coefficient on income inequality statistically significant. 
 
3.4.3 The Influence of School District Competition 
 In Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, we found that rising income inequality within 
school districts over the 1970-2000 period has been associated with higher local per-
pupil revenues and lower private school enrollment ratios (although the latter effect is 
quite small and is statistically insignificant in our subsample of districts in MSAs).  
Greater heterogeneity in race shows a consistent and statistically significant negative 
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relationship with per-pupil spending, and appears to have a positive impact on private 
school enrollment rates.  Heterogeneity in schooling seems to be associated with lower 
per-pupil spending (across all samples), but also appears to lower private school 
enrollment rates, a result that is not easily explained by our stylized model in Section 
3.2. 
As we explained in Section 3.3, where mobility between school districts is 
possible, households may respond to rising within-district heterogeneity in income, 
race or schooling through exit.  To the extent that this sorting occurs, we might expect 
to see our results weakened in school districts located in regions with a higher degree 
of choice. 
To test this idea, we estimate model (8) again on our subsample of districts in 
MSAs, but now interact our Gini coefficient of income inequality or fractionalization 
indices with various indicators of local school district competition.84  As Appendix B 
explains in greater detail, we constructed eight different measures of area school 
district competition—the count of public school districts within a 10-, 25-, and 50-
mile radius (dists10, dists25, and dists50), the fraction of enrollment within a 10-, 25- 
and 50-mile radius that are enrolled in district i (frac10, frac25, and frac50), the 
number of districts per student in the same MSA (diststud), and finally (following 
Hoxby (2000)) an enrollment fractionalization index for the MSA (or, one minus a 
Herfindahl index using the enrollment shares of all districts within an MSA).  We then 
placed districts into quintiles based on their placement in the distribution of these eight 
                                                 
84 School district competition is generally a meaningful concept only within 
metropolitan areas.  Therefore, we present these results only for districts in MSAs. 
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measures (in 2000), and interacted our Gini coefficient or fractionalization index with 
quintile dummies (the lowest quintile dummy is excluded in all regressions).  The 
results of this exercise are in Table 3.8.85 
 Our results from this experiment are mixed, and vary across our different 
measures of public school district competition.  When the number of districts within 
25 or 50 miles is used as our measure of area competition, we find that the coefficient 
on income inequality is the largest in districts that face the least competition (with 
point estimates of $7,700 to $7,948), and lower in districts in higher quintiles of 
competition, although the pattern is not monotonically decreasing in the level of 
competition (nor is this pattern observed when other measures of competition are 
used).  Similarly, the negative coefficient on schooling fractionalization is highest in 
districts with the lowest levels of competition (as measured by dists25 and dists50); 
this coefficient gets smaller in magnitude in districts with more competition (although 
the coefficients on the interaction variables are not always statistically significant).   
 When using district i's share of total enrollment within 10-, 25-, and 50-miles 
as our measure of competition, we find that the negative coefficient on race 
fractionalization is largest in districts with the least competition;86 this negative 
                                                 
85 In panel (1) of Table 3.8, we estimate a specification like that of column (1) in Table 
3.6, but add interactions between the Gini coefficient and competition quintile 
dummies.  In panels (2) and (3), we estimate a regression model similar to that of 
column (4) in Table 3.6, but add interactions between our race and schooling 
fractionalization indices and competition quintile dummies.  Only the coefficient 
estimates on the interaction variables are reported. 
86 Quintiles of the frac10, frac25, and frac50 variables are read in the opposite 
direction—when a greater fraction of enrollment within m miles is enrolled in district 
i, we think of district i as facing less competition. 
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coefficient is almost entirely offset in districts facing higher levels of competition.  No 
discernible pattern is apparent, however, when this measure of competition is used 
with income inequality or schooling fractionalization.  Likewise, this trend in 
coefficients is not observed under other measures of school district competition. 
 Our mixed results in Table 3.8 may be due to imperfect measures of school 
district competition, or may arise because Tiebout-sorting across districts is not strong 
enough to have a clear impact on our results.  In Section 3.4.4 we attempt to further 
deal with the potential problem of sorting across districts by repeating our analysis in 
Section 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 with a subsample of low-mobility districts and a sample of 
districts residing outside of urban areas. 
 
3.4.4 A Robustness Check: Low Mobility Districts and Districts Outside of MSAs 
 In this section, we repeat our analysis from Section 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, but with 
two additional subsamples—the first, a sample of “low mobility” districts, with a 
relatively low proportion of new residents, and the second a sample of districts that lie 
outside of metropolitan areas.  To construct our “low mobility” sample, we selected all 
of those districts that were in the lowest three quintiles of household migration—that 
is, with the lowest proportion of households that lived in a different county five years 
prior to the 1980, 1990 and 2000 censuses.87  3,955 districts met our criteria for 
                                                 
87 Specifically, we placed each district into a quintile of migration (the fraction of 
households who lived in a different county five years before) for 1980, 1990, and 2000 
(migration information was not available in the 1970 census tabulation).  If a district 
was in the lowest three quintiles of this distribution in all three census years, we 
included them in our subsample. 
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inclusion in this subsample.88  These low mobility districts were not strictly rural, 
unpopulated districts—in fact, over 40 percent of the districts in our low mobility 
sample were located in MSAs. 
 Our findings are summarized in Table 3.9.  Coefficient estimates on income 
inequality, race, and schooling fractionalization are qualitatively similar to those found 
for the full sample and MSA sample in Section 3.4.1 and 3.4.2.  A two standard 
deviation increase in income inequality is associated with a $308 increase in per-pupil 
spending in our low mobility sample (about 13.8 percent of the sample mean in low 
mobility districts, a slightly smaller effect in percentage terms than the full sample 
result), and a $180 increase in per-pupil spending in our non-MSA sample (about 9.3 
percent of the non-MSA sample mean).  As in our MSA sample, there is no 
statistically significant impact of income inequality on the private schooling share in 
either our low mobility sample or our non-MSA sample.  Schooling fractionalization 
continues to have a negative relationship with the private school enrollment share, 
while fractionalization in race continues to have a positive relationship with private 
schooling (although this coefficient is statistically insignificant in our non-MSA 
subsample). 
 It appears that our general findings from Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 are robust to 
varying definitions of our underlying school district sample—with few exceptions, we 
find the same pattern of results across these subsamples.   
 
                                                 
88 The mean fraction of households who lived in a different county, by quintile in 2000 
were 9 percent, 12.7 percent, 15.7 percent, 19 percent, and 26.9 percent. 
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3.4.5 Instrumental Variables Results 
 Finally, in this section, we estimate our per-pupil spending regression in (8) 
using an instrumental variables model in which we instrument for within-district 
income inequality with a measure of inequality from another nearby school district.  
As we discussed in Section 3.3, our OLS estimates of the impact of income inequality 
on local per-pupil revenues may be biased and inconsistent if households sort into 
districts based on the level of per-pupil revenues—it may be that changes in income 
inequality over time within a school district are due in part to the in- and out-migration 
of families who are responding to changes in local school finance policies. 
 We address this possibility by estimating three instrumental variables models, 
where our instruments for within-district income inequality are the Gini coefficient for 
the closest school district, the Gini coefficient for the closest district in another county, 
and the Gini coefficient for the closest district in another state.89  To the extent that 
changes in income inequality within a school district over time are due to (exogenous) 
regional labor market conditions, we would expect that the level of income inequality 
in a district and that of its neighboring districts to be highly correlated.  It is this 
portion of variation in within-district income inequality that we would like to use to 
identify the impact of income inequality on local per-pupil revenues—not the variation 
in inequality that is a mechanical response to inter-district sorting.  Of course, the 
problem is identifying districts that are close enough to be subject to the same 
economic conditions, but far enough away to preclude any sorting effects. 
                                                 
89 More information about the construction of these instrumental variables can be 
found in Appendix B. 
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 In Figure 3.2, we illustrate the spatial distribution of within-district income 
inequality across school districts in the United States.90  Each block within this figure 
is a unified, elementary or secondary school district; shading within each block 
indicates the school district’s quartile in the nationwide distribution of within-district 
income inequality, where darker shading represents a higher degree of income 
inequality.   This figure suggests that the level of within-district income inequality is 
in many parts of the United States a regional phenomenon, with the level of income 
inequality highly correlated across neighboring districts.  Much of the South, 
Appalachia, the Northeast corridor, Texas and California is characterized by smooth 
patterns of regional within-district inequality—not the checkerboard pattern that one 
might see if there were high degrees of sorting occurring between districts (the Upper 
Midwest is an exception to this rule—while some of this pattern in the Upper Midwest 
can be explained by missing data, the degree of spatial correlation in these districts is 
certainly lower). 
 The results of our first-stage regressions shown in column (1) of Table 3.10 
confirm this pattern.  The estimated coefficients on our three instruments are precisely 
estimated and have the correct sign—within-district income inequality is highly 
correlated with income inequality in the nearest district, nearest district in another 
county, and nearest district in another state, and the first-stage coefficient falls 
monotonically with distance.91  Column (2) reports our instrumental variables estimate 
                                                 
90 All school districts (unified, elementary, and secondary) and included in this Figure.  
Some districts (but not all) without shading are missing income inequality data. 
91 Note t-statistics are reported in this table rather than standard errors.  Our first- and 
second-stage regressions both incorporate observation weights. 
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of the coefficient on income inequality from specification (4) in Table 3.4.  With our 
first two instruments, our IV estimates of the coefficient on income inequality ($2,980 
and $2,837) are only slightly less than our original point estimate from column (4) in 
Table 3.4 ($3,512), and well within a 95 percent confidence interval around our 
original estimate.   Our third instrument (income inequality within the nearest district 
in another state) produces an IV estimate that is less than half that produced by the 
first two instruments ($1,167).   
 
3.5 Summary and Conclusion 
 In this chapter, we have used a panel of unified school districts to estimate the 
effects of local population heterogeneity and income inequality on the support for 
public schools.  We measured support for schools using two variables—local per-pupil 
education revenues and the fraction of district students enrolled in private schools.  
Our results suggest that rising income inequality within a district may actually 
increase per-pupil revenues, a result consistent with a median voter model in which 
rising income inequality lowers the tax price to the voter with the median income 
(which occurs when the mean income rises relative to the median income).  The 
estimated impact of income inequality on per-pupil revenues is sizable—about a $200 
(or 8 percent) per-pupil rise in local expenditure for a one standard deviation increase 
in income inequality—and robust across a number of specifications.  We also find 
that, all else equal, increased fractionalization in race tends to reduce local per-pupil 
expenditure on education, and increase the fraction of school aged children in private 
school.  Fractionalization in schooling also tends to reduce educational spending; it 
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also tends to be associated with lower private school enrollment rates—a result that 









Source: 2000 Census of Population and Housing School District Tabulation (STP2) 
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample












Gini coefficient 0.36 0.06 0.34 0.05 0.35 0.05 0.38 0.05 0.39 0.06
Schooling fractionalization 0.68 0.07 0.62 0.08 0.68 0.05 0.71 0.03 0.71 0.04
Race fractionalization 0.25 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.22 0.19 0.26 0.20 0.33 0.20
Log(95/50) ratio 0.97 0.18 0.88 0.16 0.92 0.15 1.00 0.17 1.06 0.18
Log(50/5) ratio 1.59 0.32 1.51 0.28 1.57 0.28 1.66 0.37 1.61 0.31
Real local revenues per pupil 2,238.88  1,436.64   1,861.13  1,029.60  1,847.05  1,116.59   2,520.25  1,691.41    2,736.23  1,592.98          
Real state revenues per pupil 2,305.86  1,140.92   1,377.46  577.81     2,004.72  743.27      2,736.82  1,088.42    3,134.63  1,128.50          
Real federal revenues per pupil 143.58     242.41      79.41       185.37     22.78       66.58        23.41       84.38         421.61     264.83             
Real total revenues per pupil 4,688.32  1,757.46   3,318.00  1,091.00  3,874.54  1,049.20   5,280.49  1,527.98    6,292.46  1,453.48          
Local share of total revenues 0.47         0.19          0.54         0.18         0.46         0.19          0.45         0.20           0.42         0.18                 
Fraction enrolled in private school 0.10         0.07          0.10         0.08         0.10         0.07          0.10         0.07           0.10         0.06                 
Real median family income (thousands) 39.38       11.60        36.47       9.70         38.52       9.52          39.62       12.16         42.83       13.54               
Percent of households in poverty 0.13         0.08          0.14         0.09         0.13         0.07          0.13         0.08           0.12         0.07                 
Percent high school dropouts 0.32         0.16          0.48         0.13         0.34         0.13          0.26         0.11           0.20         0.10                 
Percent high school grads only 0.31         0.08          0.31         0.07         0.35         0.07          0.31         0.08           0.29         0.08                 
Percent with some college 0.19         0.09          0.10         0.04         0.15         0.05          0.24         0.06           0.27         0.06                 
Percent college grads or higher 0.17         0.11          0.10         0.07         0.15         0.08          0.19         0.10           0.23         0.12                 
Percent nonwhite 0.23         0.22          0.16         0.17         0.20         0.20          0.24         0.23           0.30         0.25                 
Percent black 0.12         0.15          0.11         0.14         0.12         0.15          0.12         0.16           0.12         0.15                 
Percent hispanic 0.08         0.14          0.05         0.10         0.06         0.12          0.09         0.15           0.13         0.18                 
Percent of housing units owner occupied 0.67         0.15          0.66         0.15         0.67         0.15          0.66         0.14           0.68         0.14                 
Share of district population aged 65+ 0.11         0.04          0.10         0.04         0.11         0.04          0.12         0.04           0.12         0.04                 
Share of district population aged 0-19 0.33         0.06          0.39         0.05         0.33         0.04          0.29         0.04           0.29         0.04                 
Percent urban 0.72         0.35          0.70         0.36         0.70         0.36          0.71         0.35           0.77         0.31                 
Share of households with children 0.41         0.10          0.43         0.10         0.48         0.08          0.39         0.07           0.35         0.07                 
The full sample consists of 8,699 districts for a total of 34,796 observations.  All monetary values are in real 1992 dollars.  Observations are weighted by district public enrollment.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for MSA Subsample












Gini coefficient 0.36 0.06 0.33        0.05        0.35        0.05        0.37        0.06         0.39        0.06          
Schooling fractionalization 0.69 0.05 0.65        0.06        0.70        0.04        0.72        0.03         0.71        0.04          
Race fractionalization 0.27 0.20 0.18        0.17        0.24        0.19        0.30        0.20         0.36        0.20          
Log(95/50) ratio 0.96 0.19 0.86        0.14        0.90        0.15        1.00        0.18         1.08        0.20          
Log(50/5) ratio 1.57 0.32 1.44        0.25        1.57        0.30        1.66        0.39         1.62        0.32          
Real local revenues per pupil 2,477.32 1,511.99 2,086.06 1,045.29 2,012.04 1,142.70  2,817.00 1,809.03  3,001.09 1,677.53    
Real state revenues per pupil 2,279.66 1,170.99 1,333.62 556.88    2,012.39 781.64     2,709.84 1,144.69  3,094.32 1,179.50    
Real federal revenues per pupil 143.70    237.47    90.32      203.06    21.92      46.99      20.67      61.04       407.96    255.51       
Real total revenues per pupil 4,900.68 1,805.41 3,510.00 1,134.36 4,046.35 1,045.86  5,547.52 1,588.72  6,503.36 1,513.36    
Local share of total revenues 0.50        0.19        0.58        0.16        0.48        0.18        0.48        0.21         0.45        0.18          
Fraction enrolled in private school 0.12        0.07        0.13        0.08        0.12        0.07        0.12        0.07         0.12        0.05          
Real median family income (thousands) 42.56      11.74      39.85      8.90        41.37      9.49        43.14      12.46       45.82      14.31        
Percent of households in poverty 0.11        0.07        0.11        0.07        0.11        0.07        0.12        0.08         0.11        0.07          
Percent high school dropouts 0.30        0.15        0.45        0.12        0.31        0.11        0.23        0.10         0.19        0.10          
Percent high school grads only 0.31        0.07        0.32        0.06        0.35        0.07        0.29        0.07         0.27        0.08          
Percent with some college 0.20        0.08        0.11        0.04        0.17        0.04        0.26        0.06         0.28        0.05          
Percent college grads or higher 0.19        0.11        0.12        0.07        0.17        0.09        0.22        0.10         0.26        0.12          
Percent nonwhite 0.25        0.23        0.17        0.17        0.22        0.21        0.27        0.23         0.34        0.25          
Percent black 0.12        0.15        0.11        0.13        0.13        0.15        0.13        0.16         0.13        0.16          
Percent hispanic 0.09        0.15        0.05        0.10        0.07        0.13        0.11        0.16         0.15        0.18          
Percent of housing units owner occupied 0.64        0.16        0.64        0.17        0.64        0.16        0.63        0.15         0.65        0.15          
Share of district population aged 65+ 0.10        0.04        0.09        0.04        0.10        0.04        0.11        0.04         0.11        0.04          
Share of district population aged 0-19 0.32        0.06        0.39        0.05        0.32        0.04        0.29        0.04         0.29        0.04          
Percent urban 0.86        0.25        0.84        0.27        0.84        0.26        0.86        0.25         0.89        0.20          
Share of households with children 0.41        0.10        0.44        0.11        0.48        0.09        0.38        0.08         0.35        0.07          
The MSA subsample consists of 3,292 districts for a total of 13,168 observations.  Districts are included in this sample if they resided in a county that was located in a
metropolitan area, according to 1973 standards.  All dollar values are in real 1992 dollars.  Observations are weighted by district public enrollment.
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Table 3.3: 1970-2000 Changes in Income Inequality and Fractionalization (Full Sample)
Percent Change in Absolute Change in Absolute Change in
Gini Coefficient Race Fractionalization Schooling Fractionalization
1970 - 2000 1970 - 2000 1970 - 2000
Unweighted
Mean 0.070 0.090 0.110
5th centile -0.161 -0.030 -0.023
10th centile -0.115 0.003 0.018
25th centile -0.032 0.023 0.058
Median 0.065 0.053 0.098
75th centile 0.166 0.126 0.160
90th centile 0.259 0.253 0.242
95th centile 0.314 0.340 0.286
Weighted
Mean 0.152 0.165 0.086
5th centile -0.075 -0.033 -0.068
10th centile -0.027 0.010 -0.015
25th centile 0.059 0.047 0.036
Median 0.153 0.133 0.079
75th centile 0.245 0.271 0.132
90th centile 0.327 0.383 0.207
95th centile 0.352 0.442 0.262
The full sample consists of 8,699 districts for a total of 34,796 observations.  In the bottom half of the table,
observations have been weighted by district public enrollment.
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Table 3.4: OLS Results, Real Local Revenues per Pupil (Full Sample) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
gini coefficient 3027.949 3567.246 2972.546 3512.481 3166.224
(224.955) (226.650) (225.959) (227.762) (226.512)
schooling fractionalization index -2567.613 -2536.565 -2794.346 -2318.540 -2584.821
(166.517) (167.268) (166.751) (169.193) (168.729)
race fractionalization index -214.596 -181.801 -221.404 -130.935 -172.976
(81.701) (81.369) (80.726) (81.702) (81.043)
log(95/50) ratio 817.549 817.551 901.052 821.097
(60.366) (60.329) (60.933) (60.559)
log(50/5) ratio -181.953 -181.955 -96.071 -101.325
(31.585) (31.474) (32.103) (31.862)
%in poverty -2482.635 -3264.822 -2531.773 -3299.914 -2988.629 -2130.684 -935.398 -1567.377 -2504.377 -2227.480
(182.108) (188.247) (183.476) (189.559) (188.611) (173.191) (193.752) (198.626) (209.100) (207.833)
real median family income (in thousands 53.794 46.158 53.663 46.112 43.327 54.428 49.171 54.182 47.087 44.366
(1.485) (1.559) (1.490) (1.565) (1.587) (1.495) (1.454) (1.495) (1.577) (1.600)
%25+ with hs degree -3033.690 -1223.948 -3095.914 -1299.337 -1055.264 -3014.752 -3067.578 -2945.000 -1390.950 -1139.183
(134.275) (177.881) (135.458) (179.507) (178.676) (134.354) (134.979) (134.811) (179.273) (178.441)
%25+ with some college -3036.286 -1578.145 -3078.951 -1625.641 -1594.207 -3074.307 -3444.511 -3068.799 -1802.402 -1746.642
(149.977) (176.726) (150.774) (178.093) (177.702) (149.385) (147.214) (149.295) (177.177) (176.787)
%25+ with college degree or more 541.574 1295.409 647.875 1397.811 1543.837 541.495 1170.399 650.531 1413.223 1560.989
(188.450) (193.862) (189.597) (195.130) (193.803) (188.395) (185.941) (189.220) (195.737) (194.360)
%nonwhite -675.257 -417.098 -564.734 -326.214 -208.826 -627.699 -485.005 -537.525 -277.585 -162.267
(80.052) (81.429) (98.048) (98.874) (98.356) (79.797) (81.451) (81.258) (99.363) (98.806)
%owner-occupied housing -2022.990 -1739.002 -2120.288 -1835.229 -1135.103 -2041.469 -1975.310 -2004.006 -1848.083 -1145.728
(112.099) (113.100) (114.751) (115.780) (121.393) (112.111) (112.603) (112.229) (115.847) (121.453)
%population 65+ 3945.198 3890.683 3906.324 3848.956 988.935 4020.055 4228.813 4060.944 3950.442 1072.111
(217.168) (216.213) (220.613) (219.672) (262.010) (216.763) (217.150) (216.744) (219.452) (262.020)
%hh with kids -2131.128 -2136.685
(109.398) (109.377)
%population in urban area -315.219 -332.743
(41.576) (41.599)
Constant 1446.526 2226.333 1574.761 2331.974 3512.677 1676.509 2594.959 1802.047 2618.816 3778.438
(147.113) (154.932) (149.273) (156.778) (165.600) (138.901) (128.189) (140.502) (151.397) (160.015)
Observations 34,795 34,795 34,620 34,620 34,620 34,795 34,795 34,795 34,620 34,620
Adjusted R2 0.8616 0.8629 0.8976 0.8637 0.8659 0.8616 0.8962 0.8618 0.8637 0.8659
The sample consists of a balanced panel of 8,699 unified public school districts located in 48 U.S. states, for the years 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000.  All specifications include district fixed effects
and year-specific state effects.  Observations have been weighted by district public enrollment.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3.5: OLS Results, Real Local Revenues per Pupil (MSA Sample) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
gini coefficient 3685.229 4531.783 3889.188 4706.562 4231.799
(435.097) (438.988) 438.210 441.922 441.342
schooling fractionalization index -3754.109 -3695.838 -3803.477 -3469.368 -3568.159
(340.090) 341.410 340.602 (343.427) (342.617)
race fractionalization index 315.7557 292.3407 181.181 386.9414 271.3389
139.292 138.424 137.916 (139.282) (138.745)
log(95/50) ratio 984.854 1027.915 1304.26 1192.615
(119.381) (119.648) (121.812) (121.415)
log(50/5) ratio -271.2465 -321.1577 -253.4194 -274.3108
(72.053) (72.001) (72.721) (72.377)
%in poverty -5140.159 -5730.376 -5089.314 -5672.242 -4843.792 -4556.552 -2436.957 -3206.573 -3829.93 -3000.027
(430.656) (431.153) (433.281) (433.882) (438.358) (407.534) (501.308) (507.287) (515.469) (517.527)
real median family income (in thousands 26.347 14.54663 26.25154 14.6048 14.29247 27.301 22.96902 27.62077 16.84638 16.80965
(2.579) (2.776) (2.586) (2.786) (2.859) (2.602) (2.554) (2.601) (2.808) (2.884)
%25+ with hs degree -3724.542 -1131.218 -3642.823 -1096.829 -851.493 -3702.848 -3588.624 -3536.498 -1085.003 -841.3435
(278.334) (362.834) (279.757) (364.125) (364.302) (278.407) (281.662) (280.608) (363.976) (363.964)
%25+ with some college -3888.257 -1052.375 -3782.982 -997.0155 -1129.456 -3941.223 -4436.519 -3872.899 -1166.55 -1257.938
(283.336) (381.088) (284.524) (382.311) (383.321) (282.307) (275.802) (282.430) (380.191) (381.271)
%25+ with college degree or more 363.332 1511.418 404.1174 1534.511 1839.34 348.407 965.3603 510.0054 1548.377 1862.301
(341.018) (354.382) (343.708) (357.130) (356.013) (341.600) (340.399) (343.164) (358.226) (357.019)
%nonwhite -1520.788 -1304.978 -1768.74 -1535.767 -1319.796 -1493.100 -1447.24 -1402.302 -1511.869 -1294.81
(151.794) (152.058) (183.088) (183.193) (183.961) (151.867) (153.590) (153.069) (183.590) (184.279)
%owner-occupied housing -1582.617 -1246.164 -1604.787 -1274.594 -353.7409 -1639.867 -1653.105 -1636.604 -1348.155 -428.2555
(206.170) (207.070) (212.249) (213.094) (236.213) (206.041) (206.642) (205.829) (212.650) (235.924)
%population 65+ 5290.021 5321.697 5192.584 5245.644 2527.209 5405.570 5588.27 5478.383 5388.6 2650.369
(384.262) (381.747) (397.484) (394.988) (476.903) (383.619) (384.886) (383.569) (394.365) (476.632)
%hh with kids -1991.623 -1987.403
(209.181) (209.016)
%population in urban area -429.4353 -469.2901
(79.781) (79.763)
Constant 2733.165 3853.622 2625.426 3736.48 4636.67 3026.195 4122.569 3182.752 4125.287 5006.741
(271.269) (287.968) (275.063) (291.950) (301.776) (255.865) (234.592) (257.999) (281.183) (290.215)
Observations 13,171 13,171 13,120 13,120 13,120 13,171 13,171 13,171 13,120 13,120
Adjusted R2 0.8848 0.8863 0.8852 0.9218 0.8881 0.8847 0.884 0.8849 0.8867 0.8882
The sample consists of a balanced panel of 3,292 unified public school districts located in MSAs in 1973, for the years 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000.  All specifications include district fixed effects
and year-specific MSA effects.  Observations have been weighted by district public enrollment.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3.6: OLS Results, Private School Enrollment Share (Full Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
gini coefficient -0.051 -0.042 -0.049 -0.041 -0.050
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
schooling fractionalization index -0.039 -0.040 -0.053
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
race fractionalization index 0.018 0.019 0.018
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
%in poverty -0.005 -0.017 -0.005 -0.017 -0.010
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
real median family income (in thousands) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
%25+ with hs degree -0.079 -0.051 -0.077 -0.048 -0.036
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
%25+ with some college -0.018 0.005 -0.016 0.008 -0.004
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
%25+ with college degree or more -0.073 -0.061 -0.074 -0.062 -0.063
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
%nonwhite -0.053 -0.049 -0.064 -0.061 -0.054
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
%owner-occupied housing -0.038 -0.033 -0.034 -0.030 0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
%population 65+ 0.126 0.125 0.121 0.120 0.020
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
%hh with kids -0.077
(0.005)
%population in urban area 0.017
(0.002)
Constant 0.105 0.116 0.101 0.112 0.140
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 34,793 34,793 34,618 34,618 34,618
Adjusted R2 0.8763 0.8764 0.8762 0.8763 0.8776
The sample consists of a balanced panel of 8,699 unified public school districts located in 48 U.S. states,
for the years 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000.  All specifications include district fixed effects and year-
specific state effects.  Observations have been weighted by total (public + private) enrollment in district.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3.7: OLS Results, Private School Enrollment Share (MSA Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
gini coefficient -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.010
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
schooling fractionalization index -0.013 -0.012 -0.028
(0.016) (0.016)
race fractionalization index 0.011 0.011 0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
%in poverty -0.031 -0.033 -0.029 -0.031 0.002
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
real median family income (in thousands) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
%25+ with hs degree -0.133 -0.123 -0.132 -0.123 -0.100
(0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017)
%25+ with some college 0.021 0.032 0.024 0.033 0.007
(0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018)
%25+ with college degree or more -0.079 -0.075 -0.082 -0.078 -0.067
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
%nonwhite -0.031 -0.031 -0.039 -0.038 -0.024
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
%owner-occupied housing 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.057
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
%population 65+ 0.206 0.206 0.203 0.203 0.086
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022)
%hh with kids -0.098
(0.010)
%population in urban area 0.020
(0.004)
Constant 0.088 0.092 0.085 0.088 0.106
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 13,171 13,171 13,120 13,120 13,120
Adjusted R2 0.8963 0.8963 0.8963 0.8963 0.8977
The sample consists of a balanced panel of 3,292 unified public school districts located in MSAs in 1973,
for the years 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000.  All specifications include district fixed effects and year-
specific MSA effects.  Observations have been weighted by total (public + private) enrollment in district.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3.8: OLS Results--Real Local Revenues per Pupil: Interactions of Gini Coefficient and Fractionalization with Quintiles of District Competition (MSA Sample)
competition measure
(1) dists10 dists25 dists50 frac10 frac25 frac50 enrlfrac diststud
gini coefficient 3,448.782 7,948.584 7,699.180 4,709.360 5,154.200 6,161.835 1,153.928 5,068.279
(797.721) (718.294) (733.192) (607.692) (639.985) (737.329) (819.161) (570.521)
gini * 2nd quintile of competition measure 3,266.309 -4,829.156 -4,459.694 -1,535.712 -1,429.748 -2,134.445 -4,701.060 -5,019.806
(851.355) (1003.919) (976.305) (623.310) (705.917) (854.192) (433.502) (784.707)
gini * 3rd quintile of competition 262.025 -7,699.066 -2,794.989 747.541 -852.726 -3,066.431 26.742 -1,592.150
(865.526) (893.629) (851.329) (647.136) (740.223) (841.058) (2.580) (955.116)
gini * 4th quintile of competition -2,146.291 -4,397.862 -2,540.098 -2,129.882 -2,966.919 -2,848.194 -3,655.120 -277.420
(817.784) (800.979) (836.437) (644.202) (714.086) (826.730) (279.482) (940.348)
gini * 5th quintile of competition 57.459 -5,233.352 -8,769.054 -2,640.082 -1,753.668 -3,178.816 -3,654.620 -23.987
(794.163) (808.620) (931.431) (601.074) (645.583) (767.766) (284.692) (1172.456)
competition measure
(2) dists10 dists25 dists50 frac10 frac25 frac50 enrlfrac diststud
schooling fractionalization -4186.589 -4211.917 -4789.185 -2575.528 -2266.518 -2187.080 -6607.061 -4440.995
(450.066) (467.083) (454.013) (439.854) (475.753) (509.463) (521.260) (382.833)
schooling fractionalization * 2nd quintile of competition measure 1774.865 742.898 2118.742 551.524 -99.941 745.831 2844.812 995.857
(484.869) (586.074) (578.104) (453.943) (502.304) (548.127) (567.785) (470.913)
schooling fractionalization * 3rd quintile of competition measure 2111.798 1813.151 3163.463 13.029 -626.847 -687.801 1872.055 336.311
(503.314) (577.602) (558.717) (485.973) (505.815) (533.379) (566.018) (480.557)
schooling fractionalization * 4th quintile of competition measure 1466.830 521.629 2443.922 -1007.782 -1329.263 -960.685 5481.199 3575.544
(481.998) (506.847) (529.146) (439.316) (485.027) (501.094) (597.724) (522.354)
schooling fractionalization * 5th quintile of competition measure 35.305 638.055 120.720 -2917.969 -2363.871 -2482.182 4828.460 801.004
(458.475) (491.535) (499.946) (430.251) (438.652) (470.896) (581.722) (720.810)
competition measure
(3) dists10 dists25 dists50 frac10 frac25 frac50 enrlfrac diststud
race fractionalization 161.871 324.472 172.014 623.658 1278.585 2357.504 -1461.411 235.740
(229.793) (245.801) (253.978) (192.596) (220.317) (293.509) (318.244) (177.847)
race fractionalization * 2nd quintile of competition measure 515.583 138.046 349.862 -391.352 -979.328 -1704.179 1997.004 -417.220
(271.202) (349.492) (350.120) (197.396) (220.983) (317.949) (349.003) (251.774)
race fractionalization * 3rd quintile of competition measure 93.391 -803.671 -3.785 -187.345 -849.721 -2056.477 1348.209 -474.098
(236.039) (289.424) (289.494) (212.403) (240.219) (292.880) (345.515) (298.805)
race fractionalization * 4th quintile of competition measure -511.008 -239.177 724.441 -689.580 -1267.762 -2138.053 1826.615 706.042
(232.951) (272.324) (281.514) (193.466) (223.693) (294.288) (374.814) (362.165)
race fractionalization * 5th quintile of competition measure 366.098 45.640 -363.160 -951.671 -1328.140 -2417.723 2886.449 1902.613
(237.441) (267.854) (316.530) (194.441) (208.485) (280.618) (357.700) (364.604)
Standard errors in parentheses.  Panel (1) displays the results of specification (1) in Table 3.6, allowing the coefficient on the within-district Gini coefficient to vary across
quintiles of regional public school district competition.  We use six different measures of district competition: dists10, dists25, and dists50 (indicating the number of districts
within 10, 25, and 50 miles respectively), and frac10, frac25, and frac50 (indicating the fraction of public school students within 10, 25, and 50 miles that are enrolled in
that particular district).  In columns (1)-(3), higher quintiles of dists10, dists25, and dists50 represent districts in areas with greater competition; in column (4)-(6), higher
quintiles of frac10, frac25, and frac50 represent districts in areas with less competition.  Panel (2) and (3) display the results of specification (4) in Table 3.6, allowing the
coefficient on within-district schooling and race fractionalization to both vary across quintiles of district competition (the gini coefficient enters linearly into these regressions).
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Table 3.9: OLS Results--Low Mobility Districts and Districts Outisde of MSAs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Local Revenues Local Revenues Private School Private School
Dependent variable per Pupil per Pupil Enrollment Share Enrollment Share
Sample Low Mobility non-MSA Low Mobility non-MSA
gini coefficient 2,969.142 1,952.237 -0.007 0.007
(340.651) (211.992) (0.019) (0.013)
schooling fractionalization index -2,391.493 -1,126.774 -0.081 -0.024
(256.286) (172.169) (0.014) (0.011)
race fractionalization index -1,113.340 -100.286 0.013 0.005
(105.508) (105.862) (0.006) (0.007)
%in poverty -2,889.482 -301.055 -0.021 -0.062
(272.831) (164.387) (0.015) (0.010)
real median family income (in thousands) 50.059 46.562 0.002 0.001
(2.463) (2.143) (0.000) (0.000)
%25+ with hs degree -2,152.233 -92.508 -0.031 -0.018
(267.297) (176.275) (0.015) (0.011)
%25+ with some college 1,630.735 -125.728 0.051 -0.011
(309.263) (238.982) (0.017) (0.011)
%25+ with college degree or more 2,302.358 2,485.727 -0.106 0.061
(344.765) (238.982) (0.019) (0.015)
%nonwhite -458.831 84.124 -0.066 -0.057
(131.883) (111.346) (0.007) (0.007)
%owner-occupied housing -1,538.289 -228.106 -0.016 0.005
(202.771) (131.891) (0.011) (0.008)
%population 65+ 5,705.483 2,536.925 0.072 -0.095
(337.716) (250.076) (0.019) (0.015)
Constant 2,236.261 -278.943 0.140 0.079
(244.492) (177.653) (0.014) (0.011)
Observations 15,750 21,506 15,750 21,504
Adjusted R2 0.8730 0.8377 0.921 0.841
Standard errors are in parentheses.  Our low mobility sample consists of 3,955 districts in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000, who in 1970,
1980, and 1990 were in the lowest three quintiles of household migration.  The non-MSA sample consists of districts located outside
of MSAs (as defined in 1973).  District fixed effects are included in all specifications, as are year-specific state effects.  In columns
(1) and (2), observations are weighted by total public K-12 enrollment.  In columns (3) and (4), observations are weighted by total
(public + private) enrollment.
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Table 3.10: Instrumental Variables Estimates of Local Revenues per Pupil Model (Full Sample)
First stage: Second stage:
Local revenues
Gini coefficient per pupil
Instrument: (1) (2)
(a) gini coefficient of closest district 0.110 2,980.16
(27.500) (2.289)
(b) gini coefficient of closest district 0.095 2,837.87
   in another county (23.750) (1.806)
(c) gini coefficient of closest district 0.054 1,167.61
   in another state (13.500) (0.427)
t -statistics are in parentheses.  Coefficient estimates in column (1) are the results of three separate 
regressions, where our Gini coefficient of income inequality is regressed on each of our three
instrumental variables, along with district fixed-effects, year-specific state effects, and all











The unifying theme of this dissertation has been the examination of several 
important economic trends of the past four decades and their effects on the quantity and 
quality of inputs available for public education in the United States.  In chapter two, we 
showed that the first of these trends—the dramatic gender desegregation of the labor 
market since 1960—was accompanied by a decline in the propensity for women with the 
highest math and verbal skills (relative to their peers) to enter the teaching profession.  
While it has long been presumed that gender desegregation of the professions has 
adversely affected the quality of teachers, there has been surprisingly little evidence to 
date measuring the extent to which this is true.  This essay makes a significant 
contribution to the existing literature by being the first to combine data from several large 
longitudinal surveys spanning the 43-year period 1957 to 2000 to provide empirical 
evidence on this subject.  Our results demonstrated that the math and verbal ranking of 
the average new female teacher has fallen only slightly over this period, but the 
likelihood that a female in the top decile of her high school class enters the teaching 
profession has fallen dramatically (a similar decline is observed in the bottom decile of 
the skill distribution). 
In chapter three we examined the relationship between two other significant 
trends—rising population diversity and income inequality—and local support for public 
education.  Nationwide, household income inequality (as measured by the Gini 
 113
coefficient) has increased over 16 percent since 1970; within-school district heterogeneity 
in race and educational attainment have risen over 90 percent and 14 percent, respectively 
(as measured by simple fractionalization indices).  To the extent that income and 
demographic characteristics like race and schooling are correlated with the demand for 
public education, one would expect that these long-run compositional changes within 
U.S. school districts have had an impact on the quantity of local resources devoted to 
education.  While some theoretical work has addressed the potential effects of income 
inequality on school finance, and related empirical work has studied the effects of 
population heterogeneity on other public programs, there has been little evidence on how 
these forces have affected support for public schools in practice.  Bringing together four 
decades of demographic and financial data for 8,700 unified public school districts, we 
demonstrated that rising within-school district income inequality has been associated with 
greater local per-pupil spending on education.  Increased heterogeneity in race appears to 
be associated with lower per-pupil spending, although the effects are modest.   
Our results on the relationship between income inequality and spending appear to 
run contrary to the theoretical prediction that rising income inequality shrinks the support 
for public schools, as a coalition of the “ends against the middle” votes down public 
spending on education and wealthier families enroll in private schools.  Rather, our 
findings are more consistent with a median voter model in which rising income inequality 
(particularly at the top of the income distribution) represents a decline in the tax price to 
the median voter, encouraging greater spending on education.  We also examined the 
effect of rising heterogeneity and income inequality on enrollment in private schools, and 
found no evidence that greater income inequality increases private school enrollment.  To 
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the contrary, in our full sample of school districts we found that increased income 
inequality within school districts tends to reduce private school enrollment.  It may be 
that the increased levels of per-pupil spending observed in districts with rising income 
inequality raised the attractiveness of public schooling relative to private schooling, or at 




DETAILS ON THE LONGITUDINAL SURVEY DATASETS USED  
 




 In chapter two, I combined data from five longitudinal surveys of U.S. high 
school students spanning four decades (1957-2000) to see how the propensity for high 
test-scoring women to enter the teaching profession has changed over time.  In this 
appendix, I provide a brief description of each of the datasets used in that chapter 
(following), as well as detailed information about the occupational codes used to identify 
teachers in each dataset (Section A.2), the aptitude tests administered by each survey 
(Section A.3) and the sampling weights used in our analysis, where applicable (Section 
A.4).  Section A.5 presents the chapter two regression results again, without the use of 
sampling weights. 
 
Wisconsin Longitudinal Study 
The Wisconsin Longitudinal Study (WLS) is perhaps the earliest major 
longitudinal survey of high school graduates.  It is a random sample of 10,317 (virtually 
all non-Hispanic white) men and women who graduated from Wisconsin high schools in 
1957.  Follow-up surveys collected in 1964, 1975 and 1992 contain, among other things, 
information about each respondent’s schooling, work history, and labor market 
experiences.92  Also included are test scores from the Henmon-Nelson Test of Mental 
                                                 
92 The National Institute on Aging is supporting a new wave of interviews during 2003-
2004. 
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Ability (see Section A.3).  A module containing very thorough information about female 
work histories was added in 1993.  In chapter two, we focus primarily on the original 
1957 survey and the 1964 follow up, which was conducted when most respondents were 
25 years of age.  Contrary to the other follow-up surveys, the 1964 survey was completed 
by the graduates’ parents.  More information and complete documentation for the WLS 




Project Talent is another early longitudinal survey of high school students, 
originally administered to 400,000 students in grades 9-12 in 1960.  This survey was 
intended to be a representative sampling of American youth.  Follow-up surveys were 
conducted 1, 5, 11, and 20 years following the expected year of graduation from high 
school.  Designed to allow investigation into the relationship between students’ cognitive 
abilities, family and school environment, and post-high school education, work 
experience, and family development, the study includes measures of numerous aptitudes, 
and work history.  This paper makes use of the Project Talent Public Use File, a 4,000-
student subsample of the original participants.  The subsample includes 1,000 students 
from each graduating class 1960-1963, and was chosen such that every included student 
was a participant in the 11-year follow up in 1971-74.  We focus primarily on this 11-
year follow-up, when most respondents were 26-29 years of age.  For more information 
about Project Talent, refer to Flanagan, et. al. (1981).  The public use data and 
documentation is available through the Inter-university Consortium for Political and 
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Social Research (ICPSR), at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu:8080/ICPSR-
STUDY/07823.xml (access date August 9, 2003). 
 
National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 
The National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 (NLS-72) was 
the first major nationwide longitudinal study of high school students conducted by the 
National Center for Education Statistics of the U.S. Department of Education.  16,683 
high school seniors were surveyed in 1972, and then contacted again in 1973-74, 1974-
75, 1976-77, 1979-80 and 1986.  The study includes information on each respondent’s 
family background, community, education, family development, and labor market 
experience.  Also included are several measures of academic ability—SAT and ACT 
scores (where available), and raw scores on a battery of tests administered by the NLS to 
most seniors in 1972.  The fifth follow up in 1986 included a supplemental survey of all 
of those in the original 1972 sample who had obtained teaching certificates and/or who 
had teaching experience.  We focus primarily on the fourth NLS-72 follow-up in 1979, 
when most respondents were 25 years of age.  More information on the NLS-72 can be 
found online at http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/nls72/ (access date August 9, 2003). 
 
High School and Beyond 
High School and Beyond (HSB) is another major longitudinal study of high 
school students conducted by the National Center for Education Statistics.  It was 
designed to be comparable to and improve upon the NLS-72.  Two cohorts of students—
sophomores and seniors—were surveyed and tested in 1980, and then re-surveyed in 
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1982, 1984, 1986 and 1992.  Like the other surveys mentioned above, HSB and its 
follow-ups include detailed information on each student’s family background, school 
experiences, higher education and training, and career.  More detailed academic data 
(such as GPA, class rank, attendance, courses taken and grades received, etc.) is available 
for a subset of students in the HSB Transcripts Survey.  SAT and ACT scores are 
available for many students, as are raw scores on the HSB battery of tests, administered 
to both sophomores and seniors in 1980 (sophomores were re-tested in 1982—see 
Section A.3).  We use only the sophomore cohort 1982 (senior year) survey, and the 1992 
follow-up, when most respondents were 28 years of age.  Although there is a public use 
version of this data available, we used the restricted use version of the data in this chapter 
(through a confidentiality agreement with the National Center for Education Statistics).  
More information on HSB can be found at http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/hsb/ (access date 
August 9, 2003). 
 
National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988 
The National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS)—also designed and 
administered by the National Center for Education Statistics—is a nationally 
representative survey of eighth graders begun in the spring of 1988.  A subsample of 
these students was re-surveyed in 1990, 1992, 1994, and 2000.  As with the other NCES 
surveys described above, NELS and its follow-ups include detailed information about 
students’ school, work, and home experiences, higher education and training, and career.  
Students were administered a battery of tests in mathematics, reading, science, and social 
studies during each wave of the survey that they were in high school (1988, 1990 and 
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1992).  We focus primarily on the 1992 follow-up survey when the NELS participants 
were seniors in high school (we take this as our base sample—not the original sample of 
eighth graders), and the 2000 follow-up, when most respondents were approximately 26 
years of age.  We use the public use version of this dataset.  More information on the 
NELS can be found at: http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/nels88/ (access date August 9, 2003). 
 
Current Population Survey 
The Current Population Survey (CPS) is a monthly survey of about 50,000 
households, conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and intended to be the primary 
source of information about the labor force characteristics of the United States.  In this 
paper, we use public use microdata from the CPS March Supplement, or Annual 
Demographic Survey, 1964-1996.  For more information, see the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ CPS website at: http://www.bls.census.gov/cps/cpsmain.htm (access date 
August 9, 2003). 
 
IPUMS 
IPUMS is the “integrated public use micro data series,” a collection of individual-
level samples of the U.S. population from the decennial U.S. Census of Population and 
Housing.  In chapter two, we make use of the 1980 and 1990 5% State IPUMS samples, a 
1-in-20 sample of the U.S. population, and the 1970 1% State PUMS, a 1-in-100 sample.  
See the IPUMS website at http://www.ipums.umn.edu/usa/index.html (access date 
August 9, 2003) for more information. 
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A.2 Occupational Coding 
 One of the preliminary steps in preparing our data for analysis in chapter two was 
distinguishing teachers from non-teachers in each of the longitudinal datasets described 
above.  While the method of classifying and reporting occupations varied widely from 
one dataset to the next, teachers (fortunately) were identified quite consistently across 
datasets.  There were, however, some exceptions and possible miscodes.  Below, we 
briefly discuss the occupational coding system used in each of the five longitudinal 
surveys, and describe how we used these variables to identify elementary and secondary 
school teachers.93 
 
Wisconsin Longitudinal Survey 
In the WLS, respondents’ occupations in 1964 were recorded using a numeric 
code from the 1950 Census Occupational Classification system.  Using the variables 
ocx64 (respondent’s detailed occupation code as reported in the 1964 follow-up survey) 
and ocms64 (male respondent’s detailed occupation as reported in 1963 or 1964 tax 
records), we identified 447 women and 211 men who were classified as “Teachers—
NEC” (code #51).94 
The 1950 Census Occupational Classification system was a considerably less 
detailed set of codes than that used in later census years. Upon inspection of other 
                                                 
93 Unfortunately, we were unable to distinguish elementary teachers from secondary 
teachers (nor public school teachers from private school teachers) with much confidence.  
Therefore, in chapter two we count all K-12 teachers simply as “teachers.” 
94 It is important to note that many women who reported themselves to be out of the labor 
force also reported an occupation—therefore, for females this occupation code should be 
interpreted as respondents’ current or most recent job. 
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variables available in the WLS data, including educational attainment in 1964 (edat64) 
and reported occupation in 1975 (ocxcuru), we determined that the broad category 
“Teachers—NEC” included a number of individuals who were most likely not 
elementary or secondary teachers in 1964.  For example, there was no unique category in 
the 1950 coding system for school principals or librarians.  It appeared that many 
respondents who were school principals or librarians in 1964 may have been assigned the 
“teacher” occupation code in error because it was the closest available code.  It also 
appeared that PhDs (or graduate students) who in 1964 were likely to be working as 
instructors or teaching assistants may have also been classified as teachers.  To avoid 
improper inclusion of these “false positives,” we excluded a number of individuals from 
our initial selection of teachers.  Table A.1 lists the counts of excluded teachers, along 
with our criteria for making these exclusions.  After these exclusions, our sample 
includes 368 female teachers and 168 male teachers. 
 
Project Talent 
Project Talent did not use a standard Census classification system in reporting 
occupations.  Instead, the survey administrators developed their own unique 3- and 4-
digit occupational coding system to identify the occupation of those individuals who 
responded to the follow up surveys.  Only those respondents currently in the labor force 
were allowed to report an occupation.  Our initial definition of teachers included 106 
women and 69 men who were assigned the 3-digit occupation codes #400 – 433, 
categories listed in Table A.2 (along with the counts of individuals in each category).  
Note that these occupation categories exclude college or university teachers, teaching 
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assistants, school administrators (principals, superintendents, etc), and teachers of the 
handicapped, librarians, speech therapists, and the like. 
 Seven females and one male with codes #400 – 433 had an insufficient amount of 
education in 1971-74 to plausibly be considered teachers (i.e. a high school education or 
less).  These eight individuals were excluded from our identified teachers, leaving a total 
of 99 female and 68 male teachers in our Project Talent sample. 
 
National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 
 Participants in the 1979 NLS-72 follow-up survey were asked to “describe the job 
that you held the first week of October of 1979.”  The NCES matched the respondents’ 
reply to a numeric code from the 1970 Census classification of occupations, and reported 
this occupation code as the variable ft12ad.  We identified 468 females and 143 males 
whose occupation code in 1979 was #142, 143, 144 or 145 (“elementary teachers,” “pre-
kindergarten and kindergarten teachers,” “secondary teachers,” and “teachers except 
college and university, other”).  The counts of these individuals (by sex and occupation 
code) are reported in Table A.3.  There were 37 females and 8 males with these codes 
who had too little education in 1979 to be a teacher (34 and 6 females and males, 
respectively) or were a school principal during other waves of the survey (3 and 2).  We 
excluded these 45 respondents from our teacher definition, leaving a total of 431 female 
and 135 male teachers in our sample. 
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High School and Beyond Sophomore Cohort 
 Several variables in the HSB dataset were used to determine respondents’ 
occupation in 1992.  The variables y4303fa (“occupation code in 1992”) and y4303ca 
(“industry code in 1992”) were assigned by the NCES based on the verbal or handwritten 
responses of participants to the survey; the original (verbatim) responses were also 
included in the HSB dataset as the variables y4303d07 and y4303e07.  Concerned about 
the accuracy of the occupation codes (the NCES occupational coding scheme included 
only 29 general categories, one of which being the broad “School Teacher,” which was 
likely to include individuals that were not elementary or secondary teachers, such as 
daycare workers, adult education instructors, etc.) we hand-coded a new occupation 
variable by matching the verbal responses for each individual to an occupation in the 
1970 Census Occupational Classification list. 
 In general, we used the HSB coded occupation variable (y4303fa equal to code 
26, “School Teacher”) to identify teachers.  Where values were missing for this variable, 
we used the occupation code for an earlier year (y4303f9 for 1991, y4303f8 for 1990, 
etc).95  We cross-checked this variable against our hand-coded occupation variable, and 
in most cases, they matched.  Where occupations codes did not match, we relied on our 
hand-coded variable as the definitive occupation.  In total, we identified 219 female 
teachers and 62 male teachers in our sample. 
                                                 
95 Thus, this variable should be considered the respondents current or most recent job in 
1992.   
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National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988 
 As with HSB, the NCES devised its own simple categorization of occupations for 
use in the NELS.  However, unlike HSB, elementary and secondary teachers are more 
readily identified under the specific category “Educators: K-12 Teachers” (code 24).  
There were 302 females and 87 males who were identified as teachers in 2000 using the 
variable f4bxoccd.  No respondents were excluded from this category for any other 
reason.96 
 
A.3 Test Scores 
 In chapter two, respondents to the five longitudinal surveys were assigned a 
centile rank and standardized score based on their raw score on a test (or battery of tests) 
administered to their high school cohort.  While the content of the exams differed 
somewhat across the five surveys, they were all (with the exception of WLS) tests of 
verbal and mathematical aptitude.  In this section, we provide a brief summary of the 
content of the exams administered to each high school cohort, and describe how we 
calculated our test score centiles and standard scores. 
 
                                                 
96 This is due in part to insufficient time available to closely scrutinize this data. We 
incorporated the NELS data into this chapter upon its release in Spring 2003, and have 
not held this data up to the same standards of accuracy as the other four datasets.  Hence, 
appropriate caution should be used when interpreting results from this data. 
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Wisconsin Longitudinal Study 
The WLS reports for every student a raw test score from the Henmon-Nelson Test 
of Mental Ability, as well as an IQ score computed from this raw score (this IQ score 
uses a formula that adjusts for the respondents’ age when the exam was administered).  
National and state centile rankings for each student’s raw score and IQ are also provided.  
The Henmon-Nelson test was administered to Wisconsin high school students during 
their freshman and junior years—in most cases, the WLS reports both scores. 
In chapter two, we used the raw Henmon-Nelson score to compute centile ranks 
and standardized scores.  Specifically, we use the WLS reported variable ghnrs_bm, the 
“best measure” of the respondent’s raw Henmon-Nelson score, and computed a centile 
rank (or standard score) based on each students placement in the distribution of all high 
school graduates of the same sex in our sample.97  This “best measure” variable contains 
the junior year score, or a score from another source (usually the freshman year score) 
when the junior year score is missing.  In our sample of respondents to the 1964 follow-
up, most of the raw scores were junior year scores, as Table A.4 shows.  Summary 
statistics for the Henmon-Nelson raw score for our 1964 sample of WLS high school 
graduates are displayed in Table A.5. 
 
Project Talent 
 The Project Talent test battery included tests of a wide variety of cognitive 
abilities including language and mathematical skills, memory, reasoning ability, and 
                                                 
97 Centile ranks were based upon the distribution of all high school graduates in our 
dataset who took the exam, not just those who responded to the 1964 follow-up survey.  
The same method was used with all five cohorts. 
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creativity.98  We based our centile ranks and standardized scores on a “general academic 
aptitude composite” test score provided by Project Talent (again, basing these centile 
ranks on each students’ placement in the distribution of all high school graduates of the 
same gender who took the test in our sample).  This composite test score includes scores 
from nine different test components: Math Information, Vocabulary (I and II), English, 
Reading Comprehension, Creativity, Abstract Reasoning, and Mathematics (I and II).  
Summary statistics for this composite score for the high school graduates in our sample 
are provided in Table A.6. 
 
National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 
 All NLS-72 participants were asked to complete a battery of six tests, which 
included Vocabulary (15 questions), Picture Number (30 questions, an associative 
memory test), Reading (20 questions), Letter Groups (25 questions, an abstract reasoning 
test), Mathematics (25 questions), and Mosaic Comparisons (116 questions, used to test 
the ability to detect patterns).  To generate centile ranks and standard scores, we first 
summed four “formula scores,” which NLS-72 calculated from the raw scores on these 
tests: the reading formula score (variable forsc_rd), mathematics formula score 
(forsc_mt), letter groups formula score (forsc_lt) and vocabulary formula score (vocabsc).  
The NCES calculated each of these four formula scores as: 
(1) FS = R-[W/(C-1)] 
where R is the number of right responses, W the number of wrong responses, and C is the  
                                                 
98 See Flanagan, et. al. (1981) for a detailed description of all of the available Project 
Talent test scores. 
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number of item response alternatives.  Unweighted summary statistics for this composite 
score for our sample of high school graduates are provided in Table A.7. 
Based on these composite scores, we computed centile ranks and standardized 
scores for all high school graduates in our sample, based on each student’s placement in 
the distribution of all high school graduates of the same gender in our sample.  In order to 
appropriately place these students into the distribution of the population of high school 
students in their cohort, we incorporated the sampling weights provided in the NLS-72 
data.  These weights are described in greater detail in Section A.4. 
 
High School and Beyond Sophomore Cohort 
 Sophomores participating in the HSB base year survey were asked to complete a 
battery of tests nearly identical to that given to the NLS-72 base year participants (about 
86 percent of the test items were the same).  Both the sophomore and senior cohort test 
battery included achievement tests in verbal ability (vocabulary and reading, a total of 41 
questions) and mathematics (38 questions).  In addition, sophomores were asked to 
complete tests on science (20 questions), writing (17 questions), and civics (16 
questions).  The sophomore cohort completed this test battery twice—one during their 
sophomore year (the base year, 1980), and one during their senior year (the first follow-
up, 1982).   
 To calculate our HSB centile ranks and standard scores, we summed the four 
formula scores for reading (variable fyreadfs), vocabulary (fyvocbfs), and mathematics 
part one and two (fymth1fs and fymth1fs) from the test battery taken during the senior 
year (formula scores were calculated in the same manner as in the NLS-72—see above).  
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Unweighted summary statistics for these composite scores for our sample of high school 
graduates from the sophomore cohort are provided in Table A.8.  We then based each 
student’s centile rank and standardized score on the distribution of test scores among all 
high school graduates of the same gender in our sample.  In order to appropriately place 
these students into the distribution of the larger population of high school students in their 
cohort, we incorporated the sampling weights provided in the HSB data.  These weights 
are described in greater detail in Section A.4.   
 
National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988 
 Student participants in the NELS were asked to complete a series of achievement 
tests during every wave of the survey that they were still in school (1988, 1990, 1992).  
Each cognitive test battery consisted of multiple-choice questions in four subject areas: 
reading comprehension (21 questions), mathematics (40 questions), science (25 
questions), and social studies (30 questions), for a total of 116 questions.  Students in 
each year were not necessarily given the same test—after the base year, NELS developed 
multiple tests to administer to students of varying levels of ability; they then used “item 
response theory” (IRT) scoring to make the students’ raw scores comparable to each 
other (see Appendix H in Curtin, et. al (2002)).  We calculated a math and verbal 
composite score by summing the two IRT “estimated number right” scores for reading 
comprehension and mathematics (source variables f22xrirr and f22xmirr).  Unweighted 
summary statistics for this composite score for the high school graduates in our NELS 
cohort are provided in Table A.9.  
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 We used this composite score to generate centile ranks and standardized scores, 
based on each student’s placement in the distribution of all high school graduates of the 
same gender in our sample.  In order to appropriately place these students into the larger 
distribution of high school graduates, we incorporated the sampling weights provided in 
the NELS data.  These weights are described in greater detail in Section A.4. 
 
A.4 Sampling Weights 
 Three of our longitudinal datasets (NLS-72, HSB, and NELS) provided sampling 
weights to adjust for unequal selection probabilities or nonresponse to the follow-up 
surveys.  Because we would like our samples to reflect the population of each cohort of 
high school graduates as closely as possible, we make use of these sampling weights in 
our summary statistics and regressions wherever possible and appropriate.  The following 
is a description of each of the original weighting variables used in our analysis. 
 
National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 
w1: this weighting variable projects the sample of base year respondents to the population 
of high school seniors in 1972.  We used this weight when computing centile ranks and 
standard scores, so that respondents’ test score centiles better reflect their position in the 
distribution of all high school seniors.  To the extent that NLS-72 over-sampled any 
particular group of students, this weight will adjust for this over-sampling. 
 
w21: this weighting variable adjusts the sample of fourth follow-up (1979) participants 
for survey nonresponse.  Because we are observing NLS-72 high school graduates in 
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1979, the sample may be biased toward those individuals who were willing and able to 
respond to this follow-up survey seven years after high school.  The use of this weight in 
our summary statistics and regression coefficient estimates will reduce the bias that might 
arise from survey nonresponse. 
 
High School and Beyond Sophomore Cohort 
fu1wt: this weighting variable projects the sample of first follow-up (1982) participants to 
the population of 1980 high school sophomores.99  This weight adjusts both for unequal 
selection probabilities and survey nonresponse (since this is the senior year follow-up, 
not the base year of the survey).  We chose to use the weight for the first follow-up—
which was administered during this cohort’s senior year—for consistency with the other 
longitudinal surveys whose base year was the respondents’ senior year.  We used this 
weight in our calculation of centile ranks and standard scores, so that respondents’ test 
score centiles will better reflect their position in the distribution of all high school 
sophomores, and not merely all participants in the first-year follow up survey.100  To the 
extent that HSB over-sampled any particular group of students, or to the extent that some 
individuals were more likely to be included in the first follow-up survey, the use of these 
weights will reduce the bias associated with these factors. 
 
                                                 
99 Note, the weighting variable bywt was used in an earlier version of chapter two—see 
Corcoran, Evans, and Schwab (2001). 
100 This weight is not ideal, because it makes the sample representative of all sophomores 
in 1980, not all high school graduates in 1982. Unfortunately, a superior weighting 
variable was not available.  See Section A.5 for unweighted versions of our results. 
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fu4wt: this weighting variable in the HSB data adjusts the sample of fourth follow-up 
(1992) participants for survey nonresponse.  Because we wish to make inferences about 
the population of high school students who graduated in 1982 (and were observed again 
in 1992), unequal response to the 1992 follow-up survey may bias our results toward 
those individuals who were willing and able to complete the 1992 follow-up survey.  
Therefore, the use of these weights in our summary statistics and regression coefficient 
estimates will reduce the bias associated with these factors. 
 
National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988 
f4qwt92g: unlike the NLS-72 and HSB weights which only approximately project to our 
population of interest, our NELS weighting variable f4qwt92g projects exactly to the 
population of 1992 high school graduates—our population of interest for the NELS 
cohort.  It was determined that this weight would be appropriate both for computing 
centile ranks in 1992, and summary statistics and regression coefficient estimates for the 
2000 follow-up.  See Curtin, et. al. (2002) for more information on this and other weights 
provided in the NELS data. 
 
A.5 Unweighted Regression Results 
 Tables A.10, A.11 and A.12 correspond to Tables 2.7a, 2.7b and 2.8 (the third 
through fifth columns, i.e. logit regressions estimating the likelihood of becoming a 
teacher, conditional on test score ranking for the NLS-72, HSB, and NELS cohorts).  
These specifications, however, exclude the sampling weights used in chapter two.  Table 
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A.13 corresponds to Table 2.9 in the main text (predicted probabilities of becoming a 
teacher by decile), but again sampling weights have been omitted. 
 As these tables show, there is little difference in our coefficient estimates when 
weights are used compared to when they are not used.  The sample most affected by the 
use of weights in Tables 2.7a and 2.7b appears to be HSB—elasticities calculated from 
the weighted regressions appear to be generally larger in magnitude than those calculated 
from the unweighted regressions, in Tables A.10 and A.11.  The unweighted results only 
strengthen our finding that the propensity for high-ability women to teach was weaker in 
later years; on the other hand, without the use of weights, we observe a large fall in the 
elasticity in 1992 (the HSB sample) followed by a large rise in the elasticity from 1992 to 
2000 (NELS).  The less erratic pattern of the elasticities calculated from the weighted 
regressions would seem to suggest that the use of weights with these samples was 
probably appropriate. 
 The predicted probabilities in Table A.13 (the unweighted version) are virtually 
identical to those in Table 2.9, with the exception of NELS.  For example, the predicted 
probability of becoming a teacher for female high school graduates in the top decile is 
0.089 from the unweighted regressions, and 0.079 from the weighted regressions.  The 
pattern is the opposite for the 9th decile.  While in this case, this weakens our argument 
that the decline in the likelihood of becoming a teacher was largest in the top decile, the 
difference is fairly small (1 percentage point).
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Table A.1: “False Positive” Teachers Excluded from WLS Teacher Sample 
   
Reason: Females Males
Educational attainment was too low in 1964 or 1975 45 6
School principal in 1975 6 23
Librarian in 1975 6 1
Adult educator in 1975 5 0
College instructor in 1975, with 18+ years of education, and not 
     a coach, theater, music, or art teacher. 
3 5
Other individuals with 18+ years of education in 1975 (chemists, 
     research workers, seminary instructors, etc.) 
8 6
Other reasons 5 2
  




Table A2: Teaching Occupation Codes in Project Talent 
    
Code Occupation Females Males 
400 Teaching (NEC) 12 6
410 Teaching young children 1 
411 Teaching pre-school children 6 
412 Teaching elementary school 44 8
420 Teaching high school (NEC) 8 7
421 Teaching high school math 2 6
422 Teaching high school science  8
423 Teaching high school social studies 3 9
424 Teaching high school English 6 4
425 Teaching high school foreign languages  1
426 Teaching high school commercial ed 2 3
427 Teaching high school home economics 4 
428 Teaching high school trade & industrial ed  10
429 Teaching high school physical education 5 3
431 Teaching art 3 3
432 Teaching music 10 1
433 Teaching speech in high school  









Table A.3: Teaching Occupation Codes in NLS-72 
   
Occupation Code Females Males
142 – Elementary teachers 102 13
143 – Pre-kindergarten and kindergarten teachers 57 3
144 – Secondary teachers 66 34




Table A.4: Source for WLS “Best Measure” of Henmon-Nelson Raw Score
   
Source for ghnrs_bm: Males Females 
Junior year test score 4,000 4,285
Freshman year test score 268 259




Table A.5: Descriptive Statistics for WLS Henmon-Nelson Raw Score
       
 N Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Median Max 
Males 4,379 56.65 11.89 10 57 90




Table A.6: Descriptive Statistics for Project Talent General Aptitude Composite Scores
       
 N Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Median Max 
Males 1,527 499.14 121.90 174 499 796




Table A.7: Descriptive Statistics for NLS-72 Composite Scores 
       
 N Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Median Max 
Males 6,444 44.85 19.25 -9.3 46.6 85 





Table A.8: Descriptive Statistics for HSB Sophomore and Senior Composite Scores
       
 N Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Median Max 
Males (sophomore score) 4,245 32.26 17.75 -9.8 31.8 76.8
Males (senior score) 4,984 37.66 19.52 -6.9 38.2 78.0
   
Females (sophomore score) 4,735 29.47 17.00 -10.7 28.7 76.8




Table A.9: Descriptive Statistics for NELS Composite Scores 
       
 N Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Median Max 
Males  3,855 84.91 22.86 28.6 86.8 128.6 




Table A.10: Unweighted Regression Results, Logit Regresions of Teacher 













    
Sample mean 0.068 0.041 0.070 
Sample size 6,751 5,389 4,284 
    







    













    
Marginal effect of  
centile score at: 
   






    






    
Elasticity of  
centile score at: 
   






    






    
Log-likelihood -1530.4 -902.2 -1059.3 
    
Pseudo r-squared 0.045 0.018 0.030 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table A.11: Unweighted Regression Results, Logistic Regressions of 













    
Sample mean 0.068 0.041 0.070 
Sample size 6,751 5,389 4,284 
    



















    
Marginal effect of 
standardized score at: 
   






     One standard  







    
Elasticity of  
standardized score at: 
   






     One standard  







    
Log-likelihood -1529.7 -902.6 -1058.0 
    
Pseudo r-squared 0.046 0.018 0.031 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table A.12: Unweighted Regression Results, Who Enters Teaching,  













    
Sample mean 0.068 0.041 0.070 
Sample size 6,751 5,389 4,284 
    







    






    






    






    






    






    






    






    






    













    
Log-likelihood -1513.1 -899.4 -1043.2 
    
Pseudo r-squared 0.056 0.021 0.045 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table A.13: Predicted Probabilities of Entering Teaching as an Occupation, 
Females with at least a High School Degree, Based on Unweighted Regression Results 
 
         
  NLS-72 HSB NELS  NLS-72 HSB NELS 
Sample mean  0.068 0.041 0.070  0.068 0.041 0.070 
Decile of  
test score 
 (3) (4) (5)  (3b) (4b) (5b) 
10th  0.096 0.057 0.089  1.41 1.39 1.27 
9th  0.109 0.054 0.123  1.60 1.32 1.76 
8th  0.117 0.046 0.076  1.72 1.12 1.09 
7th  0.089 0.062 0.120  1.31 1.51 1.71 
6th  0.079 0.041 0.097  1.16 1.00 1.39 
5th  0.068 0.047 0.066  1.00 1.15 0.94 
4th  0.048 0.024 0.065  0.71 0.59 0.93 
3rd  0.029 0.021 0.046  0.43 0.51 0.66 
2nd  0.018 0.022 0.024  0.27 0.54 0.34 
1st  0.001 0.017 0.013  0.02 0.42 0.19 
         
 
Values in columns (3) – (5) are the average predicted probability of entering the teaching 
profession, by decile, for a female with at least a high school degree.  These columns 
correspond to the unweighted regression results in Table A.12.  Values in columns (3b) – 









 In chapter three, I used a national panel of unified public school districts to study 
the relationship between rising within-district population heterogeneity and support for 
public education, as measured by the local contribution to per-pupil district revenues, and 
the share of K-12 students enrolled in private school.  Following Hoxby (1996 and 2001), 
Evans, Murray, and Schwab (1997) and Harris, Evans, and Schwab (2001), we combined 
population and housing data from the 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 decennial census with 
school finance data from the 1972, 1982, 1992, and 2001 Census of Governments, to 
create a balanced panel of 8,699 unified school districts.  As stated in chapter three, this 
panel represents over 62 percent of all school districts and over 80 percent of all publicly 
enrolled K-12 students in 2000-2001. 
 In the following sections, I describe in greater detail the contents of our panel, 
how this panel was compiled, how certain variables were calculated or constructed, and 
various problems that were encountered during its construction.  Section B.2 discusses 
the panel’s demographic, income and school enrollment data, B.3 our measures of 
population heterogeneity and income inequality, B.4 the financial data, B.5 our 
instrumental and district competition variables, and B.6 the final assembly of the full 
panel, and MSA subsample.101   
                                                 
101 This appendix relies heavily on Amy Rehder Harris (1999), whose national public 
school district panel was the source for virtually all of our first three decades of data (this 
paper can be found at http://econ.bsos.umd.edu/econ/evans/wrkpap.htm (access date 
August 9, 2003); see also Harris, Evans, and Schwab (2001)).  Without Amy's 
painstaking work on this panel dataset, this paper would not have been possible.  
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B.2 Demographic, Enrollment and Family Income Data 
 Demographic information about the population and housing in each school district 
comes from the 1970 Census of Population and Housing Special Fifth-Count Tallies, the 
1980 Census of Population and Housing Summary Tape File 3F, the 1990 Census School 
District Special Tabulation, and the 2000 Census of Population and Housing School 
District Tabulation (STP2).  Because grade-specific public and private enrollment data 
were excluded from the 2000 Census tabulation, we supplemented our panel with data 
from the National Center for Education Statistics’ (NCES) Common Core of Data: Local 
Education Agency Universe Survey Data 2000-2001, the Common Core of Data: Public 
Elementary/Secondary School Universe Survey Data 2000-2001, and tract-level 
enrollment data from the 2000 Census of Population and Housing Summary File 3. 
 Table B.1 summarizes the number of school districts found in each of the original 
Census files in each year (note these files do not necessarily contain the universe of 
school districts).  For a number of reasons, not all of the school districts found in the 
original census files were included in the construction of this panel.  First, not all school 
districts are unified (K-12) districts.  Those districts classified as “elementary only” or 
“secondary only” were excluded for the reasons mentioned in chapter three.102  Second, 
in 1970, school districts with fewer than 300 enrolled students were aggregated into one 
quasi-district in each of thirty-nine affected states (these are included under “other or 
                                                 
102 In 1970, unified districts were identified where the grade span variable was equal to 
any of the following values: (-C, 0C, OD, OE, 1C, 1E).  In other years, unified, 
elementary, and secondary districts were coded with a “U,” “E,” or “S,” respectively.  
The 2000 census data did not include grade span information for school districts—this 
information was obtained from the 2000-01 Common Core of Data: Local Education 
Agency Universe Survey Data 2000-2001. 
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invalid,” above), accounting for the loss of approximately 1,500 individual unified 
districts.  Third, we excluded observations that covered areas that lie outside of any 
organized school district jurisdiction, or lacked any school district level code (many of 
these districts are non-operating).   Finally, in all years we excluded community areas 
within the New York City Public School District, districts in Alaska, as well as state-
managed districts located in Hawaii, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.103  These 
criteria resulted in an upper bound of 9,508 unified districts eligible for inclusion in the 
panel.  Additional districts that could not be matched to financial data, or were involved 
in a merger or consolidation, further limited the number of districts we could ultimately 
include in the panel to 8,699 (see section B.6 for details).104 
 Table B.2 shows the distribution of unified and all school districts across states, 
by year.  The table also indicates—for each state—the count of unified districts found in 
our panel, and the percent of that state’s unified and total K-12 districts that the districts 
in our panel comprise.  As the table shows, our panel represents roughly 62 percent of all 
elementary, secondary and unified districts, and 81 percent of all unified districts in the 
United States. 105  It is clear from Table B.2 that our panel’s representation varies 
                                                 
103 The “other or invalid” row in Table B.1 includes the following: in 1970, D.C. (1), 
Hawaii (1), 39 aggregated areas, 107 “other” districts and 14 out of area; in 1980, D.C. 
(1), 234 education areas in Hawaii, 42 NYC community areas, 4 “other” and 15 out of 
area; in 1990, D.C. (1), 232 Hawaii areas, 36 NYC areas, and 29 out of area; in 2000, 
D.C. (1), Puerto Rico (1), 51 Hawaii districts, 34 NYC areas, 199 “other” districts, and 97 
out of area (includes 46 unorganized rural areas, 16 are military bases, and 4 Indian 
reservations). 
104 In future work, I hope to compile a new 1980-2000 panel of school districts, which 
will allow the recovery of almost 3,000 (admittedly small) districts lost in 1970. 
105 As measured in 2000.  Hawaii, Puerto Rico and District of Columbia are excluded 
from this calculation. 
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significantly across states.  For example, our panel includes fewer than one third of all K-
12 districts in states that make widespread use of elementary- or secondary-only districts; 
these states are found largely in the west (Arizona, California, and Montana, for example) 
and New England (Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont).  Our coverage is significantly 
better in states where districts are mostly unified.  States in which our representation of 
unified districts is low are those that were most likely to be affected by the 1970 small 
district aggregation in the census file, or had very few large districts in 1970, relative to 
2000 (Arizona, Maine, North Dakota, and Nebraska, for example).  Overall, we feel that 
in most states unified districts are quite well represented here; despite the lack of many 
districts in a few states, our data contains more than 90 percent of all unified districts in 
16 states, and more than 75 percent of all unified districts in 31 states. 
 What follows is a description of all demographic, enrollment, or income variables 
extracted from the Census files and used in chapter three, categorized by subject: 
 
Demographic Characteristics of the Population 
Note: unless otherwise specified, these variables were reported consistently across the 
four decennial censuses. 
hholds: the number of households in the district. 
 
pop: the total population in the district. 
 
black: the percent of district population that whose reported race was black.  Only the 
1990 and 2000 census tables report separate counts for Hispanic and non-Hispanic 
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blacks.  In those years, we include both Hispanic and non-Hispanic blacks in “black.”  In 
2000, respondents were allowed to report more than one race.  Those reporting more than 
one race were counted in an “other race” category. 
 
hispanic: the percent of the district population whose reported ethnicity was Hispanic.  
The 1970 and 1980 census files do not categorize Hispanics in the same manner as the 
1990 and 2000 census files do.  Certain assumptions had to be made about the 
categorization of Hispanic individuals in the 1970 and 1980 census to compute this 
variable (see Harris (1999), pp. 6-7 for details). 
 
white: the percent of the district population whose reported race was white.  In 2000, only 
Hispanic and non-Hispanic whites reporting one race are counted as “white.” 
 
nonwhite: calculated as 1 – percent non-Hispanic white.  Here again, certain assumptions 
had to be made about the classification of Hispanic individuals in the 1970 and 1980 
census. 
 
dropouts, hsgrad, somecol, colgrad: the percent of the district population 25 and older 
that dropped out of high school, completed a high school diploma only, completed some 
college, or received a college degree or higher (respectively).  These variables were 
reported consistently across census years, except in 1990, where the educational 
attainment variables apply to adults aged 20 and older. 
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hhwkids: the percent of households in the district with children.  In 1970, this variable 
was calculated as: (count of families with children under 18)/(count of families + count of 
unrelated individuals).106  In 1980, this variable was calculated as: (count of households 
with 3+ children)/(total households).107  The 1990 and 2000 calculation is the true 
fraction of households with children under 18. 
 
sdp65_: the share of the total district population that is aged 65 or older. 
 
sdp0_19: the share of the total district population that is aged 0—19. 
 
urban: the percent of the district population living within an urban area. 
 
pforborn: the percent of the district population that is foreign born.108 
 
owner: the percent of housing units in the district that are owner-occupied. 
 
pmobile: the percent of the district population aged five and up whose county of 
residence in 1965/75/85/95 differed from that in 1970/80/90/00.   
                                                 
106 “Households” may contain families, or unrelated individuals.  “Families” are defined 
in the 1970 census as households containing two or more related individuals.  Thus, the 
total number of households in 1970 is simply the sum of families and unrelated 
individuals. 
107 It was not possible to determine how many households contain children in 1980, so it 
was assumed that all households with three or more persons contained children. 




Note: these enrollment counts are not used to calculate per-pupil revenues (see Section 
B.4).  They are, however, used as weights in weighted regressions and summary 
statistics. 
 
enroll: the count of K-12 students in the district enrolled in public schools.  For all 
1970—1990 observations, this count comes directly from the census files.  To obtain 
public enrollment counts in 2000, we used the Common Core of Data: Public 
Elementary/Secondary Universe Survey File 2000-2001, aggregating all K-12 students 
across schools to the district level. 
 
enrkg_8: the count of K-8 students in the district enrolled in public schools.  See enroll 
for the source of this variable. 
 
enr9_12: the count of grade 9-12 students in the district enrolled in public schools.  See 
enroll for the source of this variable. 
 
pvtenrl: the count of K-12 students in the district enrolled in private schools.  As with 
enroll, all 1970—1990 observations were taken directly from the census files.  Private 
school enrollment counts were not, however, provided in the 2000 Census School District 
Tabulation.  Instead, we were able to approximate these counts by mapping census tracts 
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to school districts and aggregating across tracts.  See below for a more detailed 
explanation. 
 
pvtkg_8: the count of K-8 students in the district enrolled in private schools.  See pvtenrl 
for the source of this variable. 
 
pvt9_12: the count of grade 9-12 students in the district enrolled in private schools.  See 
pvtenrl for the source of this variable. 
 
frpriv: the fraction of K-12 students in the district enrolled in private schools. For 1970—
1990 observations, this variable is calculated as (pvtenrl/(enroll + pvtenrl)), using 
enrollment counts from the census files.  However, as mentioned above, pvtenrl was not 
available in the 2000 census tables.  Thus, for 2000 observations we calculated frpriv 
using this formula, but instead used the aggregated census tract enrollment counts for 
both enroll and pvtenrl, to avoid using enrollment counts from two different data sources 
in one variable calculation. 
 
ttlenrl: the sum of public and private enrollment in the district (enroll + pvtenrl). 
 
Family or Household Income 
medfminc: median family income in the district in 1969/79/89/99.  This variable was 
reported in all census years except 1970.  In that year, we compute median family income 
using the distributional assumptions discussed in Section B.3. 
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rmfminc: real median family income in the district in 1969/79/89/99 (median family 
income expressed in 1992 dollars).  This variable was computed as: medfminc/cpi2, 
where cpi2 takes the values of 0.262, 0.517, 0.884, and 1.187 in 1969, 1979, 1989, and 
1999 (respectively).  See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2003). 
 
inc1—incN: counts of families whose income in 1969/79/89/99 fell into each of N income 
groups.  As described in greater detail in Section B.3, these counts are used to estimate 
the parameters of an assumed income distribution in each district.  N=15, 17, 25, and 16 
in the 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses, respectively.  See Table B.3 for a list of the 
specific income categories in each census year. 
 
inpov: the fraction of households with income in 1969/79/89/99 below the poverty line. 
 
 Computing private school enrollment counts for 2000 was one of the more 
challenging tasks of this dataset compilation.  Because the 2000 Census of Population 
and Housing School District Tabulation (STP2) failed to include a table reporting public 
and private school enrollments by grade, we instead used the following procedure to 
estimate private school enrollment for 2000.109 
                                                 
109 The 2000 School District Tabulation does include one table (PCT23) that reports 
school enrollment for males and females age three and older, by various age categories: 
3-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-17, 18-19, etc., with no public-private distinction.  Together with the 
total K-12 public enrollment counts taken from the Common Core, it would be possible 
to use the residual (census enrollment – CCD public enrollment) as an estimate of the 
number of children enrolled in private school.  This would, however, require the use of 
two different data sources in the construction of one variable, as well as critical 
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 First, we obtained public and private K-12 enrollment for every census tract in the 
United States, from the 2000 Census Summary File 3.110  These tracts were then mapped 
into school districts using census tract and unified school district cartographic boundary 
files provided by the Census Bureau.111  Using ArcInfo GIS software, these boundary 
files were overlaid and merged, creating thousands of tract-district intersections (see 
Figure B.1 for an illustration using census tracts and school districts in the Lawrence, 
Kansas area). 
 While census tracts are almost always smaller than school districts, they are not 
necessarily contained entirely within the boundaries of one school district.  In cases 
where census tracts crossed school district boundaries, we allocated total public and 
private school enrollment to school districts based on the fraction of the census tract land 
area residing in each district (in Figure B.1, for example, Census tract 0014 lies in at least 
five different school districts).   
 Of course, this method has some obvious problems.  To provide a simple 
example, suppose that 10 percent of a large census tract lies in District A, while 90 
percent of the same tract lies in District B.  Allocating enrollment by land area would 
place 10 percent of the total enrollment in A and 90 percent in B.  This method only 
works well when the population is uniformly distributed over the census tract.  If, say, the 
10 percent region were a densely populated urban area, and the 90 percent region were a 
                                                                                                                                                 
assumptions about the fraction of five-year olds in kindergarten and the fraction of 15-17 
and 18-19 year olds in secondary school.   
110 Summary File 3 contains estimates of public and private school enrollment, based on 
responses to a 1-in-6 sample of households (the Census long-form questionnaire). 
111 These boundary files can be downloaded from http://www.census.gov/geo/www/cob/ 
bdy_files.html (access date August 9, 2003). 
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rural or mountainous area, we would clearly be understating enrollment in A and 
overstating enrollment in B.  Without the help of smaller geographic units—like census 
block group—this problem seems to be unavoidable.112 
 Fortunately, the most densely populated census tracts are located in urban areas, 
are quite small in land area, and typically are contained in one and only one district; tracts 
that traverse boundaries are more frequently located in large, sparsely populated rural 
areas.  The measurement error in our private school variable, then, is likely to be highest 
in those districts with the smallest populations.  The use of enrollment weights in most of 
our regressions in chapter three should thus ameliorate at least some of the effects of this 
measurement error, where it exists.  We also benefit from the coterminous boundaries of 
school districts and counties in certain Mid-Atlantic and Southern states like Maryland, 
Virginia, and Georgia.  In these cases, where school districts are typically operated by 
county governments, census tracts almost always lie within one and only one district. 
  
B.3 Heterogeneity and Income Inequality Measures 
 Measures of population heterogeneity and income inequality within school 
districts are calculated using data from the 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 census files 
described in Section B.2.  Our indices of race and schooling heterogeneity are simple 
fractionalization indices, i.e. one minus the sum of the squared shares of J different race 
or K different educational attainment categories (or, one minus a Herfindahl index based 
on these shares): 
                                                 
112 Census data and cartographic boundary files are indeed available at the block group 
level.  We have not yet attempted to map block groups to tracts—however, the use of 


















where sjit and skit are the shares of race group j or education category k in school district i 
in census year t.  Both of these indices can take on values from zero to one, with values 
closer to one representing greater heterogeneity (a value of zero would indicate perfect 
homogeneity).  The race and education categories we use are defined as follows: 
 
race categories: white, black, Asian/Pacific Islander (API), and “other.”  We were 
limited to these four race categories because of the inconsistencies in race reporting 
across census years. In the 1970 Census, we include in the API category Japanese, 
Chinese, and Filipino.  American Indians and individuals of any other race are counted in 
the "other" category.  For the 1980 Census, we count Japanese, Chinese, Filipino, 
Korean, Asian Indian, Vietnamese, Hawaiian, Guamian, Samoan, and “Other 
Asian/Pacific Islanders” in the API category, and Eskimo, Aleutian, American Indian, 
“Race NEC Spanish,” and “Race NEC not Spanish” in “other.”  In 1990, race was 
defined using the five categories white, black, API, other, and American Indian, who we 
combined with “other.”  The 2000 Census data uses the same categorization as 1990, 
except for the possibility that individuals may report more than one race.  Those reporting 
two or more races in 2000 were counted as “other.” 
 
education categories: fraction of the district population 25 and older who are high school 
dropouts, high school graduates only, recipients of some college, or college graduates and 
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higher.  These categories were reported consistently across Census years, except in 1990, 
where the educational attainment variables apply to adults aged 20 and older. 
 
 There are no measures of income inequality reported by the Census at the school 
district level.  As mentioned in Section B.2, the Census does report counts of families (or 
households) in various income categories in each district (inc1 - incN above), as well as 
the median and total family (or household) income.  Given aggregate income in each 
income group, one could compute an approximate Gini coefficient using simple 
procedures like those outlined in Gastwirth (1972), but these group aggregates are 
unfortunately not available.  It is possible, however, to generate measures of within-
district inequality by assuming a functional form for the distribution of income in each 
district, using the grouped income data to estimate the parameters of this distribution, and 
then using this distribution to compute common measures of income inequality.  We use 
such a procedure—but it was necessary to first agree upon an appropriate income 
distribution. 
Economists have experimented with literally dozens of distribution functions for 
income.  The lognormal distribution, for example, is commonly thought to closely 
approximate the shape of the income distribution in the United States.  In an article in 
Econometrica, McDonald (1984) examined a large number of one to four parameter 
distributions in order to assess their ability to fit the U.S. income distribution.  Among 
these he included the popular lognormal, gamma, beta, and Pareto distributions—many of 
which were shown to be special cases of “generalized beta” distributions.  As might be 
expected, the four-parameter generalized beta distribution provided a better fit than 
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almost all other distributions, but its lack of a closed-form representation for its moments 
makes it quite difficult to estimate in practice.  Among the three-parameter models, 
McDonald concluded that the Dagum (1977, 1980) distribution—a re-parameterization of 
the Burr Type III distribution—outperformed all other three-parameter models (and even 
some four-parameter models), at least for U.S. family income in 1970-1980.  These 
results suggest that the Dagum distribution would be a good candidate for our estimation 
procedure, and we implement it as described below.   
For a random variable z, the cumulative distribution function for the three-
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(where β(*) is the complete beta function). 
Given this distribution, K+1 income groups, and NK+1 families in each group, the 
probability that a family falls in group k is Pr(k; a, b, p).  For the lowest income group 
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To estimate the parameters a, b, and p, we write the log-likelihood function as: 








k pbakN  
and estimate values for a, b, and p using maximum likelihood.  According to McDonald 
(1984), “the estimators obtained by maximizing the multinomial likelihood function will 
be asymptotically efficient relative to other estimators based on grouped data; however, 
they will be less efficient than maximum likelihood estimators based on individual 
observations.”  With parameter estimates for a, b, and p, Dagum (1980) showed that the 
Gini coefficient can be calculated simply as: 








 We estimated the parameters a, b, and p for every school district in our panel, for 
1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000.  We then calculated gini coefficients for each district using 
(9).  Various centiles of the income distribution were also estimated with these 
parameters, to generate several other measures of inequality in the income distribution 
(log95_50, log50_5, log95_5, and so on). 
 As one check of this procedure, we aggregated our counts of families in each 
school district income category to the state level for 1970, 1980, and 1990, estimated 
state-specific parameter values using our maximum likelihood procedure, and computed 
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state-specific estimates of the Gini coefficient.  We then compared our results to the 
actual Gini coefficients reported by the Census for each state (which they produce using 
individual family-level data from their one-in-six sample).113  The results for 1970 and 
1990 are plotted in Figure B.2 (panels a and b, respectively).  The maximum likelihood 
model seems to do remarkably well at the state level—the correlation coefficient between 
our estimated state Ginis and the actual Ginis in 1970, 1980 and 1990 are 0.998, 0.996, 
and 0.980, respectively. 
 Because school districts are much smaller than states, we were also interested in 
seeing how this procedure would perform in smaller geographic areas.  Using the same 
maximum likelihood procedure, we estimated county-specific parameters of the Dagum 
distribution for 1970, 1980 and 1990.  While the Census does not report Gini coefficients 
at the county level, they do report several other aggregate measures of the income 
distribution.  For example, in 1990 the Census reports the fraction of families in each 
county earning $50,000 or more.  We compared these fractions to the same fraction 
calculated with our estimated Dagum parameters (i.e. 1 – F(50,000; a,b,p))—again, the 
correlation between these values is quite high—0.996 for 1990.  Analagously, we 
calculated average family income in each county using the moment generating function 
for the Dagum distribution, and compared these to the average family income reported by 
the Census—the correlation between the actual and predicted values in this case was 
0.997.  Overall, it appears our maximum likelihood procedure performs remarkably well. 
 
 
                                                 
113 State Gini coefficients for 2000 had not been released as of this writing. 
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B.4 Financial Data 
Data on per-pupil revenues were extracted from the electronic files of the Census 
of Governments School System Finance (F33) Files for 1972, 1982, 1992, and 2001.114  
These files included 15,780 observations in 1972, 16,457 in 1982, 16,236 in 1992 and 
15,470 in 2001; however—like the Census demographic data—not all of these 
observations are operating unified K-12 districts.115  Key variables in our panel that were 
extracted from these datasets are defined below: 
 
r_fed: school district revenues obtained from the federal government (typically funds 
targeted for specific programs or students—bilingual or special education funds, for 
example). 
 
r_state: school district revenues obtained from the district’s state government (also 
includes funds targeted towards specific programs—special and gifted education, or 
school lunch and transportation programs, for example). 
 
r_local: school district revenues raised at the local level, through property taxes, sales 
taxes, interest earnings, special fees and contributions, and the like.   
                                                 
114 With the exception of the 2001 file, the Census of Government surveys were the 
closest to our years of demographic data.  Beginning in 1992 the F-33 survey of school 
finances began to be administered on an annual basis.  For consistency with earlier years’ 
data, we used 2000-01 data instead of 1999-2000 data (the 2002 survey was not available 
as of this writing). 
115 Dependent school districts (those operated by a higher level of government) were not 
included in the 1972 file.  For these districts, financial data was pulled from other sources 
(see Harris (1999) for details). 
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r_total: the sum of federal, state, and local district revenues.  Long-term debt issued 
during the fiscal year is not counted in district revenues. 
 
cogenrl: the count of K-12 students enrolled in the district in the fall of 1971, 1981, 1991, 
and 2000.  This enrollment count will not necessarily be equal to that reported in the 
Census (where it was reported in all years except 2000, as discussed in Section B.3).  
 
frevp: real federal revenues per pupil in 1972/82/92/01 (federal revenues per pupil 
expressed in 1992 dollars), calculated as: (r_fed / cogenrl) / slpi, where slpi is a state and 
local expenditure price index that takes the values of 0.279, 0.611, 1.0, and 1.323 in 
1972, 1982, 1992, and 2001, respectively (see U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(2003)).  We used the Census of Governments enrollment variable (cogenrl) in this 
calculation instead of the Census data enrollment (enroll) to avoid using two different 
data sources in the calculation of one variable. 
 
srevp: real state revenues per pupil in 1972/82/92/01 (state revenues per pupil expressed 
in 1992 dollars), calculated analogously to frevp. 
 
lrevp: real local revenues per pupil in 1972/82/92/01 (local revenues per pupil expressed 
in 1992 dollars), calculated analogously to frevp. 
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trevp: real total revenues per pupil in 1972/82/92/01 (total revenues per pupil expressed 
in 1992 dollars), calculated analogously to frevp. 
 




B.5 Instrumental and District Competition Variables 
 Concerned about the endogeneity of within-district income inequality changes 
over time, we used several different variables in chapter three to instrument for this 
inequality measure.  These included the Gini coefficient of the closest school district 
(ivdag_c1), that of the closest district in another county (ivdag_c2), and finally the Gini 
coefficient of the closest district in another state (ivdag_c3).   
To determine the identity of the school district closest to each district in our panel, 
we consulted the NCES Common Core of Data: Local Education Area Universe Survey 
2000-01 and obtained the zip code for every school district’s headquarters in 2000.  We 
then calculated the distance from each district’s zip code centroid to the zip code centroid 
of every other U.S. school district headquarters, and captured the identity (closest1, 
closest2 and closest3) and distance to (milesto1, milesto2 and milesto3) the closest 
district, closest district in another county, and closest district in another state.116  Due to 
                                                 
116 Mappings from zip codes to centroid latitudes and longitudes are available from many 
sources.  We used ZipList5, a commercially available dataset, downloadable at 
http://www.zipinfo.com/products/products.htm (access date August 9, 2003). 
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the limited availability of Gini coefficients for all U.S. districts, we restricted our search 
to the closest district that was also in our panel.    
 We also used a distance calculation procedure similar to that used above to 
generate measures of the degree of local school district choice, or, the availability of 
other public school alternatives within a designated region.  As we did with our 
instrumental variables, we relied on the Common Core of Data: Local Education Area 
Universe Survey 2000-01 to generate these measures, as we describe below: 
 
dists10, dists25, dists50: the number of public school districts in 2000 within 10, 25, and 
50 miles of the zip code of the district’s headquarters.  The higher are these measures—
all else equal—the more public school district options the typical household has. 
 
frac10, frac25, frac50: the fraction of total K-12 public enrollment within 10, 25, and 50 
miles enrolled in this district.  When a district is the only school district within 10, 25, or 
50 miles, these variables will take a value of one.  As a district becomes a less significant 
portion of regional enrollment (perhaps representing more competition, but possibly just 
representing greater concentration in one or more other districts) these variables will 
approach zero.   
 
enrlfrac: a fractionalization index of school district competition based on enrollment 
shares (calculated for MSA districts only).  One can interpret this index as the probability 
that a randomly selected student placed in a randomly selected district will end up in a 
district that is different from her own.  This measure takes a value of zero if a region 
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consists of only one district.  With Nm students enrolled in J public school districts in 




















schlfrac: a fractionalization index of school district competition based on school shares 
(calculated for MSA districts only).  This index is calculated like enrlfrac, except that  Nm 
would represent the total number of schools in metropolitan area m, and Njm the number 
of schools in district j. 
 
diststud: the number of public school districts per student in a metropolitan area 
(calculated for MSA districts only). 
 
For our regressions, we calculate each district’s quintile of local school district 
competition based on each of these measures.  In all MSA district regressions, these 
quintiles are based only upon those districts residing in metropolitan areas (most districts 
in MSAs by definition would likely be in the top quintiles of district competition if we 
were to base these quintiles on the entire distribution of districts). 
 
comp1, comp2, comp3: the district’s quintile in the panel-wide distribution of dists10, 
dists25, and dists50.  (comp1m – comp3m are quintiles based on these distributions across 
MSA districts only).  For example, if for one district comp1=1, that district is in the 
lowest quintile of district competition (based on dists10) among all districts.    
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comp4, comp5, comp6: the district’s quintile in the panel-wide distribution of frac10, 
frac25, and frac50.  (comp4m – comp6m are quintiles based on these distributions across 
MSA districts only).  For example, if comp5m=2, that district is in the second quintile of 
district competition (based on frac25) among all districts residing in MSAs. 
 
compenrl: the district’s quintile in the distribution of enrlfrac across MSA districts only.  
For example, if for one district compenrl=3, that district is in the third quintile of district 
competition (based on enrlfrac) among all districts residing in MSAs. 
 
compschl: the district’s quintile in the distribution of schlfrac across MSA districts only.  
For example, if for one district compschl=4, that district is in the fourth quintile of 
district competition (based on schlfrac) among all districts residing in MSAs. 
 
compd: the district’s quintile in the distribution of diststud across MSA districts only.  
For example, if for one district compd=2, that district is in the second quintile of district 
competition (based on districts per student) among all districts residing in MSAs. 
 
Table B.4 provides summary statistics for each of the closest district and district 
competition measures described above, for both the full sample and MSA subsample.  
 
B.6 Panel Assembly and Conclusion 
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School districts in the demographic and finance files were matched in one of two 
ways—using a unique NCES ID code, or—if necessary—by hand.117  The matching of 
2000 private school enrollment data from the Census tract files, or public enrollment 
from the CCD was accomplished in a similar fashion.  Except in cases of district mergers 
or splits (discussed below), the vast majority of districts were easily matched by NCES 
ID, at least in 1980/82, 1990/92, and 2000/01.  In 1970/72, the demographic and finance 
files used different identifying codes for school districts.  For most of these 1970/72 
observations, it was possible to obtain a match by first matching each district to its 1982 
counterpart (using a unique Census of Governments ID) and then capturing the 1980 
NCES ID for use in 1970.  Districts that were manually matched were done so using 
district names, grade spans, enrollment, county, or any other field that might aid in 
obtaining matches across datasets.   
While none of the districts in our panel were involved in a consolidation before 
1990, a sizeable number of districts in the panel (124) were part of a consolidation 
between 1990 and 2000.118  Most of these were the result of a wave of rural school 
district consolidations in Minnesota (40) and Iowa (40); we consulted Minnesota House 
of Representatives (2003) and Iowa Department of Education (2003) for lists of specific 
consolidations in these states.  Following Hoxby (1996) and Harris (1999), we 
                                                 
117 A detailed description of the matching process and outcome for the 1970-1990 data is 
provided in Harris (1999).  The NCES ID code is a seven-digit number, with the first two 
digits corresponding to the state FIPS code, and the last five digits corresponding to the 
NCES number for that district, in that state. 
118 In the original version of this panel dataset (which included elementary- and 
secondary-only districts, as well as unified), Harris (1999) identified 122 districts that 
were involved in mergers or splits between 1980 and 1990, as well as 39 that were part of 
a merger or split between 1970 and 1980.  None of these districts appear in this version of 
the panel.  
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“preconsolidated” districts who took part in a school district consolidation by summing or 
taking weighted averages of all variables across these districts (where the use of sums or 
weighted averages is applied where appropriate).  There was only one school district split 
between 1990 and 2000—the affected districts were dropped in this case.  
In the end, our full sample panel contains 34,796 district/year observations, with 
8,699 in each year.  From this full sample, we created a subsample of 3,292 unified 
districts (13,168 total district/year observations) that reside in a county that was 
determined to be part of a metropolitan area in 1973.119   
 
                                                 
119 As urban boundaries extend over time, new counties will meet Census Bureau criteria 
for inclusion in a metropolitan area.  We wanted to ensure that all of the districts in our 
MSA subsample had been considered to be in a metro area for the entire sample period. 
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Figure B.1: Matching 2000 Census Tracts to School Districts—Example of Lawrence, 






Figure B.2a: Estimated Gini Coefficient vs. Actual Census Gini Coefficient Based on 






























Figure B.2b: Estimated Gini Coefficient vs. Actual Census Gini Coefficient Based on 
























Table B.1: Number of School Districts in Original Census Files by Type and Year 
 
     
 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Unified 9,508 11,239 11,263 10,692
Elementary only 1,547 3,903 3,165 2,867
Secondary only 464 602 561 462
Other or invalid (includes DC, HI, NYC) 168 296 298 383
  
Total 11,687 16,040 15,287 14,404
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Table B.2: Unified and Total Districts Across States in Census Data and Panel, by Year 
 
        
 Unified Districts  Total Districts     
 




% of unified 
districts in 
panel, 2000 
% of all 
districts in 
panel 
AK 14 50 54 53  14 52 54 53   0.00 0.00 
AL 115 125 131 128  118 126 132 128  111 0.87 0.87 
AR 287 369 329 310  288 371 329 310  243 0.78 0.78 
AZ 5 74 139 104  153 217 222 210  32 0.31 0.15 
CA 248 278 278 349  700 1,026 821 984  207 0.59 0.21 
CO 111 178 175 176  111 181 176 176  109 0.62 0.62 
CT 109 110 113 166  152 165 166 166  105 0.63 0.63 
DE 22 14 16 15  23 16 16 16  11 0.73 0.69 
FL 67 67 67 67  67 67 67 67  67 1.00 1.00 
GA 185 181 188 174  187 187 189 180  168 0.97 0.93 
IA 426 443 430 374  426 443 430 374  360 0.96 0.96 
ID 83 106 112 107  83 115 112 113  81 0.76 0.72 
IL 430 448 427 406  937 1,012 958 890  351 0.86 0.39 
IN 268 290 294 291  275 299 303 292  250 0.86 0.86 
KS 281 306 304 303  281 307 304 304  271 0.89 0.89 
KY 184 175 178 171  186 180 178 176  170 0.99 0.97 
LA 66 66 67 66  66 66 67 66  64 0.97 0.97 
MA 185 231 202 207  308 403 329 295  179 0.86 0.61 
MD 24 24 24 24  24 24 24 24  24 1.00 1.00 
ME 70 168 266 111  99 287 291 224  61 0.55 0.27 
MI 508 529 527 524  510 575 561 554  493 0.94 0.89 
MN 399 434 436 327  399 437 436 341  305 0.93 0.89 
MO 394 454 452 449  402 547 541 522  378 0.84 0.72 
MS 149 151 151 147  149 151 151 149  141 0.96 0.95 
MT   1 55  103 553 536 447   0.00 0.00 
NC 151 144 136 117  151 144 136 118  96 0.82 0.81 
ND 108 265 224 170  108 330 282 226  97 0.57 0.43 
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NE 168 294 278 259  183 1,016 828 569  153 0.59 0.27 
NH 42 84 83 64  65 169 170 159  35 0.55 0.22 
NJ 188 229 232 213  472 582 576 550  155 0.73 0.28 
NM 67 88 88 89  68 89 88 89  63 0.71 0.71 
NV 14 16 17 17  14 17 17 17  14 0.82 0.82 
NY 641 664 695 636  682 716 709 682  598 0.94 0.88 
OH 610 612 612 610  611 615 612 611  596 0.98 0.98 
OK 308 451 453 429  312 614 605 542  292 0.68 0.54 
OR 118 157 181 176  169 312 300 195  114 0.65 0.58 
PA 502 504 501 498  503 504 501 500  480 0.96 0.96 
RI 28 31 31 31  38 40 37 36  27 0.87 0.75 
SC 93 92 91 86  93 92 92 86  84 0.98 0.98 
SD 145 191 184 172  147 196 184 176  133 0.77 0.76 
TN 122 121 123 122  140 142 139 137  109 0.89 0.80 
TX 728 1,069 976 974  735 1,070 1,054 1,038  699 0.72 0.67 
UT 38 40 40 40  38 40 40 40  38 0.95 0.95 
VA 128 139 136 135  129 139 138 135  124 0.92 0.92 
VT 27 60 55 35  97 274 259 230  22 0.63 0.10 
WA 203 244 290 246  212 299 296 295  195 0.79 0.66 
WI 357 372 372 368  395 433 429 426  309 0.84 0.73 
WV 55 55 55 55  55 55 55 55  54 0.98 0.98 
WY 37 46 49 46   41 49 49 48  33 0.72 0.69 
Total 9,508 11,239 11,263 10,692  11,519 15,744 14,989 14,021  8,701 0.81 0.62 
                     
 
Source: 1970 Census of Population and Housing Special Fifth-Count Tallies, the 1980 Census of Population and Housing Summary 
Tape File 3F, the 1990 Census School District Special Tabulation, and the 2000 Census of Population and Housing School District 
Tabulation (STP2).  Excludes DC, HI, PR, and NYC education areas.  
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Table B.3: Income Ranges for Census Family Income Categories 
 
 
1970 Census (15 categories): 
   under $1000   $8000 – 9000  
   $1000 – 2000   $9000 – 10000  
   $2000 – 3000   $10000 – 12000 
   $3000 – 4000   $12000 – 15000 
   $4000 – 5000   $15000 – 25000  
   $5000 – 6000   $25000 – 50000 
   $6000 – 7000   over $50000 
   $7000 – 8000 
 
1980 Census (17 categories): 
   under $2500   $25000 – 27500 
   $2500 – 5000   $27500 – 30000 
   $5000 – 7500    $30000 – 35000 
   $7500 – 10000   $35000 – 40000 
   $10000 – 12500   $40000 – 50000 
   $12500 – 15000  $50000 – 75000 
   $15000 – 17500   over $75000 
   $20000 – 22500 
   $22500 – 25000 
 
1990 Census (25 categories): 
   under $5000   $40000 – 42500 
   $5000 – 10000   $42500 – 45000 
   $10000 – 12500  $45000 – 47500 
   $15000 – 17500  $47500 – 50000 
   $17500 – 20000  $50000 – 55000 
   $20000 – 22500  $55000 – 60000 
   $22500 – 25000  $60000 – 75000 
   $25000 – 27500  $75000 – 100000 
   $27500 – 30000  $100000 – 125000 
   $30000 – 32500  $125000 – 150000 
   $32500 – 35000  over $150000 
   $35000 – 37500 
   $37500 – 40000 
 
2000 Census (17 categories): 
   under $10000   $60000 – 75000 
   $10000 – 15000  $75000 – 100000 
   $15000 – 20000  $100000 – 125000 
   $25000 – 30000  $125000 – 150000 
   $30000 – 35000  $150000 – 200000 
   $35000 – 40000  over $200000 
   $40000 – 45000 
   $45000 – 50000 
   $50000 – 60000 
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Table B.4: Summary Statistics for Closest District and School Competition Variables 
 
              





















Miles to nearest district 9.4 7.3 0.0 8.2 110.5 6.0 5.1 0.0 5.1 100.3
Miles to nearest district in another county 13.7 8.2 1.2 12.2 110.5 10.7 6.7 1.2 9.3 100.3
Miles to nearest district in another state 58.1 52.9 2.0 43.3 430.2 57.2 58.0 2.0 39.5 390.3
  
Number of districts within 10 miles 5.0 10.4 0 2 111 11.0 14.9 0 6 111
Number of districts within 25 miles 27.9 39.0 0 15 284 53.2 52.9 0 34 284
Number of districts within 50 miles 92.3 100.3 4 60 596 155.3 130.6 1 117 596
  
Fraction of enrollment within 10 miles in 
this district 
0.52 0.38 0.01 0.44 1.0 0.28 0.30 0.00 0.15 1.0
Fraction of enrollment within 25 miles in 
this district 
0.12 0.19 0.00 0.05 1.0 0.06 0.13 0.00 0.02 1.0
Fraction of enrollment within 50 miles in 
this district 
0.03 0.08 0.00 0.01 1.0 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.01 1.0
  
Enrollment fractionalization index  0.86 0.15 0 0.91 0.99
School fractionalization index  0.87 0.13 0 0.92 0.99
Districts per student  0.0003 0.0002 0 0.0003 0.0015
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